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Abstract 
This thesis examines the use of the term Heimat in the political discourse of Austria’s 
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ). The concept of Heimat has long described the 
collective identity and cultural rapport between German-speaking groups, as well as 
the strong feelings of affection one has for their ‘home’ and native environment. With 
the advent of European nationalism during the nineteenth century, however, Heimat 
gained a political dimension through which it was possible to dictate normative 
features of national identity. Heimat is therefore explored in this dissertation as a pre-
established concept that has been appropriated by the FPÖ in order to discursively 
construct an Austrian national identity narrative that suits its anti-immigration policies 
and Right-Wing populist parochialisms. Right-Wing Austrian political parties are 
well known for using emotive imagery in an inflammatory way to polarize opinion, 
and a deconstruction of their materials through the lens of Heimat provides an original 
and substantial contribution to cultural studies. Central to my investigation is an 
analysis of the FPÖ’s Right-Wing populist Heimat imaginary, which is used by the 
party to outline its definition of the Austrian nation, community, culture, and identity. 
A recurring theme in the FPÖ’s Heimat discourse is the notion of a ‘homeland’ that 
positions ‘the people’ as a central native community. This dissertation accordingly 
attempts to discover how Right-Wing populist Heimat discourse can affect 
perceptions of Austria’s character as a nation. These perceptions influence the way 
Austria should look and feel, which collective identities and cultural manifestations 
are considered to be normative in the national identity narrative, and which physical 
landscapes typify the topography of the nation.  
The final objective of this dissertation is to investigate these features of 
Heimat as examples of an idealised sense of community that is constructed around 
ethnocentric nationalism and monoculturalism. The dissertation consequently 
provides empirical evidence to demonstrate how the term Heimat is used by the FPÖ 
to construct a national identity narrative that gains voter support while also contesting 
the increased foreign migration to Austria and Europe. This thesis examines how the 
FPÖ uses the term Heimat to counter what the party identifies as a rupture of 
community, the diminishing sense of an identity of place, and loss of collective 
national identity, all of which has supposedly arisen from a sense of alienation caused 
by modern globalisation and the resultant push for cultural and societal diversification 
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and pluralism in Western democracies. As an important identity concept in the FPÖ’s 
rhetoric, Heimat is explored in this thesis through the dominant lenses of landscape, 
language, history and mythology. These categories of analysis are integral to 
understanding the FPÖ’s definition of Heimat, and therefore require thematic 
examination in individual chapters. My study draws on the FPÖ’s political 
programmes, literature, speeches, photographs, websites, and social media. The 
inquiries that are addressed in the thesis are motivated by three overarching research 
questions:  
(1) How is the physical landscape of Heimat defined in Right-Wing populist
discourse, and how does it resonate with the native Austrian population?
(2) Which demographic is ‘at home’ in this image of Heimat, and how is their
identity defined?
(3) Which social groups are either marginalised or denied membership in this
narrative?
A resolution to these inquiries offers a unique insight into what it means to be 
Austrian from a contemporary Right-Wing populist perspective. 
To date, no systematic investigation has considered the role of national 
identity politics in Austria while also taking into account the current refugee and 
migrant crisis facing modern Europe. The political dominance of the Centre-Leftist 
parties continues to wane throughout Western democracies, and with it comes the 
resurgence of Far Right attitudes and the rising popularity of Right-Wing populist 
political blocs. This thesis examines how the FPÖ’s populist Heimat discourse targets 
the fear many Austrian citizens hold about the preservation of their traditional 
national identity and image of the nation. It shows how the party then exploits these 
anxieties in order to question the validity of the governing multiculturalism narrative 
by attempting to discredit the idea that one can import large numbers of foreign 
cultural groups and have no societal problems as a result. This thesis thus discovers 
how the concept of ‘Heimat’ functions as an imaginary cultural border that enforces a 
frontier between a national ‘us’ and a foreign ‘them’ in the FPÖ’s political strategy. 
1	  
Introduction 
This thesis investigates the FPÖ’s Heimat discourse as a discursive construction of 
Austrian national identity. The thesis attempts to further understand what it means to 
be a ‘genuine’ Austrian from the perspective of the nation’s most powerful Right-
Wing populist party. The principal ‘features’ that establish the FPÖ’s Heimat 
discourse are separated into the categories of physical and human landscapes, which 
in synthesis demonstrate the party’s national identity narrative. As with any national 
identity formula, the FPÖ’s espousal of a divisive ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ dichotomy is 
simultaneously investigated as a result of the party’s Heimat rhetoric. The dissertation 
therefore draws additional attention to the FPÖ’s exclusion of minorities, asylum 
seekers, or Islamic migrants, as well as their belief that Austrian society is in peril 
from the agents of globalisation and the conflation of too many foreign cultural 
groups and ethnicities. In a social climate where the populations of European nations 
are beginning to feel anxiety towards the intensified fluctuations of migrants and 
asylum seekers to the continent, this thesis attempts to gain insight into how native 
Austrians are defined by the FPÖ, and how that national identity is allegedly 
jeopardised by outside groups. The intent of this dissertation is to therefore 
deconstruct the FPÖ’s definition of Heimat, and investigate its individual features as 
part of a distinct political strategy to perpetuate localised nativism alongside a policy 
of foreign exclusion.  
The party’s Heimat platform, it will be argued, allows the FPÖ to define the 
Austrian homeland and collective national identity through an allegory of shared 
cultural features and natural landscapes that are claimed to be unique to the Austrian 
people and their homeland. This insular view of identity and homeland, it will be 
shown, is largely inaccessible to other socio-cultural groups, or is in fact largely 
denied them by the FPÖ. This thesis aims to show that by its very design, the FPÖ’s 
anti-immigration strategy seeks to strengthen the borders of the nation from 
‘outsiders’, while also reinforcing a strict view on Austrian identity that is informed 
by a compendium of culture, traditions, and other features of identity that are believed 
to be pure, autochthonous, and in peril from the forces of globalisation and the 
increasing number of migrants to both the frontiers of Europe and in Austria itself.  
To investigate the general negative reaction to increased migration fluxes and 
globalisation in Austria, this thesis draws on Right-Wing populist parochialisms as 
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the inspiration behind the FPÖ’s anti-globalist, anti-foreigner Heimat message. The 
parochial interests that inform the FPÖ’s Heimat discourse, it will be argued, are 
presented to the Austrian public in the guise of a celebration of the perceived native 
cultural characteristics of the population, all of which are linked to quintessential 
Austrian landscapes and settings. A simultaneous analysis of what features of identity 
are conversely deemed by the FPÖ to be contradictory to the sense of Heimat, and 
therefore prerequisites for exclusion or marginalisation, will also be provided. In an 
attempt to decipher the features of ‘Austrianness’ from a Right-Wing populist 
perspective, the thesis may at times appear to reject the legitimacy of a collective 
Austrian identity narrative. This is by no means the author’s intent. The line between 
the celebration of one’s culture and a descent into parochialism or notions of cultural 
or ethnic superiority is indeed ambiguous. Rather, the aim of this thesis is to critically 
analyse this fine line and identify if, or where, the FPÖ stray into a more dangerous 
exclusionary narrative. This dissertation therefore approaches Heimat as both a 
cultural construct and a politically charged concept, through which the FPÖ’s 
monocultural vision for Austria can be openly discussed and, theoretically, realised. 
The thesis is designed to demonstrate the gradual return of Right-Wing parochialisms 
into the mainstream of Western democracies, which, in the case of Austria, have been 
carefully disguised as a celebration of nativism, traditionalism, and Heimat. 
Review of relevant studies in the area 
While previous studies have parenthetically noted the emotive power of the 
term Heimat in Austrian Right-Wing populist discourse, there has been, as yet, no 
deeper analysis of how the FPÖ actually defines the features of Heimat. Some of the 
primary sources analysed in this study, furthermore, are as recent as 2016, and this 
provides added strength and relevance to the research. The prevailing refugee crisis in 
the West, and the increasing political strength of parties like the FPÖ, only further 
compound the necessity of this study. The thesis does, however, draw upon the 
authority of previous research where appropriate. For example, Ruth Wodak provides 
valuable investigations within this area, and offers some insightful judgements on the 
FPÖ’s use of the Heimat concept. For example, Wodak explains in The Politics of 
Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean that Right-Wing populist parties 
often refer to a collective homeland, which along with notions of kinship relating to 
blood and ethnicity, has to be protected against ‘dangerous’ outsiders who threaten 
	   3	  
the stability of the national ‘in’ group.1 Wodak further contests that the Austrian 
Right-Wing populist definition of Heimat is linked to the emotionally charged 
concept of fatherland, while the nation is subsequently viewed as the vessel which 
contains the extended family (the native people) who belong there by birth.2 Due to 
Right-Wing populist parties’ lengthy references to a singular people and the 
autochthonous cultural origins of the nation or homeland, Wodak also notes the 
expediency of the concept of Heimat in nationalist discourses. Wodak accordingly 
attests that Austrian Right-Wing populist parties target nationalist and conservative 
voters through the use of the Heimat concept, because this demographic responds 
favourably to the patriotic feeling of ‘togetherness’, the sense of local community, 
and the observance to the traditional or rural values of Austria that the concept 
evokes.3 Wodak further contests in ‘Anything Goes!’ – The Haiderization of Europe 
that Far Right parties have moved away from neo-fascist discourse, and refer instead 
to “the protection of – seemingly homogeneous - national identities or a ‘mythical’ 
homeland (Heimat)” while also engaging in discriminatory and exclusionary rhetoric 
towards foreign groups.4  
 In his paper Identifikationsangebote für Bürgerinnen und Bürger zweier 
Welten Bilder von der “Heimat” im Wahlkampf zum österreichischen Nationalrat, 
Pier-Paolo Pasqualoni notes that in the 2006 Nationalrat campaign Heimatrhetorik 
played an important role, with slogans like “Lust auf Heimat” and “Mut zu Heimat” 
adorning FPÖ billboards.5 Pasqualoni shows that the party’s use of Heimat allowed it 
to seize considerable political capital by politicising the term as a concept that 
included ‘all’ Austrians, while paradoxically also excluding others. Pasqualoni 
consequently attempts to define the concept of Heimat as a utility to facilitate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Wodak, Ruth. The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean. UK: Sage, 
2015. Print. 66. 
2 Wodak The Politics of Fear, 77.  
3 Wodak The Politics of Fear, 146. 
4 Wodak, Ruth. "‘Anything Goes!’ – the Haiderization of Europe " Right Wing Populism in 
Europe: Politics and Discourse. Eds. Wodak, Ruth, Majid KhosravNik and Brigitte Mral. 
London: Bloomsbury, 2013. 23 - 38. Print. 25. 
5 Pasqualoni, Pier-Paolo. "Identifikationsangebote für Bürgerinnen und Bürger zweier Welten 
Bilder von der “Heimat” im Wahlkampf zum österreichischen Nationalrat." Globalisierung 
und Gerechtigkeit : Eine transdisziplinäre Annäherung. Innsbruck: Innsbruck University 
Press, 2007. 183 - 209. Print. 183. 
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inclusion within, as well as sanction exclusion from, a group, through active political 
agitation, and this explains much about the importance of the word in Right-Wing 
populist nomenclature. To state his case, Pasqualoni refers to group identity in order 
to demonstrate that the Heimat idea has similarities with the sociological theory of 
positioning.6 When individuals, for example, empathise with their Heimat, they also 
allocate themselves a personal identity that is influenced by social collaboration 
within their group, thus ‘positioning’ in order to formulate that identity. One theory 
put forward by Pasqualoni, for example, defines personal identity as such a process: 
 
 Personal identity is one’s sense of being located in space and having a 
 position in the moral order of the little group with which one is 
 conversing. […] Selfhood is discursively produced for others by the use of 
 the first person pronoun, and at the same time is discursively produced for 
 ourselves.7 
  
Selfhood in the concept of Heimat references the space where the subject was born or 
has been located for many years. That space is then distinguished through the 
discursive arrangement of identity features that are usually derived from the 
ethnography that relates directly to the group. Pasqualoni explores the FPÖ’s 
Heimatrhetorik as a conversation about national identity and selfhood that is 
manipulated by Right-Wing populist politicians. This is seen in slogans such as “WIR 
für Österreich” which utilise personal pronouns alongside calls for “Heimat”, 
implying that the FPÖ are there to defend their own target demographic: native 
Austrians. The emotive power of the Heimat concept in personal and group identity 
formulas means the term is extremely effective in the FPÖ’s divisive brand of 
politics. As Pasqualoni notes, the FPÖ consistently warns the population to keep the 
Heimat ‘pure’, and to eternally guard it from foreign infiltration, such as from 
migration flows or hostile takeovers from globalist corporations. 8  This 
‘inclusion/exclusion’ schema allows Right-Wing populists to exemplify the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For a detailed account of positioning theory as a discursive process of identity formation see 
Davies, Bronwyn, and Rom Harre. "Positioning: The Discursive Production of Selves." 
Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 20.1 (1990). Print. 
7 Cited in Pasqualoni 185. 
8 Pasqualoni 187.  
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uniqueness of Austrians and attract an empathetic public by stressing that only the 
politicians in the FPÖ dutifully concern themselves with the local affairs of the 
people. It is also a strategy to claim either indifference for, or hostility towards, the 
interests of other groups, who are excluded by design. This thesis builds upon the 
conclusions of Pasqualoni by providing further detailed analysis of the features of 
Heimat according to the FPÖ. It will do so by providing a greater depth of primary 
sources for investigation, which will extend beyond the use of billboards and political 
slogans. 
  In their book The Discursive Construction of National Identity, Ruth Wodak, 
Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl and Karin Liebhart further cite the visceral patriotism 
the Heimat concept evokes, and its subsequent efficacy in the context of forging 
national identities. In the study, Heimat is described as a discursive concept that can 
help to facilitate a specific national identity, and is argued to be greatly important to 
‘pan-Austrian’ national identity and self-perception.9 Wodak et al quote a survey of 
what being ‘Austrian’ means, where the subjects’ close emotional relationship to 
Austria was usually formed around their understanding of Austria as ‘Heimat’.10 In 
the case study, it was found that many of those surveyed referred to their sense of 
Heimat in either a rural and traditional manner (whether in a local or national sense), 
and always with a particular reference to the deictic ‘We’ and the concept of Volk.11 
Wodak et al. also cite Jörg Haider’s persistent use of the term Heimat in reference to 
both his local Carinthia and greater Austrian national identity as a commonly held 
home that must be preserved and protected.12 This thesis also draws upon the 
relevance of Heimat as a concept that facilitates feelings of group solidarity, 
collective identity, and an inherent sense of place that is rooted to the land. However, 
while much groundwork has been laid by preceding studies, this dissertation focuses 
primarily on the features of the FPÖ’s Heimat concept, where previous research 
included the Heimat topic alongside a more general field of political inquiry. 
 Due to the efficacy of Heimat in the formation of group self-awareness and 
solidarity, previous research has also cited the concept’s use in the facilitation of anti-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Wodak, Ruth, et al. The Discursive Construction of National Identity. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2009. Print. 191. 
10 Wodak et al. The Discursive, 116. 
11 Wodak et al. The Discursive, 155. 
12 Wodak et al. The Discursive, 82. 
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foreign sentiments. There have been various relevant studies of the anti-foreigner 
message that can confound the reader regarding the innocence of the FPÖ’s Heimat 
message and the subsequent patriotism expressed by the party. Onus Kar, for 
example, argues in his study of Right-Wing populism in Austria that the FPÖ often 
use the term Heimat to encourage a sense of ‘fear’ or ‘anxiety’ directed towards 
outsiders, seen for example with the interchangeable use of “Recht auf Heimat” 
alongside “äuslandischer Socialschmarotzer” and “Import von Kriminellen.”13 This 
study, however, focuses predominantly on the reign of Jörg Haider in the years 
surrounding 1993, and therefore is not as relevant in relation to contemporary 
developments.  
 Herbert Dachs similarly cites the FPÖ’s use of Heimat in a strategy to 
depreciate all things foreign and thereby ‘protect’ national interests (which is equal to 
the sense of Heimat).14 Dachs also notes the use of Heimat in the debate surrounding 
Austria’s entry to the European Union in the FPÖ’s slogan “Ausverkauf der Heimat”, 
which implies that Austria’s national interests would be sold off to foreign 
bureaucrats in Brussels.15 Such citations document the FPÖ’s consistent use of the 
Heimat concept to stir patriotism and nationalism, while also encouraging disdain 
towards foreigners and foreign interests. The use of Heimat is therefore concluded by 
Dachs to be characterised by the more general Right-Wing populist rejection of 
immigrants and multiculturalism in Austria, characterised, for example, in the slogan 
“Recht auf Heimat – oder multikulturelle Gesellschaft”, which implies the FPÖ’s 
Heimat concept is culturally insular and incompatible with cultural or ethnic 
pluralism.16 Michał Krzyżanowski similarly cites the use of the Heimat concept in the 
FPÖ’s anti-immigration discourse, arguing that catchy slogans such as “Recht aufs 
Heimat” denotes Austrians’ entitlement to live within their own, unique Heimat, 
while also suggesting foreigners also have their own ‘right’ (or, perhaps, obligation) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Kas, Onur. Rechtspopulismus in Österreich die FPÖ als Oppositions- und 
Regierungspartei. Hamburg: Bachelor and Master Publ, 2014. Print. 24. 
14 Dachs, Herbert. "Umschmeichelte Heimat? Über Politische Instrumentalisierungversuche." 
Ferne Heimat, Nahe Fremde: Bei Dichtern und Nachdenken. Eds. Beutner, Eduard and 
Karlheinz Rossbacher. Würzburg: Verlag Königshausen & Neumann, 2008. 264 - 74. Print. 
265. 
15 Dachs 265. 
16 Dachs 265. 
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to return to their own homelands (thereby implying that they do not belong in Austria 
at all).17 
 The antagonism shown towards foreigners in the FPÖ’s Heimat discourse is 
overwhelming directed towards the Turkish or Islamic population, with numerous 
studies available that analyse the degree of Islamophobia evident in Right-Wing 
populist discourse. Dorothée de Nève, for example, refers to the use of Heimat as a 
rallying war cry in the FPÖ’s comic series Sagen aus Wien from 2010, which refers to 
historical battles between Austria and the Ottomans to demonstrate the 
unacceptability of an Islamic population in modern Austria.18 The FPÖ’s comic series 
will also be pivotal aspect of this thesis. Krzyżanowski argues that since the leadership 
of Heinz-Christian Strache the FPÖ consistently refers to Heimat with a degree of ‘us’ 
versus ‘them’ innuendo, or, to be more precise, Austrians contrasted with a foreign, 
Islamic ‘menace’.19 Such studies therefore refer to Right-Wing populist Heimat 
rhetoric alongside a certain degree of implicit racism or cultural chauvinism. They 
reveal that Heimat is characterised by the FPÖ as an autochthonous collective identity 
and place in the world that is somehow connected to this cultural construct. Foreign 
groups, and Islam specifically, are also shown to be incompatible and therefore 
unable to gain membership in this Heimat narrative. 
  
Theoretical framework 
 The theoretical framework of this thesis uses a structured and thematic 
analytical approach to Heimat, investigating the term’s use by the FPÖ through 
categories that will provide the basis for each chapter. The sub-sections of the FPÖ’s 
Heimat concept are therefore organised into three major chapters, preceded by an 
introductory chapter that provides a history of the Heimat concept since the 
nineteenth century. The individual features of Heimat that assemble the foundation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Krzyżanowski, Michał. "From Anti-Immigration and Nationalist Revisionism to 
Islamophobia: Continuities and Shifts in Recent Discourses and Patterns of Political 
Communication of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)." Right-Wing Populism in Europe: 
Politics and Discourse. Eds. Wodak, Ruth, Majid KhosraviNik and Brigitte Mral. London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013. 135 - 48. Print. 141. 
18 Nève, Dorothée de. "Islamophobie in Deutschland." Religion und Politik im vereinigten 
Deutschland: Was bleibt von der Rückkehr des Religiösen. Eds. Pickel, Gert and Oliver 
Hidalgo. Wiesbaden: Springer 2013. 195 - 220. Print. 210. 
19 Krzyżanowski 141. 
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this thesis are connected by the overarching theory that the Heimat concept, in its 
many varied forms, stands at the centre of an Austrian (and indeed German) moral 
and political discussion about identity, place, and belonging that is, at least, two 
centuries old. 20  As a result, this thesis presents the hypothesis that the FPÖ 
appropriate genuine ‘features’ of Austria as Heimat to support their own Right-Wing 
populist strategies, as well as manufacture their own resolution to the question of 
Austrian national culture, belonging, and identity in an increasingly unstable age of 
‘migration’ and cultural pluralism in the European continent. The conjecture, 
accordingly, is that the FPÖ’s use of the term Heimat is an attempt to manipulate a 
sense of national consciousness as a means of safeguarding a traditional image of 
Austrian identity from an age of globalisation and multiculturalism. Heimat is 
resultantly theorised as a narrative that provides example of ‘sameness’ and the 
‘collective selfhood’ on a community and national level.21 As with any narrative 
pertaining to the collective identity of the social group, it is further surmised that 
‘togetherness’ cannot be successfully achieved without the exclusion of the ‘Other’, 
or those social groups that do not conform to the identity mandate.22 This thesis uses 
these assumptions to provide the following hypothesis: 
 
 The FPÖ establishes discursive messages within Heimat discourse, which, by 
 design, attempt to create an national identity narrative in Austria through a 
 heightened sense of indigeneity and exceptionalism within the national ‘In’ 
 group, as well as the simultaneous scapegoating of other groups through 
 messages that are either inflammatory or used to foster an adversarial image. 
 
Definition of Terms 
 As an investigation of the FPÖ’s political strategy to use euphemisms, nation-
cultural identity characterisations, and exclusionary rhetoric to define the Heimat 
concept, this thesis also exposes the resurgence of identity politics sweeping Western 
democracies. The research, as such, requires the categorisation of empirical evidence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Applegate, Celia. A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990. Print. 4 – 5. 
21 Wodak, Ruth, et al The Discursive, 11 – 14. 
22 Wodak, Ruth, et al The Discursive, 15. 
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into central themes. The themes within this thesis, accordingly, require definitions of 
the terms that are imperative to this investigation. The following definition of terms is 
alphabetically presented, with the omission of ‘Heimat’, the definition of which is 
reserved for the investigation offered in Chapter One. 
 
• Ethnoculture 
 This thesis attempts to introduce the pertinent features of Austrian 
ethnoculture as outlined in the FPÖ’s Heimat discourse. By ethnoculture this thesis 
refers to a specific group of people who have been socialized by institutions and 
processes to think, act, and self-identify in similar ways.23 The similarities are largely 
derived from a group that shares the same racial, national, religiousor geographical 
origin.24 Therefore ethnoculture is defined in this thesis as a community or people 
with a consistent and unchanging culture and ethnicity. For the purposes of this 
thesis, ethnoculture is  characterised by an unbroken heritage that maintains culture in 
the form of values, traditions, art, religion and philosophy, as well as ordinary social 
practices such as food, relationship, and behaviourisms.  
 
• Ethnocultural nationalism 
 This thesis argues further that the FPÖ demonstrates policies of cultural 
encapsulation and cultural oppression in its Heimat discourse. 25  The desire to 
preserve one’s own culture and to oppress those cultures that are deemed to be foreign 
and threatening is characteristic of ethnocentric monoculturalism. Ethnocentric 
(valuing one’s own ethnic or cultural group over others) monoculturalism (belief in 
one ‘true’ culture) is defined in this thesis as “a conscious or unconscious 
overvaluation of one’s own cultural beliefs and practices, and simultaneous 
invalidation of other cultural worldviews.”26 In ethnocultural nationalism, the nation 
or homeland is understood as a community defined by ethnic and cultural uniformity, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Lister, Larry. Human Sexuality, Ethnoculture, and Social Work. London: The hawthorn 
press, 1986. Print. 1. 
24 Lister 1.  
25 Sue, Derald Wing. Multicultural Social Work Practice. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 
2006. Print. 50. 
26 Taylor, Jennifer F. "Ethnocentric Monoculturalism." Encyclopedia of Multicultural 
Psychology. Ed. Jackson, Yo. London2006. 203 - 04. Print. 203. 
	   10	  
which is derived from the common ancestry of its members.27 As a belief system, 
ethnocentric monoculturalism has three main characteristics: 
 
i. A strong belief in the superiority of one group’s cultural heritage to others, 
ii. Belief in the inferior nature of all other cultural heritages, 
iii. The power to impose restrictions on the less powerful groups.28 
 
The prevalence of ethnocultural nationalism in a society tends to result in the 
establishment of a social or political platform that practices normative measures in 
order to maintain a perceived level of purity through the reduction of ethnic or 
cultural complexity. In the ethnocentric monocultural worldview, as a result, 
pluralism and difference are things to be minimised rather than embraced. The avowal 
of a specific Austrian culture and ethnicity, it will be shown, is a characteristic 
example of the ethnocultural nationalism that is embedded in the FPÖ’s Heimat 
discourse.  
 
• Ethnography 
 As a study that explores the ethnocultural features presented by the FPÖ in its 
Heimat discourse, this thesis requires a degree of ethnographic analysis. Ethnography 
is defined accordingly in this thesis as the study of the worldview of a given ethnic 
‘host population’, through an analysis of its cultural systems and their meanings.29 In 
the case of the research submitted here, an analysis of the FPÖ’s use of the Heimat 
concept is therefore also a systematic ethnographic study of the Austrian people and 
their culture in accordance with the party’s Right-Wing populist beliefs.  
 
• Right-Wing populism 
 As has been noted, this thesis describes the FPÖ as a Right-Wing populist 
party. The term ‘Far-Right’ is therefore purposely omitted. The use of ‘Right-Wing 
populism’ allows the thesis to draw parallels to a larger movement that exists across 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Brown, David. Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural, and Multicultural 
Politics. London: Routledge, 2000. Print. 35. 
28 Sue 49 – 53. 
29 Bernard, Russel H. Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches. Walnut Creek: AltaMira, 2002. Print. 5. 
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Western democracies, thus demonstrating the authority of a political creed that 
continues to gather momentum within and without the confines of Austria. For the 
purposes of this thesis the term Right-Wing populism is defined as a set of principles 
and a political strategy to reject the pre-existing, mainstream political consensus in 
favour of free-enterprise neoliberalism.30 The thesis spefically defines the principles 
behind Right-Wing populism as: 
 
 a) A belief in the purity of a central people who are native to their location.  
 b) A belief in a heartland or homeland that is the vessel in which the purity of 
 the people is preserved. 
 c) A general antagonism towards foreigners (migrants/asylum seekers) and 
 elites (usually the established political class, agents of globalisation, and  the 
 banking sector).31  
  
As a political movement that stylises itself as a rejection of the establishment, Right-
Wing populist parties tend to construct themselves through a “Ich bin für/gegen eine 
konkrete Forderung”, and therefore functions in many cases as an “Ideologie ohne 
Weltanschaaung.”32 Right-Wing populism, in other words, tends to use self-gratifying 
and at times ‘popular’ strategies to stir empathy from the citizenry rather than relying 
on core political philosophies or worldviews. 
  The skilful use of rhetorical devices that characterises Right-Wing populism is 
considered ‘populist’ because of overtures to the ‘common man or woman’, which are 
typified by the use of anti-establishment motifs that criticise the ruling elite and 
established political class. 33  “Der politische Mode des Rechten Populismus”, 
Sebastian Rienfeldt explains, “beruht auf der Aktivierung von Leidenschaft en über 
krasse Entgegensetzung. Als eine Variation von Politik bezieht er sich vordergründig 
erst in zweiter Linie auf akute Verwaltungsprobleme des Staatswesen, den in erster 
Linie zielt er auf die Lebensweisen und alltäglichen Erfahrungen der Bürger in einem 
Staatswesen.” This thesis explores the FPÖ’s exploration of the interior and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Wodak The Politics of Fear, 7 
31 Wodak The Politics of Fear, 26. 
32 Reinfeldt, Sebastian. Nicht-wir und Die-da. Studien zum rechten Populismus. Vienna: 
Braumüller, 2000. Print. 3. 
33 Wodak The Politics of Fear, 7. 
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bioundaries of Heimat as one such strategy the party employs to connect with the 
‚common’ man or woman, and garner empathy from them for their political cause. 
 Right-Wing populism validates criticisms of established mainstream politics 
and elites through a referral to Abraham Lincoln’s famous definition of democracy as 
‘government of the people, for the people, and by the people’; meaning that the 
people should govern themselves, and the intermediary political and elite classes are 
either secondary actors in, or potential obstructers of, ‘true democracy’.34 Populism is 
therefore understood as a general political revolt against the ‘checks and balances’ 
seemingly introduced by the ruling elite, which deny the common people the ability to 
rule themselves and seek their own prosperity. The populist mantra, as such, states 
that the ‘people’ are entitled to govern themselves, for themselves, and without any 
restrictions from the elite or outsider groups.35 The inability of the ruling elite to 
provide a general sense of security and wellbeing for the common men and women of 
Western European nations is partly responsible for the decline of the established 
political powers and the adjacent rise of the Right-Wing populist parties.36 For the 
Right-Wing populists, the ruling elite must be removed from power because they have 
put internationalism and their own self interests above the interests of ‘the people’ and 
the nation.37 The anti-elite strategy further draws disenfranchised voters towards the 
Right’s messages, through which they are depicted as champions of the common man 
even if their status or background is anything but middle class.  
 The unfounded assumption that Right-Wing populist parties and politicians 
are marginalised extremists without any real voice was decisively refuted with the 
election of Donald J. Trump to the White House in 2016. Trump ran a successful and 
aggressive campaign that used the anti-establishment and anti-foreign motifs typical 
of Right-Wing populism, and his victory signalled a fundamental shift in the West 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Pelinka, Anton. "Right-Wing Populism: Concept and Typology." Right-Wing Populism in 
Europe. Eds. Wodak, Ruth, Majid KhosraviNik and Brigitte Mral. London: Bloomsbury, 
2013. 3 - 22. Print. 3. 
35 Pelinka Right-Wing Populism, 4. 
36 Betz, Hans-Georg. Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. Basingstoke, 
Hampshire England: Macmillan, 1994. Print. 41. 
37 Rydgren, Jens. "The Sociology of the Radical Right." Annual Review of Sociology 33.1 
(2007): 241 - 62. Print. 242. 
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towards the Right.38 Trump sold himself, in many cases, as a representative of the 
common man, who would put the interest of ‘the people’ before the will of globalist 
elites. In doing so Trump struck a deep chord with many disenfranchised (largely 
white) voters in the United States, and sent a clear message to the rest of the West that 
new political changes may be, indeed, at hand. 
 
Thesis overview 
 The term Heimat, as used by the FPÖ, includes references to physical 
landscapes, as well as a human landscape through the paradigms of language, history, 
and mythology. This thesis will provide new research by exploring these features of 
Austrian Right-Wing populist Heimatrhetorik through a comparative assessment of 
previous concepts of Heimat, and how they interrelate with the Right-Wing populists’ 
own narrative. The overarching questions that will be addressed in this thesis are: 
  
 (1) How is the physical landscape of Heimat defined in Right-Wing populist 
 discourse, and in what way does it resonate with native population?  
 (2) Which demographic is ‘at home’ in this image of Heimat, and how is 
 their identity defined through linguistic, cultural, and historical examples?  
 (3) Which social groups are either marginalised or denied membership in this 
 narrative?  
 
The resolution of these inquiries offers unique insight into what it means to be 
Austrian from a contemporary Right-Wing populist perspective.  
 To achieve the above aim, Chapter One introduces arguably the most 
compelling and emotive feature of the FPÖ’s national identity discourse, that is, the 
party’s Heimat narrative. In order to understand the efficacy of Heimat discourse in 
national identity formulas, Chapter One presents a synopsis of the Heimat concept’s 
development in Austria and Germany since the nineteenth century. To position the 
Right-Wing populist use of Heimat within a historico-cultural framework, a 
chronological summary is required. The etymological origins of the term, 
accordingly, are examined first, all of which provide linguistic clues towards 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Aksel, Leth N., et al. "Making America Great Again? A Critical Discourse Analysis of the 
Slogan Adopted by Donald Trump." RUC, 2016. Print. 18 – 24. 
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Heimat’s power as a concept. Departing from Heimat’s linguistic origins, a thematic 
exploration of the concept follows by analysing and categorising the activities of 
various Heimat enthusiasts since the nineteenth century. Using a range of empirical 
evidence and secondary literature pertaining to the concept’s development, Heimat is 
then explored in Chapter One through its prevailing references to nature – whether 
forests, mountains, or rural and agrarian environments. The expediency of the Heimat 
concept to cultivate community and collective identity is also explored through 
language, history, and mythology paradigms that dominate Heimat narratives. Finally, 
the Heimat concept’s role in collective identity formation, evidenced through the 
term’s persistent use as a conduit for collective cultural abstractions and national 
myths, is examined as evidence of the concept’s enduring political dimension, where 
the sense of homeland and place is used to discursively construct national identity 
narratives. 
 Due to the Heimat concept’s effectiveness in establishing community formulas 
on both a local and national level, an investigation of the development of Austrian 
national identity is also required. Chapter One therefore presents the diverse origins of 
the Austrian national identity myth, and explores the problems the country faces in 
establishing a collective identity that is, culturally at least, both Austrian and 
European, but not decisively ‘German’. It investigates how the tragedies surrounding 
National Socialism led to the development of a renewed sense of national identity 
through the Heimat concept that was distinctly ‘Austrian’, and as such, different from 
the pan-Germanism that dominated Austria in previous decades. The development of 
Austrian national identity is examined through a comparative assessment of the 
arguments presented by numerous popular historians and academic scholars. The 
contention surrounding the topic shows that, despite post-1945 conjecture concerning 
a unique and consolidated version of Austrian national identity, national 
consciousness is an abstraction that remains in continual development, and is 
accordingly prone to subjective interpretation or, indeed, manipulation. The 
problematic nature of modern Austrian national identity is therefore explored in 
Chapter One through a particular focus on the divide between the ‘Austrian’ and 
‘German’ culturo-political positions, and how the two opinions continue to inform the 
debate surrounding Austria’s identity and historical place in the world.  
 Based on the conclusions presented in Chapter One, Chapter Two returns 
specifically to the FPÖ’s use of the Heimat imaginary as a political discourse. Chapter 
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Two, accordingly, develops an appropriate method for deconstructing the FPÖ’s 
Heimat discourse into its first sub-section: the natural topographies that constitute the 
physical landscape of Heimat, as outlined in the FPÖ’s identity politics. The chapter, 
consequently, explores the FPÖ’s adoration of Austrian nature, and how that affection 
influences the party’s policies pertaining to the environment. The physical landscape 
of Heimat is arranged in Chapter Two into the subsections of forest, alpine, and rural 
topographies. The FPÖ’s promotional photos, imagery, events, speeches, and 
conservation policies provide the empirical evidence. The FPÖ’s enthusiasm for 
nature is subsequently analysed as a narrative that encourages territorialism, ethnicity, 
and ownership over the land. The FPÖ’s preoccupation with quintessential Austrian 
landscapes and associated conversation policies are examined as a strategy employed 
by the party to diminish the existential divide between the ‘In’ Austrian social group 
and their natural environment. Social groups, in other words, have their ‘own’ place 
in the world, which, according to the FPÖ, has defined their identities, and must 
therefore be preserved in the same manner their culture and community should be 
kept ‘pure’. 
 Chapter Two additionally examines the FPÖ’s extremely in depth platform for 
land conservation and resource management, all of which is at the core of the party’s 
Heimat rhetoric. Resource and land management policies, sourced largely from the 
party’s political manifesto, website, social media, and political billboards, provide the 
evidence for the research. The protection of forests, the sustainable management of 
ecosystems, increased use of renewable energies, and a reduction in fossil fuels and 
atomic power are the specific areas investigated in the party’s environmental 
platform. The FPÖ’s conservation centered approach to land and resource 
management, furthermore, is specifically discussed in relation to the FPÖ’s rejection 
of foreign groups and political bodies, and this will be illustrated through an analysis 
of the party’s anti-European Union stance in the context of domestic water 
management.  
 Based on the close link established in Chapter Two between natural 
environments and cultural identity, Chapter Three departs from physical landscapes 
and presents an analysis of the second sub-section of the FPÖ’s Heimat discourse: the 
human landscape. Language is introduced as the first identifying feature of the human 
landscape that dwells within the FPÖ’s Heimat imaginary, and is, as such, the focus 
of the chapter. It highlights the FPÖ’s use of the German language as a tool to define 
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Austrian ethnoculture as a collective identity for the Austrian national ‘In’ group. The 
chapter therefore presents an investigation of the link the FPÖ forge between Austrian 
identity and the German language. This requires an analysis of the FPÖ’s attitude, 
sourced largely from their political literature, on the interrelation between language, 
national identity, and the Heimat concept. The FPÖ’s inferences to the importance of 
the German language as a facilitator of identity and Heimat in Austria are, however, 
questioned in the chapter. It points to the history of a multilingual (and multicultural) 
Austria, which is addressed in juxtaposition to the parties’ tendency to allocate 
German as the sole national language and determiner of national identity in the 
nation.  
 The chapter additionally provides a close examination of the FPÖ’s fondess 
for the term Muttersprache (‘Mother Tongue’ or ‘first language’) when it describes 
the German language in the context of national and cultural identity. Inferences to the 
biological transmission of languages (and therefore identity) are contrasted with 
overarching anti-immigration, anti-foreign FPÖ policies. The party’s use of Austrian 
dialect, furthermore, is explored as a distinctly Austrian (in place of pan-German) 
form of patriotism. This distinctly Austrian manifestation of linguistic patriotism is 
comparatively assessed alongside an FPÖ strategy to antagonise or exclude those 
groups within Austria who display an inability to speak Austrian dialects or German, 
and who prefer to identify personally with foreign, non-Germanic, dialects. The 
party’s policy of forced language acquisition for migrants, political programs 
applying to language more generally, as well as the linguistic depictions of various 
foreign groups in the FPÖ’s publications, provides the data for analysis. Finally, the 
chapter addresses the interrelation of language and broader cultural systems, and 
whether conformity to a language (or not) indicates compliance to, and normalisation 
within, a broader culturo-national identity narrative. 
 Chapter Four examines history and mythology as the final features of the 
human landscape in the FPÖ’s Heimat narrative. The empirical evidence is sourced 
from the FPÖ’s political literature pertaining to the value of history and myth, with a 
specific analysis of the party’s mythological comic series released during the 2010 
and 2013 election campaigns. History and myth are allocated a singular chapter on the 
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hypothesis that both history and mythology provide a narrative of the nation39: a 
means of collective national identity that is discursively constructed by recounting 
past events, whether real or imagined, as well as the traditions and culture they are 
believed to preserve. The chapter explores a Right-Wing populist nuance for the 
nostalgic, and an image of Heimat that is both contemporary and anachronistic. It 
investigates the validity of a core feature of FPÖ belief: that Austrians all share deep 
roots in the past, and in order to be a ‘real’ Austrian one must personally identify with 
a specific version of the nation’s history and subsequently apply those lessons to the 
present. 
 To achieve the above aim, the chapter examines the central role history has 
played in Heimat scholarship, comparing the FPÖ’s adoration of the past with earlier 
examples of nineteenth century Heimatgeschichte. It explores the similarities between 
scholars’ accounts of the Heimathgeschichte movement, and the use of history in the 
FPÖ’s identity politics. This method of research is also applied to the FPÖ’s penchant 
for Austrian mythology, with a thematic case study of the party’s comic series. The 
chapter surveys the link made by the FPÖ between myth and Heimat, and how the 
party aims to define the Austrian human landscape by a discourse of indigeneity and 
exceptionalism that pushes foreign exclusion. The chapter investigates the similarities 
established by the FPÖ between myths and contemporary issues such as migration, 
the question of national identity, and domestic policy. This is investigated in 
conjunction with examples of the broader Right-Wing populist tendency to project the 
virtues of heroes onto their own politicians and supporters, thereby re-living and re-
enacting the deeds of those that came before. Finally, the anachronistic retelling of a 
past masquerading as the present is examined with a particular study of the historical 
and mythic ‘enemies’ of the Austrian people, and whether the FPÖ use myth and 
history to resurrect Feinbilder and apply the image to contemporary migrant, asylum 
seeker, and minority groups. 
 Together, the chapters in this thesis present an overview of the individual sub-
sections that merge to create the FPÖ’s image of Heimat. The first sub-section, the 
physical landscape, is explored to discover which topographies typify the ‘outer 
Heimat’, how they affect national identity, and what relationship Austrians share with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Hall, Stuart. "The Question of Cultural Identity." Modernity: An Introduction to Modern 
Societes. Eds. Hall, Stuart, et al. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. 595 - 634. Print. 613 – 15. 
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them. The chapters on language, history, and mythology explore the human landscape 
in the FPÖ’s definition of Heimat, in order to discover which ethnocultures the party 
believes belong in Austria, as well as those that do not. The concept of Heimat, 
therefore, is deconstructed into core features that are used by the FPÖ in a discourse 
about belonging, national identity, and separatism. The thesis provides an important 
analysis of how Right-Wing populist parties continue to discursively construct 
identity narratives in the hope of restricting cultural pluralism and enforcing restricted 
identity politics as a countermeasure to prevent an increasingly globalised world. 
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Chapter One 
 
Austrian national identity and the appropriation of Heimat related concepts 
 
1.0 – Introduction 
2016 was a politically challenging year for Europe. The citizens of Western 
Europe in particular began to directly experience the consequences of war and 
upheaval in the Middle East, with Muslim migrant influxes to the European continent 
skyrocketing to result in a migration crisis not felt since the aftermath of World War 
Two.40 The ‘open border’ policy perpetuated by Germany’s Angela Merkel, worsened 
by the lack of any clear strategy for integration, housing, or job opportunities for 
migrants, fueled the fires of Right-Wing populist antagonism towards the political 
establishment, and a growingly anxious European populace perceived those flames 
with empathy. By December 2016, the second round of presidential elections in 
Austria nearly saw the FPÖ’s candidate Norbert Hofer gain victory, narrowly losing 
to the independent candidate Alexander van der Bellen. Hofer campaign was largely 
focused on an anti-immigration, pro-nativist stance, encapsulated in the party’s 2016 
slogan “Aufstehen für Österreich – Deine Heimat braucht dich jetzt.”41 As with most 
of the FPÖ’s identity politics, the concept of Heimat, and the underlying discourse of 
what features typify the Austrian homeland, remained a dominant aspect of the 
party’s political strategy. Although Hofer was beaten, albeit by the narrowest of 
margins, a clear statement had been made in Austria and then delivered to the rest of 
the European Union and, indeed, the world. Right-Wing populism had struck a 
decisive blow to the political establishment in the West. The FPÖ’s identity politics, 
which refers to defence of the homeland, as well as the advocacy of indigeneity 
through nativist national identity discourses, has successfully resonated with a large 
percentage of Austrian voters, and, as a result, the concept of Heimat has returned to 
fore of political debate.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 “Europe is facing the worst refugee crisis since World War II – and there’s no end in sight.” 
Business Insider. Reuters, 28 Aug. 2015. Web. 7 Jan. 2016. 
41 FPÖ. “Aufstehen für Österreich – Deine Heimat braucht dich jetzt.” FPÖ. FPÖ, 14 Mar. 
2016. Web. 17 Jun. 2016. 
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1.1 - The FPÖ’s Heimat strategy 
 For the FPÖ, the term Heimat is favoured when the party describes traditional 
values and a sense of nativism, which in unison is argued to typify the Austrian 
national character. Heimat is used by the FPÖ as a point of reference with which to 
address the questions of Austrian character, identity, and place in the world. Indeed, 
identity and cultural factors consistently play a leading role in the political platform of 
the Austria’s Right-Wing populist parties. For example, in the FPÖ’s political 
programme, the party promotes itself as the defenders of a homogeneous Austrian 
cultural identity by initiating a return to ‘traditional’ Austrian values and a sense of 
Heimat.42 The premise that the FPÖ seek to preserve Heimat and national identity 
suggests that these two abstractions are somehow under threat. The FPÖ places 
themselves in opposition to this alleged threat - the forces of cultural pluralism and 
globalisation, whose agents are seemingly responsible for the decline in national 
identity and autonomy. As a result, Austrian cultural identity is not only celebrated by 
the FPÖ, but also aggressively defended from the perceived encroaching identities of 
minorities and the spectre of a multicultural Austria and Europe at the expense of a 
‘native’ Austrian homeland. Heimat, therefore, is used by the FPÖ as a reference 
point to questions of national identity, all of which are addressed specifically by the 
party through cultural and ethnic lenses.  
 The FPÖ’s Heimat strategy has, more recently, been a powerful tool with 
which to criticise and critique the Austrian government and European Union’s 
handeling of the asylum seeker crisis. Since 2013, unprecedented asylum seeker 
numbers alongside migration patterns from the east and south of Europe have caused 
great problems. Due to instability in the Middle East and North Africa, millions of 
largely young Muslim men have been massing at Europe’s borders in the hope of 
gaining asylum there. Frontex, the agency that promotes, coordinates, and develops 
European border management and strategy, claimed in a report from 2016 that 
1,822,337 illegal immigrants were detected crossing European borders by the end of 
the previous year.43 The report went on to conclude that the year 2015 “was marked 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 FPÖ. Handbuch Freiheitlicher Politik. Vienna: FPÖ Bildungsinstitut, 2013. Print. 31. 
43 Frontex. Risk Analysis for 2016. Warsaw: European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union, 2015. Print. 14.  
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by an unprecedented number of detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs”, 
or ‘border crossing points’, “revealing a migration crisis without equivalent in Europe 
since World War II.”44  Austria’s numbers were relatively low in comparison to other 
nations such as Germany and Sweden.45 However Austria’s intake of asylum seekers 
reached some ninety thousand by the end of 2015, which led the government to 
declare a cap on the amount of migrants they would accept daily.46 
 The massive influx of foreign people to Austria and Europe provided an 
opportune moment for the FPÖ to make their move and assert their political agenda. 
Norbert Hofer, the FPÖ’s presidential candidate for 2016, ran a carefully designed 
campaign that focused primarily on anti-immigration messages directed at the 
prevailing European asylum seeker crisis. On his personal website Hofer urged 
Austrians to vote for him because he is the only one that will defend “unsere 
Bevölkerung sowie ihre Kultur, Werte, Traditionen und Sicherheit“ from “die neue 
Völkerwanderung.“47 Hofer very nearly secured the presidency in 2016, and was 
narrowly defeated by the ex-leader of the Green party Dr. Alexander Van der Bellen, 
who is now a Far Left independent.48 The FPÖ contested the narrow loss to the 
Constitutional Court by citing irregularities and evidence of voter fraud, leading to the 
result being overturned and a return to the ballot boxes.49 Due to another narrow loss 
after the second round of voting, the FPÖ’s Norbert Hofer was eventually forced to 
concede the narrowest of defeats to Vam der Bellen by October of 2016.50 Despite 
Hofer’s loss, the close result clearly demonstrated the ascendency of FPÖ, as well as 
the empathy many voters in Austria share for the party’s Heimat instead of 
multiculturalism message. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Frontex 14. 
45 Germany received 476,00 asylum claims in 2015 alone. See “Migration Crisis: Migration to 
Europe Explained in Seven Charts.” BCC. BBC, 4 Mar. 2016. Web. 7 Jun. 2016. 
46 “Migrant Crisis: Austria Sets Asylum Claim Cap and Transit Limit.” BBC. BBC, 17 Feb. 
2016. Web. 7 Jun. 2016. 
47 Hofer, Norbert. “Meine Positionen.” Norbert Hofer. FPÖ, n.d. Web. 20 May 2016.  
48 Van der Bellen’s margin of victory was only 0.07%. See “Bundespräsidentenwahl 2016 – 
2. Wahlgang – Gesamtergebnis inclusive Verlautbarung der Bundeswahlbehörde.” 
Bundesministerium für Inneres. Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2016. Web. 7 Jun. 2016.  
49 “Austrian presidential election result overturned and must be held again.” The Guardian. 
The Guardian. 1 Jul. 2016. Web. 1 Jan. 2016.  
50 “Austria Election: Far-Right candidate Norbert Hofer concedes defeat in presidential poll.” 
ABC News. ABC News, 5 Dec. 2016. Web. 5 Dec. 2016. 
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 The irreconcilable differences between a traditional Austrian homeland 
and the threats caused by multiculturalism and ‘outsiders’ is seen most markedly in 
the political policies and slogans of the FPÖ under the party’s new leadership. In 
many slogans, the beloved ‘Heimat’ is praised in contrast to the evils of outlandish 
Islamic practices or the corruption of the European Union.51 As will be explored 
further in subsequent chapters, the FPÖ’s semantic field of Islam is outlined by 
referring to the dangers of the growing number of Muslims in Austria: minarets as 
symbols of anti-European violence, the general violence displayed in the Koran with a 
particular emphasis on Jihad, religious freedom and its abuses by Muslims, and the 
threat posed to women’s rights.52 Since ascending to the FPÖ leadership in 2005 after 
the exit of Jörg Haider to form the BZÖ, the media savvy Heinz-Christian Strache has 
successfully run a party platform in which he campaigns for the preservation Austrian 
identity from these perceived foreign threats. Strache’s FPÖ won 26% of the vote in 
2010, and most interestingly was the most popular politician for voters under the age 
of 30.53 His political approach is consistently constructed around an admiration for 
European cultural heritage, which must be defended at all costs from the 
Überfremdung – the feeling of being ‘overwhelmed’ by immigrants.54 The Heimat, 
accordingly, represents all that must be defended from the threat of foreign 
dominance, which is identified in such events as non-European immigration 
fluctuations and political or economic globalism.  
 The term Heimat, then, is an important slogan in Austrian Right-Wing 
populist nomenclature. This thesis explores how this seemingly inconspicuous term 
has been transformed by the FPÖ to resemble a euphemism for nationalist parlance. 
Austria as Heimat, accordingly, will be shown to play an influential conceptual role in 
the renewed patriotic and nationalistic rhetoric that the parties exhibit.55 In their party 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 For example, the FPÖ’s “Daham (Heimat in Austrian dialect) statt Islam” slogan of 2008 
creates the duality of ‘us’ native Austrians and ‘our’ Heimat juxtaposed with the foreign and 
menacing specter of Islam. Islam, as a result, is described by the FPÖ as a foreign entity that 
cannot gain membership in the Heimat. See Krzyżanowski From Anti-Immigration, 141. 
52 Wodak The Politics of Fear, 144. 
53 Lattinger, Peter. “Grüne, Blaue bei Jungen stärker.” Heute. Heute, 27 Sept. 2010. Web. 4 
Apr. 2011.  
54 Wodak The Politics of Fear, 144. 
55 Lamb-Faffelberger, Margarete. "Beyond "the Sound of Meliusic": The Quest for Cultural 
Identity in Modern Austria." The German Quarterly 76.3 (2003): 289 - 99. Print. 296. 
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literature, speeches, and interviews the FPÖ consistently refers to Heimat when 
describing the identity of Austrians and the characteristics of the Austrian nation.56 It 
is a term that is often patriotically referred to in the context of the FPÖ’s 
understanding of Austrian history, culture, the German language, national landscapes, 
and collective identity. The term dominates Austrian Right-Wing populist literature, 
speeches, and images, and is constantly brought to the fore by the parties as an 
example of their patriotism and zealousness for all things ‘Austrian’. In an interview 
from 2013, the Strache explained his own personal definition of Heimat as the sacred 
ground from which native cultural identity flourishes: 
 
 Heimat ist, wo sich Menschen angenommen und geborgen fühlen. Heimat  ist 
 der Ort, den man mit seinen Liebsten in einer gemeinsamen Sprache, einer 
 Kultur und einer Identität wahrnimmt. Ich halte es mit Johann Gottfried 
 Herder: “Heimat ist da, wo man sich nicht erklären muss.” Wir erleben heute 
 ja oftmals, dass sich angestammte Österreicher in ihrem Land erklären 
 müssen.57 
  
In this extract Strache relates the sense of Heimat with a self-affirmation to remain 
‘Austrian’ in one’ own land. As this thesis will explore in subsequent chapters, for 
Strache, the features of Heimat are clearly derived from Austrian indigeneity and 
exceptionalism. It describes the individual and groups’ relationship to the place where 
they are born and where a sense of self and collective identity is cultivated. For the 
FPÖ, Heimat is a cultural abstraction linked with a physical topography, and it is, as 
such, a unifying force that helps to describe and define the character of the people that 
dwell there.  
 Strache’s definition of Heimat, however, is by no means novel. An emphasis 
on Heimat in the FPÖ’s rhetoric arguably began to take prominence under the 
leadership of Jörg Haider, who during the 1990s chose to restrain overt pan-German 
statements in favour of a new form of Austrian nationalism. The spectacular rise of 
the FPÖ since then is largely attributed to the charisma and intellect of Haider. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 For example see FPÖ Handbuch 2013, 34. 
57 Kramar-Schmid, Ulla, and Michael Nikbakhsh. “H.C. Strache: Die Wunderbare Tradition 
des Wienerlieds.” Profil. Profil, 3 Sep. 2013. Web. 10 Aug. 2015. 
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collective ideology of the FPÖ as a party, accordingly, became largely synonymous 
with Haider’s personal ideas, which included populist opportunism alongside German 
nationalist traditions.58 The distinct form of Austrian patriotism favoured by Haider 
was grounded in the ‘sacred’ notion of one’s Austrian Heimat, while also effectively 
incorporating typical German cultural nationalist imagery.59 Slogans such as “Heimat, 
Sicherheit, Arbeit” and “Heimat muss Heimat bleiben” were carefully juxtaposed 
alongside criticisms directed at presence of foreign groups, values, and culture in 
Austria, indicating that, for the FPÖ, Heimat must remain both culturally German as 
well as nationalistically ‘Austrian’.60  
 Preserving the Austrian identity and way of life thus guides the FPÖ’s 
Heimatrhetorik, alongside the implied (and often blatantly stated) opposition to 
cultural pluralism and multiculturalism. The use of the Heimat concept permits the 
FPÖ to celebrate their nation as both distinct and ancient, through a process of myth 
building that establishes a subjective view of national and cultural identity. In this 
chapter I analyse the discursive constructions that lay behind the FPÖ’s use of the 
Heimat concept. It explores Heimat as a culturo-political abstraction, or a subjective 
national identity discourse, in which the FPÖ uses provincialism, traditionalism, and a 
fixed, geographically rooted identity of place symptomatic of typical Heimat concepts 
in order to establish its closed monocultural, monoethnic definition of the nation. As a 
term with long historical roots in German-speaking communities, however, there are 
many historical references to Heimat as a concept that require analysis. A greater 
understanding of the concept’s efficacy throughout history, with a particular focus on 
the discursive construction of normative examples of national identity, will assist to 
illustrate Heimat’s persuasive influence in modern Right-Wing populist identity 
discourses. 
 
1.2 – The meaning and historical use of term Heimat 
 As we have seen, the term Heimat features prominently in the FPÖ’s national 
identity politics. When carefully applied, the concept of Heimat permits the party to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Judson, Pieter. "Austrian Non-Reception of a Reluctant Goldhagen." The "Goldhagen 
Effect": History, Memory, Nazism - Facing the German Past. Ed. Eley, Geoff. Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 2003. 131 - 49. Print. 137. 
59 Judson 138. 
60 Judson 138. 
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defend traditional Austrian values and identity while simultaneously providing the 
justification for the rejection of ideologies that sanction cultural pluralism and policies 
that facilitate multiculturalism. The effectiveness of the Heimat concept in identity 
narratives is a result of the term’s long historical roots in the German-speaking world, 
where it functions as a model for self-identification and group belonging. The term 
Heimat stands at the very core of a moral and political dialogue about ‘place, 
belonging, and identity’ in Austria and Germany that is nearly two centuries old.61 
Traditionally speaking, Heimat is characterised by references to traditional social 
structures (family, kinship, culture) and the role of the land in collective identity 
formulas.62 It is a term that is especially problematical to translate, defined around 
features that describe local and national identity, and sometimes referring to rather 
vague, geographically indefinite places, all of which were used to advocate various 
ideological positions. The mystery of the Heimat concept lies, furthermore, in the 
innocence of its etymological origins, which, when contrasted with the complexities 
of Heimat as a concept, demonstrates the development of a rather inconspicuous term 
into a cultural abstraction of profound moral and political importance in the German-
speaking world. 
 
1.2.1 – Early etymological origins and the Heimatrecht edict 
 As a term denoting one’s own home region, Heimat appears a rather ordinary 
concept, with a meaning that is inconspicuously neutral. In a more regressive sense, 
Heimat is the place where one was born, where one establishes his or her life, and 
realises a sense of self among family or friends.63 Literal translations of the term 
Heimat include ‘home’, ‘homeland’, ‘hometown’, ‘homestead’, ‘native region’ 
(Lower Bavaria, Frankonia, Upper Swabia, Black Forest, Appenzell, etc.), as well as 
‘native country’ (Germany, Austria, Lichtenstein or Switzerland). 64  Early 
etymological examples of Heimat support these more regressive translations. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Applegate 4 – 5. 
62 Pyrah, Robert. The Burgtheater and Austrian Identity: Theatre and Cultural Politics in 
Vienna, 1918-38. London: Legenda, 2007. Print. 11. 
63 Wüst, Sarah. "Young German Heimatfilm: Negotiations of a Powerful Myth." Austausch 
1.1 (2011). Print. 77. 
64 Blickle, Peter. Heimat: A Critical Theory of the German Idea of Homeland. New York: 
Camden House, 2002. Print. X. 
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According to the Brothers Grimm, the term ‘Heimat’ has been present in various 
German dialects since the 1500s.65 Relating to a house, hometown, a landscape, a 
region or a country, Heimat is a term often used in a very inconspicuous manner and 
is frequently accepted as an unquestioned reality.66 One’s home, in other words, 
simply is, and therefore is identified neutrally, without supposedly requiring any 
investigative approach. 
 It is from this rather regressive definition of Heimat that certain practical laws 
and rights of domicile in Austria and Germany were derived. From the medieval 
period until the late 18th century, Heimat represented in a practical sense a property 
such as a regional farmstead (Haus und Hof) as well as a legal title (Heimatrecht), or 
the right of domicile.67 The Bavarian Heimatrecht law of the 1820s formed the basis 
of an administrative effort to recognize the identity of Bavarian Germans and make 
that definition of citizenship uniform and all-inclusive by emphasising shared cultural 
factors.68 During the Austrian First Republic, the principle of Heimatrecht provided 
those living within the German-speaking territories of Austria the basis for Austrian 
citizenship, as well as those outside German-speaking territories, who, provided they 
belonged to the same race and spoke the same language, could eventually take up 
residence in Austria.69  
 Heimat’s rather ordinary etymological origins and practical application in law, 
however, was to profoundly transform during the course of the nineteenth century. 
The dislocating experiences of nineteenth century European industrialisation, the rural 
to urban migrations (Landflucht), diaspora, the weakening of family and traditional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 In the Brother’s Grimm’s 1854 Deutsches Wörterbuch, Heimat is defined as a German 
word for a land or region to which one belongs either by birth or through long established 
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kinship arrangements, and the increasing political popularity of German cultural 
nationalism, all supplanted the regressive and straightforward dimensions of Heimat 
for more emotive connotations. It was due to the dislocating consequences of these 
political and societal upheavals that the ‘concrete’ dimension of Heimat was gradually 
replaced, as we shall now see, with more emotional resonances concerning native 
landscapes, self-positioning within groups, and the detailing of culturally ‘normative’ 
features of collective identity.  
 Notwithstanding the term’s complexities of meaning, archaic etymological 
examples provide some clues regarding Heimat’s deeper conceptual connotations. 
Peter Blickle identifies the amorphous nature of the Heimat concept in a variation in 
the fifteenth century spelling Heinmut, which appears as a compound noun for Heimat 
with two separate terms Hein (grove/forest) and Mut (courage).70 This linguistic 
variation of Heimat, as will be further explained in Chapter Two, is an interesting 
example of the term’s capacity to represent more subjective ideas about place and 
identity. The compound noun Heinmut denotes a synthesis of the spatial forest with 
cultural attributes afforded members of a warrior society, both of which are enclosed 
within in a term for home. Heinmut, therefore, does not only describe home in an 
everyday sense, but is rather a term that discursively constructs the characteristics of 
that home, and, as a result, also distinguishes the identity of the people that live there. 
Heimat as a concept therefore transcends the geography the term supposedly 
describes, incorporating cultural constructs that function as discursive instruments for 
identity formation. It is from the fifteenth century spelling Heinmut that the term is 
seen to abandon its unremarkable classification in place of more abstract and emotive 
concepts of belonging.  
 
1.3 - The Heimat concept 
 As a concept, Heimat is difficult to define. Throughout history Heimat as a 
concept has been prescribed a wide spectrum of abstract meanings, and has had a vast 
array of applications in the social, moral, and political life of the German-speaking 
world. Consequently, Heimat as a concept is more difficult to define than regressive 
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translations of the term afford. Johannes von Moltke, for example, explains that 
Heimat has come: 
 
to accumulate so many meanings – ranging from the mundane to the religious, 
from the reactionary to the progressive, from the specific to the unimaginably 
vague – that it has become difficult to conceive a lexicon entry that could even 
begin to claim exhaustive treatment of its function.”71  
  
Despite the large scholarship into the amorphous nature of the Heimat concept, 
existing research tends to focus primarily on either 1) an entirely German perspective, 
2) works relating to the literary use of the term, or 3) the intersection of Austria as 
Heimat and 1930s German National Socialist ideology. For example, Celia Applegate 
(1990) provides valuable research into the use of Heimat for (national) identity 
formation by the nineteenth century historical Vereine in the Pflaz region of Germany. 
Alon Confino (1998) also presents a study of the nineteenth century German sense of 
Heimat, where Heimat enthusiasts tended to draw inspiration from local 
provincialisms in order to construct compendiums of a greater German national 
identity. However, it is generally agreed that the Heimat concept is linked both to 
material places and as well as with notions of identity, alterity, and self-positioning 
within or outside of a community.72 Despite the ambiguous nature of the Heimat 
concept, certain features have endured throughout concept’s development since the 
nineteenth century. Although the sense of Heimat can differ from region to region, 
there are certain core attributes that unify the concept. The principal ‘sub-sections’ of 
Heimat together forge a uniformity that has power and influence over national 
identity through emotive cues that affect notions of belonging and self-positioning 
within a community. 
 
1.3.1 - Nature and landscape 
 The first feature that typified the sense of Heimat in both Austria and 
Germany was that of nature, which was seen as a place that embodied provinciality, 	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parochialism, and picturesque folklore all encapsulated in a lifestyle that is traditional, 
hereditary, and in harmony with the natural world. Nature, as well the communities 
that lived within or alongside it, became a basic formative element from which all 
aspects of the Heimat imaginary were discursively constructed. Peter Blickle, for 
example, argues, “The beauty of nature is not only closely related to the idea of 
Heimat but is an integral aspect of it. Heimat has absorbed the beauty of nature and 
given it a geographical grounding.”73 Heimat enthusiasts throughout Austria and 
Germany looked to their own natural environments as beautiful national landscapes, 
with topographies so rich with beauty as to leave its audience in awe. Confino, for 
example, cites the Heimat enthusiasts of Württemberg in Germany tendency to treat 
nature with a sense of “poeticalness and practicality”: a natural place that was 
cherished for its timelessness, its beauty, the emotive passion it inspired, while 
simultaneously preserved for its usefulness in the areas of nature tourism and a source 
of local profit.74 Heimat’s appreciation for local and national nature, however, was not 
confined to scientific analysis or economic advantages. Nature, rather, remained for 
Heimat enthusiasts a cultural landscape, complete with epic beauty and the collective 
memories of local communities, and was, significantly, always distinguished from the 
nature found in other parts of the world.75 Nature, as a result, became synonymous in 
the Heimat imaginary with a sense of local distinctiveness, and its lakes, rivers, 
forests, and mountains became the native place where social groups could assert their 
own identity. It was through the Heimat imaginary that communities departed from 
the confines of the city and returned to nature, and in doing so the extraneousness of 
the collective being to nature was diminished, or at best, refuted.76  
 While Germany set the standard for Heimat enthusiasts during the nineteenth 
century, similar developments were also taking place in Austria. Authors of the 
Austrian Heimatroman, for example, sought to describe Austrian identity and Heimat 
through the pastoral idealism of the surrounding countryside. The celebration of 
pastoral settings and communities in Heimatroman tended to illustrate agrarian scenes 	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as a ‘’transitory ground’ that connected a community to nature, by describing that 
relationship as harmonious and interdependent. In contrast to the urbanisation brought 
forth by modernity, Heimaromanen depicted ‘home’ in a distinctly provincial and 
nature-orientated way. 77  While the city tended to represent cosmopolitanism, 
alienation, and lack of identity, the countryside provided a wealth of heritage, 
community, and tradition. Recognising the endearing magnetism nature evoked in the 
collective psyche of their readers, authors of the Austrian Heimatroman such as 
Ludwig Azengruber (1839 – 1889) and Peter Rosegger (1843 – 1918) constructed 
images of Heimat by describing home in a way that celebrated nature, agrarian 
communities, and provincial life. In their works the protagonists lived in, or at least 
always returned to, the hospitality of communities that were forever pastoral and 
largely characterised, accordingly, by a sense of rootedness and tradition.78 The 
parochialisms of a provincial life represented a rather conservative definition of home 
in the Heimatroman, which tended to describe natural agrarian communities as 
favourable to modern urbanisation and austere city landscapes.79 Rather than the 
facelessness and disorientated sense of place that dominated city or industrial 
landscapes, community was believed to flourish in natural and rural settings where the 
close proximity to nature demonstrated a sense of unity and harmony. Heimat was 
described by alluding to the distinct attraction one felt for the natural way of life 
pastoral communities embodied. Heimat returned its participants to the ‘good old 
days’, encouraging members to empathise with natural landscapes and to one another, 
via the revalidation (and in many cases restoration) of the anachronisms typical of a 
simple, provincial life encapsulated in bygone days. Nature allowed Heimat 
enthusiasts to preserve and relive ‘what once was’, to recapture the original meaning 
of home, and perhaps, as a result, reinstate traditional modes of identity to a modern, 
more complicated age. 
 The Heimat imaginary’s enthusiasm for nature during the nineteenth century 
coincided with the creation of nature organisations that sought to preserve natural 
environments and traditional aesthetics. This is seen, for example, in Bund 	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Heimatschutz, or ‘The League for Homeland Protection’, a German national citizens 
group founded in 1904, whose members avidly campaigned against the degraded and 
austere modern landscape. The aim of the group was outlined in its foundational 
charter, where it is said to stand for “protecting the natural and historically developed 
uniqueness of the German homeland.”80 In many cases, the Heimatschutz sought to 
preserve the landscapes of Heimat as features of national identity, thus creating an 
ideological link between Heimat, nationalism, and environmentalism. For example, 
the founder of the Bund Heimatschutz, Paul Schultze-Naumberg (1869 – 1949) used 
the organisation to merge environmental preservation and nature adoration with 
strong nationalistic overtures.81 Regional landscapes, as a result, began to unify as an 
example of the interconnectedness of localities to the greater national entity. 
 It did not take long for the synthesis of local patriotism, nationalism, and 
nature adoration to also take hold in the Austrian Heimat movement. In 1904, for 
example, the magazine Hohe Warte began to publish articles and photographs 
showcasing Austrian nature and countryside alongside nationalistic approaches 
towards what ‘constitutes’ Heimat in Austria.82 Just as in Germany, the Austrian 
Heimatschutz began to advocate for the preservation of the natural topographies of 
Heimat while also connecting regional identity to the national level. In 1914, for 
example, the österreichischer Heimatschutzvereine brought the individual Vereine 
from Niederösterreich, Öberösterreich, Salzburg, Steiermark and Tirol together in 
order to celebrate regional natural landscapes and cultures as examples of the 
combined Austrian nation and Heimat.83 Used within this local and national context, 
Heimat nature illuminated a kinship between community, nature, province, and 
homeland.  
 As we shall now explore, the sense of community and belonging that nature 
and pastoralism helped to facilitate in the Heimat imaginary would prove efficacious 
in discursive constructions of national identity throughout the German-speaking 	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world. Nature was immediate, real, and tangible, and was therefore a convenient 
means with which to summon sentiments of local and national belonging. Local 
mature provided ease and security to the national image through images and 
descriptions of the mountains, forests, and agrarian valleys that collectively belonged 
to the people: a national topography over which one could boast ownership. Nature 
therefore, ceased to be a foreign wilderness, and rather was used to describe the 
intimacy between social groups and place. The focus on the regional and natural 
landscapes that housed traditional communities, afforded Heimat a new socio-
political dimension: a means of manipulating a national consciousness through the 
amalgamation of indigenous history and ethnographic features. 
 
1.3.2 –Local provincialism as national identity 
 The use of the Heimat concept to cultivate a sense of national consciousness 
began during the nineteenth century. It has been well documented in previous studies 
that the evolution of the Heimat concept during the nineteenth century followed the 
shifting allegiances of belonging from a hometown (or region) to a nation, thus 
gaining a nationalistic, political dimension.84 Applegate provides a valuable case 
study for this in the context of Germany, describing how the renewed interest in 
provincial culture (such as histories, dialects, songs, and various other ‘qualities’ of 
the locale) resulted in the emergence of Heimatbestrebungen that sought to provide a 
mythology and character for the new German nation. 85  Applegate, however, 
concludes that the overwhelming presence of local identities in the Heimat concept 
demonstrates that the movement was, in essence, a local, regional one, and not 
entirely a national phenomenon.86 However, the persistent appropriation of local 
identities in order to facilitate a greater ‘German’ national conscious in the Heimat 
movement leads to the assumption that the Heimat idea became largely synonymous 
with national identity.87 Heimat thus became more analogous to a ‘national myth’, 
and a means with which to establish national identity formulas in addition to regional 
allegiances. 	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  Despite the tendency of scholarship to focus on the development of the 
Heimat concept in a German context, the term’s usage in national identity discourse 
does find manifestations in Austria as well. For example, in his study Kulturraum 
Österreich: die Identität der Regionen in der bildenden Kunst des 19. Jahrhunderts 
Werner Telesko notes developments in Austria that are markedly similar to Germany, 
where a prevailing Denkart tended to characterise Heimat as a concept that 
emphasised both the regional (in this case the surrounds of Salzburg) and the national 
aspects of heritage, culture, and identity.88 Robert Pyrah also shows that the Heimat 
concept in Austria from the nineteenth century could represent a collective empathy 
for local regions such as Tyrol, as well as all the way to national levels of self-
identification.89 The concept differed from Germany, however, in that the use of 
Heimat in Austria constantly encountered the difficulty of defining a new homeland 
following the collapse of the Habsburg Empire. The loss of former territories, the 
dissolution of the ‘Danubian Federation’, and the subsequent emergence of a more 
homogeneous ethnic character to Heimat Österreich post 1918, largely characterised 
by the Western German-speaking territories of Cisleithania, together demonstrated 
the predicament of describing a clear, and continual, example of the Austrian 
Heimat.90 Despite these conflicting historical differences, we can nonetheless assert 
with some confidence that from the nineteenth century onwards the concept of 
Heimat came to represent ‘home’ on both a regional and national level in Austria as 
well as Germany. Although Heimat can refer to anything from a local village to an 
entire nation, the concept does not describe the specifics of any given place alone, but 
rather is much more a concept of a group or individual ‘belonging somewhere’. The 
architects of the Heimat concept expanded upon the notion of belonging by describing 
the ethnography of the people who had dwelt within the land for centuries, looking 
toward history as the inspiration with which to construct national myths pertaining to 
both populations and place.  
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1.3.3 - History and ethnography 
 At the end of the nineteenth century, local communities throughout the 
German-speaking world began to publish a new style of book that documented 
regional identity. These Heimatbücher contained popularised local histories, all of 
which were recorded in an effort preserve the character of the community through the 
recounting of a region’s past. Consistent with the Heimat idea’s affection for agrarian 
and natural settings, Heimatbücher were characterised by nature adoration, local 
genealogies, and histories. Ortgeschichte, or local history, an earlier genre written by 
schoolteachers and priests from around 1819, greatly influenced the style and content 
of Heimatbücher, transmitting to the new literary field its focus on local nature and 
history.91 Heimatbücher, however, expanded upon the themes seen in Ortgeschichte, 
including, for example, the history and times of Germanic tribes to the present 
(thereby establishing a link with antiquity), catalogues of regional nature, geography, 
plants, and animals, and expositions of antiquated lifestyle through examples of 
tradition and customs.92  
 The preservation and documentation of regional history during the nineteenth 
century helped to distinguish local identities. Heimat, as a result, was described in 
these historical compendiums in a very immediate and native way. The political era of 
pan-Germanism had only begun to awaken, and the Heimat concept, while still in its 
infancy, was therefore limited to histories describing proximate homelands only, and 
not any greater German cultural territory. In Austria, for example, Joseph Fink and 
Hippolyt von Klenze’s ‘Der Mittelberg: Geschichte, Landes und Volkskunde des 
ehemaligen gleichnamigen Geritches’ (1891), and the very first Wälder Heimatbuch 
‘Au im Bregenzerwald’ by the priest Joseph Hiller in 1890, presented the local history 
of the mountainous Vorarlberg region as an example of Austrian regional 
distinctiveness. Local priests or schoolteachers, who were seen as the authority for the 
transmission of community history, usually authored Heimatbücher, and, unlike 
scholarly texts, were clearly written and well-illustrated publications destined for 
school curriculum or the family home.93  
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 By the twentieth century Heimatbücher had become an established literary 
style. The ‘Wiener Heimatbücher’ series openly made use of the term in its title, and 
was released as individual compendiums of local history pertaining to Vienna’s 
various Gemeindebezirke.94 The distinct history reserved for each Gemeindebezirke, 
simultaneously assembled as a greater historical Viennese narrative, is further 
evidence of the close synergy placed between local and national identity discourses in 
the Heimat concept, albeit within the context of Austria’s ancient imperial capital. 
The authors of Heimatbücher presided over the reawakening of older times, by 
providing conceivable and therefore popular accounts of the past that were all but 
stripped of academic banality. Heimat history was therefore not a logical or 
theoretical account of the past, but rather a living and vivid account of the legacy left 
by the ancestors, and the identity this heritage imparts. Heimat history, in particular, 
looked toward the past for political, cultural, and existential reassurances of 
distinctiveness and meaning in a present age of national homogenisation.95 The 
individual histories of the Viennese Gemeindebezirke, accordingly, coalesced to 
provide its audience with a grand narrative pertaining to the exceptionalism of 
Viennese history and identity, and presented evidence that while the political 
uncertainties of the twentieth century were transforming Austria and much of Europe, 
local identities remained the very foundation of the nation’s collective identity 
narrative. 
 Having successfully attracted audiences to the preservation of natural 
landscapes, while also simultaneously writing compendiums of local history, Heimat 
enthusiasts then set about the aim of evoking ethnographic consciousness. A detailed 
presentation of local communities’ culture and customs, sourced largely from 
folkloric data, provided the stimulus from which to generate Heimat ethnography. 
Heimat ethnography was practiced by academic and non-academic circles, all of 
which, together, dutifully collected, catalogued, studied, displayed, promoted, and, 
indeed, invented folk traditions. 96  The	   results	   of	   their	   ethnographic research 
provided the Heimat concept with an important human presence. The folkloric studies 	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undertaken by the Heimat movement cultivated traditional customs, values, and life-
styles to communities in a very personal way. Developing collective ethnographic 
awareness through folklore was structured largely around the goal of developing a 
culture that was rooted in the people, with Heimat as the centre point from which all 
was derived and cultivated.97 Individual social groups could take great pleasure in a 
sense of ownership over these stories, and subsequently laude them as chronicles to 
their distinctiveness. Through the preservation and, indeed, adoration of folklore, 
Heimat enthusiasts could describe where their local communities had lived, as well as 
how they lived and thought throughout an extended temporal continuum.98  
 In Germany, for example, Heimat became a way to celebrate provincialism 
and nationalism through the conservation of language, folklore, history, traditions, 
and all things that were believed to characterise local and national identity. 99 
Nineteenth century Heimatkundler, and the more general Heimatbewegungen, 
provided both the local and national community compilations of folk culture that 
extolled the virtues of local customs that were ascribed to a greater national image.100 
From the nineteenth century, Austrian Heimat enthusiasts also attempted to diminish 
the divide between nationalist territorial claims and the identities of local villages by 
showcasing local histories, culture, geography, and language as characteristic of the 
Austrian Heimat.101 The Verein für Volkskunde was established 1894 in order to 
further explore Austrian folk culture through the lens of historical anthropology, and 
Museum für Volkskunde opened a year later to showcase the results of such 
ethnographic research to the public.102 The field of Volkskunde (folkloric studies or 
anthropology) is attributed to the German Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl (1823 – 1897), 
who wrote numerous works on Germanic folklore, culture, and history in order to 	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illuminate the ‘German social essence’ as a model for the state.103 From its very 
inception then, Volkskunde sought to use ethnographic data as a design for collective 
national identity, with Heimat as its focal point. In Austria, Heimat ethnography also 
attempted to capture the ‘essence’ of the populace through an exploration of culture 
and folklore. Die österreichische Zeitschrift für Volkskunde (1895), for example, 
included articles by Richard von Kralik titled Zur österreichischen Sagenkunde and 
Alois Riegl’s Der Volksmäßige und die Gegenwart.104 The purpose of the articles was 
to highlight the distinctiveness of the Austrian character through the paradigm of 
follore.  
 Rather than research that was motivated by a pan-Germanist agenda, however, 
Austrian Heimat ethnography was principally an exercise in recording and cultivating 
the folk culture of the Habsburg Monarchy, which, due to the urbanisation of late 
nineteenth century Central and Western Europe, was sourced largely from the influx 
of peoples from the Austrian countryside as they moved toward the cities.105 Heimat 
folklore in Austria thus integrated many local traditions into a distinctly Austrian 
narrative. Austrian ethnography, through the many references to the folk culture and 
traditions of the Habsburg past, became a popular patrimony that connected 
generations of Austrians together in a long continuum. Heimat ethnography 
epitomised the Volkscharacter of Austrians, reconciling regional identities into a 
conceivable whole that was epitomized through legends, dialects, costume, food, 
dances, values, and traditions. A proclivity for that which is inherited, however, could 
easily be utilised in an agenda that impelled biologically derived notions of Heimat. 
The pan-Germanic racism that would develop in Germany and Austria by the 
twentieth century would transform the Heimat concept into a platform with which to 
promote völkisch nationalism, Aryanism, and the politics of National Socialism.  
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1.3.4 - The biologically derived homeland: Heimat, racism, and National 
Socialism 
 The FPÖ’s tendency to use the Heimat concept as a point of reference in a 
discourse that antagonistically contrasts a genuine Austrian national ‘in’ group with 
foreign ‘outsider’ groups has led to numerous accusations of xenophobia leveled 
against the party. Due to the party’s additional intransigent rejection of 
multiculturalism, the FPÖ’s use of Heimat is interpreted in some corners as a racially 
inimical platform. Jack Malone, for example, argues that the FPÖ’s frequent use of 
Heimat alongside discourse that is antagonistic towards the Islamic community of 
Austria indicates that the term is being used by the party to encourage nationalistic 
fervor that can also, directly or indirectly, lead to manifestations of racism.106 The 
FPÖ’s Heimat discourse has even been indicted elsewhere for allegedly exhibiting 
National Socialist undertones. Wodak and Reisigl, for example, argue that the FPÖ’s 
Heimat discourse is a direct and calculated appeal to Conservative Austrians, which, 
when persuasively applied, harkens the sympathetic ear back to a time before and 
even during the Nazi era, and is therefore much more evocative than the notion of 
‘nation’ or state’.107  
 While the FPÖ makes its anti-immigration platform abundantly clear, there is 
also a certain stigma surrounding the term Heimat that is a result of the concept’s role 
in the development of aggressive ethnocentric nationalism and National Socialism in 
Central Europe during the late and early twentieth centuries. The historical usage of 
the term Heimat as a means of manipulating a sense of national consciousness proved 
to be very expedient during the reign of the National Socialists. Although Nazism 
would merge concepts of Heimat with racism and a biologically derived notion of 
homeland, the concept’s previous proclivity towards ethnographic data as collective 
identity, all of which was connected to a specific territory, allowed for easy 
manipulation under National Socialism. The origins of the ‘racist’ taboo associated 
with the concept of Heimat lies in the rise of German völkisch nationalism, which 
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begun in the nineteenth century but reached its zenith during the twentieth century.108 
By the early twentieth century, this rising tide of German cultural nationalism in 
Central Europe began to influence the philosophy and politics of the Heimat 
movement in Austria. Although the favored narrative that celebrated the history of the 
Habsburgs remained present, the popular notion of a pure, autochthonous, and 
interrelated Germanic history, culture, and identity began to grow. Austrian 
Heimatschützer joined their German counterparts in their emphasis on a collective 
return of the people to their “heimische” or “bodenständige” traditions, which were 
encapsulated in both the local and national histories.109 The traditions that informed 
the Heimat concept, however, increasingly began to be understood as examples of an 
Austria that, by the nature of the nation’s Germanic heritage, belonged within the 
German cultural community.110 The defeat of the Habsburgs in World War I, the 
radically more homogeneous ethnic makeup of the westerly German speaking 
territories known as Cisleithania, and the loss of more ethnically and culturally 
diverse territory to the east, all led to a more vigorous debate around the possibility of 
Anschluss with Germany.111  
 In the debate surrounding a political union with Germany, it was the 
commonality of culture and ethnicity between Germans and Austrians, assisted by 
growing völkisch attitudes within the Heimat movement and contiguous politico-
cultural groups, which proved to be the most persuasive. In an essay from 1919, for 
example, Robert Musil (1880 – 1942), a philosophical writer born in the Austrian city 
of Klagenfurt, declared that a ‘mystic’ and ‘spiritual’ union existed between the two 
nations on the basis of linguistic and ethnic kinship.112 The only logical conclusion for 
many Austrians who prescribed to völkisch interpretations of Heimat was that a 
political union should follow suit. The rising political power of Germany, and the 
growing will of many Austrians to join with her on the basis of common ethnoculture, 
demonstrated a profound ambiguity within the twentieth century Heimat narrative: the 	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sense of belonging to both an Austrian homeland and to the German Volk. Austrian 
Heimat ethnography, while undoubtedly maintaining a distinctly local Austrian 
character, had nonetheless drawn the population closer to their Germanic cultural 
roots. The preoccupation with the history and cultural identity of the Volk 
demonstrated that, from its very beginnings, the Heimat concept was appropriate for 
manipulation by the advocates of ethnocentric nationalism. With the rise of völkisch 
nationalism and the success of Adolf Hitler’s Nazi party, the Austrian sense of 
Heimat, identity, would be transformed to suit the propaganda of the NSDAP. The 
local autonomy of the Heimat, as a result, would all but disintegrate under the weight 
of the prevailing pan-Germanic narrative that would characterize early twentieth 
century Central Europe. 
 Like so many other aspects of German-speaking cultural life, the Heimat 
concept was wholly manipulated and transformed under National Socialism to 
represent the will and ideology of the Nazi regime. So total was the Nazi conquest 
and control over cultural abstractions such as Heimat, that, as Michael Giesler argues, 
“National Socialism was the greatest movement toward the destruction of ‘Heimat’ in 
German history.”113 The ruin of the original Heimat concept lay in its total conversion 
into a political creed that proclaimed ethnic superiority, segregation, and racist 
political violence. National Socialism achieved the disfigurement of the Heimat 
concept by dominating descriptions of the homeland through references to race, 
blood, and biology. In the National Socialist interpretation of Heimat, the concept 
became linked with an aggressive form of völkisch cultural nationalism.114 Heimat 
therefore came to be synonymous with völkisch concepts of race and territory. The 	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National Socialist Blut und Boden policy defined Heimat as “rootedness that has been 
transformed into feeling and spirit. Through the sense of Heimat, the individual, the 
family, and the group are tied together by fate to a piece of land that dominates their 
soul.”115 The policy of Blut und Boden was developed by the Reichminister for Food 
and Agriculture Richard Walther Darré (1895 – 1953), an Argentine-born German 
and dedicated member of völkish groups in his youth. In Darré’s ideology, Blut, as 
blood, stands for his völkisch racial theories and biological-nationalism, and Boden, 
as soil, for all his notions on agriculture.116 As a result, the conbination of blood and 
soil in National Socialist Heimat discourse led to the exile or murder of those that 
were believed to not belong to the land. By linking the identity of the land with 
biologically derived völkisch notions of race, Heimat stood as the murderous 
campaign against anyone who was deemed “un-German.”117 
 By the turn of the century, German völkisch poet Adolf Bartels’s definition of 
(1862 – 1945) Heimat as a membership to the Germanic racial group, thus excluding 
other ethnicities, was largely accepted. 118  The principles of völkish German 
nationalism, and the distortion of Heimat as a biologically derived notion of society 
and state, achieved a dominant intellectual and political position in the National 
Socialist dictatorship. As Johannes von Moltke explains, it was völkisch antagonism 
toward the homogenizing forces of modernity, which led authors and participants of 
the völkisch movement to see themselves as disgruntled cultural elites, which 
subsequently helped pave the way for National Socialism. 119  While völkisch 
nationalism had influenced the politics of Hitler, the Nazi party entirely usurped 
Heimat to encourage patriotism and racism. By the time Nazi control in both political 
and academic circles was absolute, Heimat had lost its autonomy, becoming just 
another word in the party’s lexicon to promote the central themes of race, blood, and 
German destiny.120 For this reason modern scholarly tradition often attempts to link 
the discourse of Heimat with the National Socialist ideology of biological-cultural 	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nationalism.121 For example, the Heimatschutz organisation, with its environmental 
planning and activism alongside vague association with cultural mysticism, has been 
consistently argued to be a prelude to Nazi Blut und Boden policies, and thus labelled 
‘crypto-fascist’. 122  However as with many ideas and institutions under Nazi 
dictatorship, the meaning and direction of Heimat groups was largely transformed, or 
hijacked, to suit the narrative of the party. It is generally agreed that the Nazi Blut und 
Boden ideology benefited from the strength of pre-existing rural traditions and 
provincial identities123, preserved, for example, by the numerous Heimat and völkisch 
organisations. 
 For all their talk about Heimat, race and roots, localism was anathema to the 
regime, which consolidated its power by advocating national policy.124 For example, 
the four-volume Nazi textbook Deutsches Volk, deutsche Heimat of 1935 provides a 
natural history of Germany from the primordial and mythic Urdeutschland, to the 
contemporary return of Germanic superiority embodied in the Nazi regime. The 
historiographical theorem implicit in Deutsches Volk, deutsche Heimat defines the 
German Volk as “the unity of blood, language, will and fate” and Heimat as “the unity 
of the soil that has been shaped by the work of the people and is populated entirely or 
predominantly by this people.”125 While Heimat enthusiasts had originally focused on 
regional identity, under National Socialism Heimat is consistently seen as a reference 
to nation and Volk.126 Heimat was consumed into the Nazi revolutionary totality, a 
synthesis of blood and soil, and a mythic ethnogenesis culminating in Nazi 
ascendency and political dominance. In the conclusion to Deutsches Volk, deutsche 	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Heimat, it states “National Socialism is a march into Heimat”, and that “only a 
people’s revolution that seized all aspects of life and initiated the march into Heimat, 
to a renewed unity of blood and soil, could preserve the one thing that gives any 
politics it sense and goal: the life of the German people.”127 Through works like 
Deutsches Volk, deutsche Heimat, the Nazis transformed Heimat into a völkisch 
national entity that entirely suited their social-biological principles. Adolf Hitler’s 
failure to secure victory in Europe, and the subsequent abandonment of his party’s 
ethnocentric, pan-Germanic principles, essentially permitted the Heimat concept to 
reset itself. The Heimat concept in Austria, like the nation’s own government, was 
now free to look once more to its own landscapes, history, and distinct culture as a 
means of inspiration. 
 
1.4 - Austrian national identity in the Second Republic  
 With the defeat of Nazism in Europe, and with it any political or academic 
musings on pan-Germanism, the Second Republic of Austria attempted to put the 
pieces of its Heimat back together. As we have seen, the concept of Heimat had up 
until the Third Reich been increasingly used to illustrate Germanness as a discourse of 
identity through cultural or biological perspectives. However, thanks to the Allies 
decree that Austria was, despite considerable evidence to the contrary, the first victim 
of Hitler’s aggression, the Austrian nation was at liberty to unburden itself of the 
‘ghosts’ of the Third Reich, and return to their cultural cities, rural topographies, and 
mountainous Heimat. This meant that Heimat in post-war Austria would become a 
place in which to forget, feel renewed pride, and to retreat into the peaceful 
tranquillity of the mountain landscape. This modern Austrian Heimat was seen from 
the Second Republic as a one-thousand-year old country with a unique history and 
cultural traditions, all of which developed in naturally beautiful landscapes. 128 
Patriotism and a sense of a distinct collective history were gained through focussing 
on the great era of the Habsburgs. The legacy of this powerful European dynasty 
allowed Austria to distance itself from the failed national concepts of Kultur- and 
Sprachnation endemic under Nazism, by providing Austrians a distinct historico-
cultural identity narrative that predates the era of nationalism or pan-Germanism. 	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Ancient history and cultural inheritance of a golden artistic and feudal age provided a 
continuity of greatness and legitimacy. The natural beauty of the Austrian landscape 
was also harnessed as a Heimat motif to attract tourists, a rich and beautiful land of 
the blessed.129 
 The Austrian Heimatfilm genre provided a powerful medium with which to 
discursively construct a distinctly Austrian image of Heimat during the Second 
Republic. Post World War II Austrian Heimatfilm is described specifically as those 
productions, which, according to their own self-image, wanted to depict the Austrian 
character by using Austrian countryside, customs, and mentality, all of which is 
encapsulated in beautiful, clichéd landscapes, which are charged with positive, rural, 
and even mythical values.130 Eventually reaching heights of popularity during the 
1950s, Gertraud Steiner writes that after 1945 the Heimatfilm was not only a West 
German genre but also the dominant product of the Austrian film industry.131 The 
dramaturgy of post-war Heimatfilm portrays the homeland by using ‘native’ people 
filmed alongside ‘intact’ nature. Austrian Heimatfilm therefore focused on displaying 
to its audience those Austrian topographies and communities that were believed to 
have cultural and national significance.132 Heimatfilm in Austria was thus devised to 
adapt beautiful scenery and narratives pertaining with simple and traditional modes of 
existence in order to demonstrate a hidden message – the quest to establish a new 
nation and national identity.133 The result was a new and popular medium that could 
educate and inform all Austrians of their unique, collective national identity through 
the lens of the Heimat concept. Much like the FPÖ, the architects of post-war 
Austrian Heimatfilm sought to create a new sense of Austrian patriotism through a 
celebration of regional landscapes and the cultural communities that live there. 
Heimatfilm thus sought to negate the alienating influence of modernity by ‘turning 
back the clock’ to a more pure and genuine age, enriched with native tradition.134  	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 The persistent attempts to construct national consciousness through the lens of 
the Heimat concept shows that Austrian national identity in history remains contested. 
Despite the turbulent socio-political history of the Austrian nation, however, the 
Heimat concept continues to function somewhere within the very centre of the debate 
surrounding place, belonging, and identity. Although Heimat has proven expedient in 
the manipulating a sense of national consciousness, as a concept that is consistently 
evoked to further one interpretation of national identity or the other, the question of 
collective identity in Austria remains problematical. Austria is a nation of many 
Heimaten, and the historical examples of what constitutes the Austrian nation 
continue to perplex the architects of Heimat. While Heimat may evoke national 
consciousness, national identity in modern Austria remains complex and at times 
altogether illusive.  
 
1.5 – Austria’s complicated national image 
 While it is apparent that for the Right-Wing populists Heimat is analogous 
with a national identity informed by hereditary and uniform cultural patterns, Austrian 
national identity remains a contested topic. Austria’s identity has many contradictory 
features, sourced from a wide array of historical and cultural sources. Academic 
literature on the topic of Austrian identity principally uses historical perspectives in 
an attempt to verify the existence of an independent Austrian nation and national 
identity, using empirical evidence to demonstrate how these abstractions are firmly 
rooted in the Austrian psyche.135 In this argument, Austria is seen as distinct from 
German origins. However, opinions on the topic remain as diverse as the nation itself. 
Austria is described either as the great European power Habsburg power that 
dominated most of central Europe, or defined by its complex relationship with 
Germany especially from 1848 – 1938, a land that was a focus of Nazism, or imply a 
small alpine country like that of Switzerland.136 Indeed, there is no other European 
country at the end of the twentieth century whose identity has changed so often since 
the 1800s.137  	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 The continuum of alternative opinion on the Austrian national character, 
which has long been obscured by profound historical and political incongruities, 
hinders attempts to consolidate a definitive identity narrative. Expressions of Austrian 
identity (understood here as the popular identity in the territory that makes up the 
Republic of Austria) traditionally incorporate a range of opinion, which, along with 
local identity rooted in provincial origin, claim Austria holds both a geographically 
Austrian and ethnocultural German identity. 138  Modern attempts to define the 
Austrian nation and cultural identity as European, but not German, continue to puzzle 
and cause debate among scholars today. The contentious nature of the debate, in the 
past few decades in particular, over what defines an Austrian in a national sense 
results in many contradictions within public and academic opinion. ‘Austria’ was 
established prior to the age of nationalism, it has seen the rise of a multiethnic empire 
to the east, been the purveyor of territories won and lost, seen a decline to a core 
German speaking territory after the First World War, as well as the forfeit of 
sovereignty in the German annexation of 1938. Peter Thaler notes that in “the 
(modern) Austrian nation debate, the lines have been drawn more sharply, and the 
cultural notions of nationhood are frequently interpreted as a German aberration.” 139 
The case of Austria, at the very least, is a good example of the difficulty in gaining an 
appropriate balance between cultural notions of nationhood, and more straightforward 
conceptualisations of national identity as systems of governance. Matters concerning 
culture are so intrinsically linked with the nation’s political history that any pursuit of 
a firm national identity in modern Austria is at the same time a quest for cultural 
identity.140 The borders of Austria may be geographically clear, but the frontiers of 
Austrian identity throughout the course of history into modern day seem too contested 
to permit a common identity upon which all Austrians can agree. 
 
1.5.1 – The founding myths of the Austrian nation 
 Austria’s diverse history is contested in the debate between popular historians 
and traditional scholarship. According to the ‘Germanist perspectivce’, Austria’s 	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German heritage and close political relationship with Germany indicates a close and 
natural repour between the two nations. The emergence of ‘Austrianist’ scholarship 
during the Second Republic, however, disputes the ‘Germanist’ argument in favour of 
a distinctly Austrian narrative. Since the collapse of National Socialism, scholars have 
construed the origins of the birth of the Austrian nation in various ways. For example, 
Gerald Stourzh (1990) and Ernst Bruckmüller (1991) identify the beginning of the 
Austrian nation in the local traditions of various provinces dating back to the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries.141 Other historians concur that a distinctly separate Austrian 
identity developed during the course of the nineteenth century beginning with the 
abdication of Franz II from the Holy Roman Empire in 1806.142 We may well trace 
the modern debate on Austrian national identity to the final days of World War II, 
where in the wake of the National Socialist defeat, political leaders of the Austrian 
Second Republic emphasised the country’s long tradition of culture and autonomy.143 
As Innsbruck historian Anton Pelinka explains in his essay From Pan-Germanism to 
New Populism in Austria, after the Allies re-established Austrian independence in 
1955, the pan-German tradition, so well established in Austria previously, was 
ostracised “due to its identification with Nazism.”144 Indeed, there is an explicit 
attempt to deny the very legitimacy of the German cultural community as a platform 
for national identity.145 The aversion to German Nazism in the nation has led many 
historians to subsequently conclude that the re-emergence of a separate Austrian 
identity at the beginning of the Second Republic is entrenched in an Austrian 
‘resistance’ to National Socialism.146 The arguments of historians such as Kriessler 
negate the earlier concept of the nation defined by ethnic and cultural characteristics, 	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a German Kulturnation or Sprachnation, which places Austrian identity within a 
wider German Kulturgemeinschaft, and which is accepted by only a small number of 
scholars in Austria today.147 While Austrian historiography had been previously been 
known for its Germanist perspective, this modern rejection of the Kultur- and 
Sprachnation was, at least academically, a profound distancing from past 
perspectives. As a result, all Austrian roots in German history were ignored in the 
restoration years, and Austria’s own unique history was honoured for the purposes of 
identity formation.  
 It was during the early years of the Second Republic that the so-called 
“Ostarrîchi myth” was applied in a re-emerging national identity that was distinct 
from the formerly prevailing pan-German narrative.148 Ostarrîchi is the middle-high 
German from which the name Österreich is derived. The word first appears in a 
document dating back to A.D. 996, describing the lands of Leopold of Babenburg in 
what is present-day Lower Austria.149 The historical document provides Austria an 
ancient past, placing the origins of the modern Austrian nation in the Middle Ages. 
The result of such national historiography was new myths of national identity that 
distanced Austria from Germany and Nazism, and put the nation at the heart of a one-
thousand-year old land, rich with history, cultural tradition, and epic natural beauty. 
The term ‘Austria’ thus came to once more reference the unifying force of the house 
of Habsburg as well as the House of Austria (Casa d’Austria), which from the 
nineteenth century stood for the Austrian empire as a Central European power.150 
 The Second Republic’s ‘Austrianist’ argument provided the country with a 
sense of ‘national pride’ derived from Austrian high culture and the Habsburg 
monarchy. National consciousness was linked to an image of Austria as a ‘cultural 
world power’ that boasted a wealth of typically ‘Austrian’, and not necessarily 
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German, history, cultural symbols, and traditions.151 Numerous artworks in Austria 
have been used to evoke national pride in the Habsburg victory over the Ottomans in 
1683 – 97. Telesko, for example, cites the use of art as a medium to illustrate the 
potent mythification of the Habsburg victory over the Islamic army in Austria, and the 
subsequent national legend it created.152 Memories of these events endure today, and 
the historical myth that describes Habsburg’s dominance over the Ottomans has 
endured to inform the collective identity of many Austrians. For many, Austria 
remains characterised as a defender of the West and Christendom from Islam, leading 
to a prevailing anti-Islamic, anti-Turkish attitude in Vienna in particular.153 The 
Habsburg legacy, therefore, not only provides a distinctly Austrian identity narrative 
that bestows pride in its sympathisers, but also, indirectly, formulates images of an 
historical enemy.  
 In furtherance of Austria’s independence from German history, the history of 
the nation is further described by recalling the Austrian Empire (Kaisertum 
Österreich), which was created in 1804 out of the various provinces ruled by the 
Habsburgs and represented not only German speakers but also Polish, Czech, 
Hungarian, Italian, Slovenian, Slovakian, Serbo-Croatian, Ukranian, Romanian, 
Yiddish, and Romani.154 In origin, therefore, Austria was seen as a great and 
independent power second only to Russia, whose multi-ethnic population was ruled 
over by a dynasty whose lineage stretched back to the Holy Roman Empire, and was 
thus unrestrained by the cultural and national limitations of the Germany nation or 
cultural community. For example in 1980, Austrian Felix Kreissler published La prise 
de conscience de la nation autrichienne, 1938-1945-1978, in which he identifies the 
origins of the Austrian nation with the proclamation of empire in 1804.155 In his work 
Österreich: Zweite Republik, historian Georg Wagner also illustrated an Austrian 
nation that was distinct from the German cultural community by locating Austria’s 
Celtic origins in the state of Noricum, as well as the development of the Habsburg 	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hereditary lands around 1500.156 Viennese historian Ernst Bruckmüller similarly 
emphasised the formative roles of local province and popular participation in his 
study Nation Österreich, where he argues that the longing for collective national 
identity post-1945 to consolidate a definitive national identity from the various 
regions of Austria.157 While the emphasis on distinctions from German patterns of 
cultural-identity dominated public opinion post-1945, it was through the seminal work 
of such popular histories that the traditional Germanist academic view of Austrian 
identity was openly contested, and Austrian national historiography became clearly 
visible.  
 Despite the dominance of national historiography in the Austrian identity 
debate, however, the commonality of culture in a pan-German identity narrative 
persists, greatly influenced by those scholars and historians who oppose the strictly 
‘Austrianist’ approach to history and national identity. The traditional ‘Germanist 
‘view defines Austrian identity as an integral part of the broader German identity 
narrative, while the new school of ‘Austrianists’ refute a relationship between 
Austrian and German identity of any kind.158 The highly respected Austrian historian 
Fritz Fellner, for example, advocates a ‘Germanist’ perspective by refuting the 
simplicity and tunnel vision of Austro-nationalist historiography. For Fellner, such a 
school of thought is similar to the restricted, state-centric Prusso-German model of 
historiography, and he emphasises the polycephalic diversity of German history, in 
which Austrian developments are key to understanding greater German 
developments.159 In 1978 West German historian Karl Dietrich Erdmann encountered 
much criticism, where, in his essay Die Spur Österreichs in der deutschen Geschichte, 
Erdmann followed a ‘German’ historical narrative through Austrian components.160 
Erdmann’s tendency to describe Austrian national identity through historiography that 
linked Austria with the greater German cultural community had largely fallen out of 
favour in academic circles.  	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 However Austria’s past role as a central European power continues to hinder a 
conclusive modern Austrian self-image, as a constant measuring between a small 
modern Republic and an “old” empire is at times specious.161 As Thaler explains, 
Austria’s long relationship to the German cultural community, along with a sizeable 
demographic that has sought to distance the nation from Germany, has arguably not 
only facilitated the disintegration of a common central European cultural identity, but 
also hindered a distinctly common Austrian identity from forming in its place. The 
contemporary popular notion of what makes up modern Austrian national identity, 
then, possesses the following conflicting elements. Austria as a nation has both 
territorially Austrian as well as culturally German characteristics, both of which have 
developed alongside local identity rooted in regional and provincial idiosyncrasies, 
which are also unique unto themselves.162 Therefore the debate over where one 
identity starts and the others begin remains problematical. The dividing lines seem too 
established, the history too complicated, to allow for a commonly accepted collective 
identity.  
 It is clear in a historico-cultural context that both a ‘Germanist’ and 
‘Austrianist’ perspective on national identity remain in modern Austria. The two 
opposing schools of thought continue to cause ambiguities and contradictions in the 
national identity debate in contemporary Austria. It would be unfair to deny 
‘Austrianists’ their belief that their identity is independent from central European 
German cultural influence, in the same way it would be irrational to reject that a 
people whose mother tongue is German indeed hold some relationship with the larger 
German community. Austria’s two schools of thought on the national identity debate 
demonstrate, either by preserving older historico-cultural identity myths or 
establishing distinct and separate new ones, that cultural factors play an inseparable 
role alongside political ones in defining modern Austria. The FPÖ’s political success 
will lie in its ability to overcome the incongruities of Austrian identity, and at the 
same time appeal to both the ‘Austrianist’ and ‘Germanist’ demographic. The parties 
seek to accomplish this broader political influence by advocating a national ‘in’ group 
of Austrians that are both nationalistically Austrian and a part of the German 	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Kulturgemeinschaft. The party’s use of Heimat in its national identity discourse, as 
will be explored in the following chapters, allows for the exclusion of minority groups 
or outsiders that do not conform to the normative cultural abstractions that 
characterise the party’s understanding of the nation and its genuine population.  
 
1.6 - Conclusion  
 Heimat, then, is an important point of reference in questions pertaining to 
Austrian collective identity and belonging. The typical image Heimat depicts, from its 
origins and development to the modern Austrian perspective, is that of provinciality, 
parochialism, nature, and picturesque folklore all encapsulated in a lifestyle that is 
traditional, hereditary, and in harmony with nature. The image of Heimat may be 
immediate as a surrounding, although that is not always necessary. Heimat can also be 
that special place known as home that is remembered, sometimes collectively, as 
childhood memories or long lost recollections. In synthesis the spatially and 
temporally determined elements of Heimat construct a national identity narrative with 
long provincial roots, often where a definitive national identity is lacking. A typically 
Austrian physical and human landscape develops from the notion of Heimat, and 
defines how the population should identify themselves and their community or nation. 
The use of the Heimat concept helps elites facilitate and strengthen an imagined 
national community, in which representations of locality, region, and nation become 
interchangeable and interdependent to create a definition of a modern ‘Austria’. This 
version of modern Austria enjoys an historical continuity traced back to antiquity, 
which allows native Austrians to express a degree of pride in local traditions and 
cultural inheritance, and avoid the problematic question of pan-Germanism and 
Germanic identity while not directly denouncing it. The diversity of regional 
identities in the greater Austrian identity framework allows many to use the concept 
of Heimat to establish definitive national (while also local) examples of the true 
Austrian character. As a result, modern Austria as Heimat provides the grounds for 
firm patriotism (Nationalgefühl) and new sense of unique identity and purpose. The 
previous oppositional discourse endemic in Heimat discourse, such as provincial 
instead of urban, traditional before modern, and fixed community rather than 
migration and displacement, have always demonstrated a certain desire in local 
German speaking communities to maintain their cultural identity when the future of 
the political establishment is either in transition or in turmoil. 
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 However, as we have seen, identifying a definitive Austrian national identity 
remains, at least from a historico-cultural perspective, as illusive as the many 
ambiguous definitions of Heimat throughout history. Austria as an empire and 
kingdom predates the classifications of nationalism, and the history of the nation into 
the modern world has seen a great range of tumultuous changes to borders, 
administration, and national identity narratives. The cultural dimensions of Austria’s 
national past often distort any clear boundaries between Austria as a European nation, 
and a community with a cultural identity that is fixed within the German cultural 
sphere. This is seen most noticeably in the fierce debate about Austrian national 
identity between Austrianists and Germanists, and also demonstrates that the histories 
and mythologies of nations are largely open to interpretation by the historians that 
analyse them. Distinguishing the boundaries of the Austrian nation and Heimat 
therefore becomes a Right-Wing populist quest to wrest an Austrian identity from the 
influences of cultutral pan-Germanism, without necessarily negating Austria’s 
cultural roots. In the FPÖ’s debate surrounding the German cultural origins of 
Austrian identity, Heimat may very well be symbolically depicted as a tree with roots 
that run deep. The tree is harvested for timber, which is then used to fashion the 
collective ‘house’, or nation, that accommodates the population. German roots, in 
other words, produced the wood that came to build a uniquely Austrian nation. 
Although the Heimat concept, with its numerous citations of ethnographic data, 
acknowledges the Germanic heritage of Austrian identity, it also, through natural 
landscapes and dialect for example, describes the very genuine Austrian contribution 
to the German cultural community. Heimat, therefore, describes the profundity of 
local identity over pan-German abstractions, no matter the close cultural ties. Heimat, 
accordingly, affords all Austrians a heritage and identity that grew to exceptional and 
distinctive heights, while never disregarding origins and roots. 
  It is through the Heimat concept that Austria attempts to discursively construct 
its own unique national story to share with the world. Heimat is summarised, as this 
thesis will now explore, through Austrian national landscapes, histories, culture, and 
traditions. My thesis explores, furthermore, the manipulation of the Heimat concept 
into a discursively constructed national identity narrative that suits the FPÖ’s Right-
Wing populist political agenda of monoculturalism and ethnic preservation. Their 
interpretation of Heimat legitimates their vision for a monoethnic society, which 
marginalises other ethnic minorities through a denial of the practicality of both multi- 
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and uniculturalism in modern Austria. This definition of Heimat is legitimated, as we 
shall see, through the thematic portrayal of the elements that supposedly constitute a 
true sense of Heimat. The first of which is the topography of the land itself, which is 
symbolically charged with cultural elements of Austrian national identity that are 
hereditable and fixed to the landscape. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Heimat, Nature, and Landscape 	  	  
Nothing more gladdening grows on earth, O Zarathustra, than an exalted, 
robust will: it is the earth’s fairest growth. A Whole landscape is refreshed by 
one such tree. 
To the pine-tree, O Zarathustra, do I compare him who grows up like you: 
tall, silent, hard, alone, of the finest, supplest wood 
- at last, however, reaching out with the strong, green branches for its domain, 
asking bold questions of the winds and storms and whatever is at home in the 
heights.163 
 
2.0 - Introduction 
 As has been established in chapter one, for the FPÖ the notion of Heimat and 
therefore also national identity is closely linked to nature and landscape. This is seen 
for example in the party’s 2011 Graz party programme, where, under the title Heimat, 
Identität und Umwelt, the party’s policies on the environment are listed as an ethnic-
cultural-environmental triptych alongside perspectives on Austrian culture and 
identity. The ‘greening’ of nationalism, with such detailed and dedicated programmes 
toward environmental conservation, initially appears to reflect Green political 
thought. For example, Right-Wing populist and Far Left Green groups both criticise 
the Western ethos of consumption and the degradation of nature without any real 
advancement in human prosperity or fulfilment.164 Green political thought, however, 
advocates sustainable practices alongside core policies of social justice, 
decentralisation, pacifism, progressive gender roles, and racial equalities, all of which 
are largely incompatible with Rightist ideology.165 For the FPÖ, nature and landscape 
are brought into the political debate to demonstrate a local sense of place, ownership 
over nature, and a long-established inhabitancy, all of which demonstrate a definitive 
identity of place through a Heimat discourse that is embedded in emotive rhetoric.  
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2.1 – Umweltschutz ist Heimatschutz  
 Right-Wing populist parties in Europe share the political creed that local 
nature defines the homeland, and that each separate people have developed a unique 
identity and culture in interaction with their own land and territory.166 The FPÖ 
similarly uses environmentalism in order to diminish the existential divide between 
the Austrian national group and its natural environment. For example, in their 
political programme the FPÖ explains the need for environmental protection 
alongside the demand to preserve culture, national identity and Heimat.167 Nature, 
therefore, plays a decisive role in their image of Heimat. This is observed particularly 
in the FPÖ’s Umweltschutz als Heimatschutz platform, which merges eco-nationalism 
with the conservation of nature, resource management, and agricultural protectionism. 
The fusion of emotional nationalistic rhetoric and environmentalism is a popular 
approach across the Right-Wing populist political spectrum. Many European Right-
Wing populist parties engage in environmentalism as a platform designed to protect 
the homeland.”168 Although the FPÖ has always had an environmental preservation 
platform, political expert Thomas Herfer explains that the modern FPÖ identifies 
Umweltzschutz, specifically, “als Heimatschutz.”169 The blending of Umwelt and 
Heimat is seen, for example, when in 2006 the then FPÖ Vizebundesparteiobmann 
Norbert Hofer stated that for the FPÖ “Umweltschutz” also means “Heimatschutz.”170 
The Graz chapter of the FPÖ also declares that the party aspires to preserve Heimat 
“für kommende Generationen”, and make possible “ein selbstbestimmtes Leben in 
einer intakten Umwelt.”171 Environmental preservation, in other words, is specifically 
associated with the protection of nation and Heimat from any form of exploitation.  
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 Many other German-speaking Far Right groups share the Umweltschutz ist 
Heimatschutz thesis. The Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, for example, 
state in their programme under the title Umweltschutz ist Heimatschutz that an ‘intact’ 
nature is the foundation of the future, and that nature is not only Umwelt but also 
Mitwelt because it is an integral part of national identity.172 The party goes on to state 
specifically that man is a part of nature, and any existential divide between national 
groups and their environment must be negated.173 The Far-Right Sweden Democrats 
see humans as a part of nature, with “the qualities of beauty that are embedded in 
nature” required in order to “fulfil our spiritual needs and make possible a high 
quality of life.”174 Nature, as such, is a place that is recognised by Right-Wing 
populist groups as identify-forming and identity-preserving.175 From the Far Right 
perspective, environmental preservation has “as much to do with protecting a piece of 
ourselves, as it does with protecting forests, rivers, and lakes.”176 ‘Environmentalism’, 
as a result, is understood as a platform that preserves not only natural topographies, 
but also the specific national identity narratives that have been ascribed to them. In 
this discourse, the preservation of the environment becomes as much a pursuit to 
secure autonomy and self-sufficiency in the resource and energy sectors, as it is any 
greater obligation to the planet as a whole.  
  For the FPÖ, the conservation of Austria’s environment is also a matter of 
national sovereignty and is also, therefore, directly linked to the preservation of 
national identity. National identity facilitates a preeminent sense of belonging, and for 
Right-Wing populist parties environmental policies also apply to a platform that 
protects the homeland of the national ‘in’ group’.177 On the topic of ‘Heimat, Identität 
und Umwelt’ in the FPÖ’s political programme, for example, the party states that that 
they are the defenders of ‘our’ Heimat Österreich, ‘our’ national identity, and ‘our’ 
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“Eigenständigkeit” through the defence of the nation’s natural resources.178 The 
FPÖ’s combination of environmental conservation with the safeguarding of national 
identity forms the premise of the party’s “Umweltschutz als gelebten 
Heimatschutz”179 narrative, in which the preservation of the environment directly 
contributes to the protection of Heimat. The party’s thesis is derived from an inherent 
Right-Wing populist requisite that ‘all humans have the right to a homeland’.180 
According to the FPÖ, Austrians have a Recht auf Heimat, and are therefore entitled 
to live in an autonomously in and “einer intakten Umwelt.”181 The sense of ownership 
over the land, of inhabitancy, the right to speak for a territory and thereby preserve the 
topography, in other words, all contribute to the FPÖ’s collective sense of self and 
national identity formula. The FPÖ’s understanding of Umweltschutz is therefore 
directly linked to the party’s overarching Heimat and national identity narrative, 
emboldened through continual references to a tenure of the land that is the birth right 
of all Austrians. 
 
2.1.2 – ‘Österreich muß energieautonom werden’ 
 The FPÖ’s determination to secure local, autonomous, and renewable energy 
resources is the principal feature of the party’s Umweltschutz platform. Norbert Hofer 
explained in 2006 that Energienutzung was a matter of national importance, “weil wir 
vom Ausland unabhängig sein wollen. Und das können wir nur, wenn wir unsere 
erneuerbaren Ressourcen nutzen.”182 Environmental concerns, in other words, require 
innovative renewable energy solutions that will liberate Austria from its subservience 
to outside energy sectors. In the Graz chapter’s website the FPÖ outline a need to 
extract energy from “Energiequellen” that are in “Einklang mit der Natur”, while 
also, unlike the Greens and KPÖ, underscoring the need for balance “zwischen 
Ökologie und neuem Freizeitraum in Graz.”183 While the Greens and KPÖ reject 	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many new innovative projects regarding resource management and energy production 
due to their obstinate environmental platform, the FPÖ wish to appeal to both the 
environmentally conscious and those that encourage innovation and self-sufficiency. 
 An emphasis on land and resource ownership is also indicative of the FPÖ’s 
belief in the relationship between environmental conservation, the concept of Heimat, 
and the preservation of national identity. This is seen, for example, in the party’s 
political handbook, where it states that the “Schutz” of Austria’s natural resources is 
the “Lebensgrundlage für unsere Heimat Österreich”, and therefore requires a 
sustainable approach management of resources, as well as a homegrown, self 
sufficient, and Austrian owned Energiegewinnung.184 Renewable energies, which are 
sourced from the local environment, will provide freedom and autonomy for the 
Austrian population, provide jobs and technological development, as well as 
safeguard the natural environment through the reduction of pollution.185 Through the 
implementation of renewable energies, and the phasing out of fossil fuels, the FPÖ 
demonstrates its will to preserve the environment by reducing ‘dirty’ energy sources, 
while also advocating local infrastructure and technological development in wind, 
solar, and other clean energies that will provide jobs and industry for Austria.  
 The FPÖ’s inference that environmental protection, renewable resource 
management, and the preservation of national identity are all somehow 
interdependent, however, also reveals the separatist principles that underscore much 
of the FPÖ’s ideology and policy implementation. The FPÖ’s argument for self-
sufficiency and comprehensive proprietorship in the resource and energy sector 
advances an underlying ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy, through which the party reserves 
the environment solely for the use of the national ‘in’ group, while simultaneously 
exposing those that would exploit Austria’s natural beauty. The premise that Heimat 
must be energieautark is an example of the FPÖ disassociating itself and the nation 
from outside markets and globalisation, a will of the FPÖ to facilitate an insular 
approach to the management of the nation. In the party’s discussion surrounding 
Umweltschutz, the local environment is a privately owned possession of the national 
‘in’ group’, and therefore also demonstrates a collective responsibility to preserve a 
homeland for future generations that will facilitate autonomous existence “in einer 	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intakten Umwelt.”186 The FPÖ’s Umweltschutz policies accordingly cast disparities 
between the local Austrian people, who benefit from conservation policies, and 
outsider groups, who would seek to circumvent protectionism, exploit Austria’s 
resources for foreign gain, and implement globalist platforms. 
 When the FPÖ proclaims that the party stand for protecting ‘our’ natural 
resources, ‘our’ national identity, and ‘our’ Eigenständigkeit, it also clandestinely 
creates a ‘them’ and ‘us’ scenario. The Right-Wing populist predication of 
maintaining a clean and intact natural environment indicates the party ethos that the 
current system of environmental management is corrupted or inadequate. For the 
FPÖ, Austria’s resource management and energy consumption is vulnerable due to 
the importation of fuels. In its political programme, for example, the party declares 
“Österreich ist nicht frei”, because of the nation’s lack of renewable energy.187 The 
inference that Austria remains constrained is due to a reliance on these fossil fuels 
that are, presumably, imported from overseas. The party sees dependence on outside 
markets as a weakness, especially when it is unnecessary. The FPÖ’s deliberate 
reference to the Austrian politician Leopold Figls’ famous speech is an attempt to 
draw its audience back to the dark days of post-war occupation. While Figls’ 
celebrated Austria’s freedom from occupation with the dawn of the Second Republic, 
the FPÖ intentionally negate the famous quote, thereby implying Austria can never 
truly be free when it relies on outside markets in the energy and resource sectors. This 
lack of freedom can be overcome by establishing a renewable energy platform to meet 
Austria’s needs. As a result of this, the FPÖ declares in its party programme that 
Austria must free herself from the chains of importation and foreign agents, especially 
when the nation’s resources are being extracted to satisfy overseas interests.188 
 
2.1.3 - Defending Austria’s commodities: water as a case study 
 Charging outside corporate and political actors with national resource and 
economic theft is a typical Right-Wing populist position, in which the homogenizing 
forces of international capitalism and globalisation, personified through political 
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agents, are depicted as hostile to local forms of existence.189 In contrast to the theft 
brought forth by globalism, therefore, the FPÖ stand for local, sovereign control over 
commodities. Comparing this to globalism is an easy and popular strategy used by the 
party. The foremost antagonist in the FPÖ’s ‘them’ and ‘us dichotomy is the 
European Union, and resource management plays a central role in the party’s 
argument. In an interview with NT News, Strache explains that the EU is, by 
definition, a centralised, centralising agent, and therefore by its very design seeks to 
take everything from Europe “into its own hands.”190 Austria’s leading Right-Wing 
Populist Party accordingly claims to stand as the last line of defense against the 
occupying force of the European Union, which, the FPÖ allege, wants to rob Austria 
of its environment, resources, and ultimately, freedom.  
 To demonstrate this argument, the FPÖ turned in 2012-2013 to the issue of 
Austria’s domestic water supply. During 2013 in particular, the EU proposal to 
privatise water supplies in Austria was met with great concern.191 Austrians are 
known for the pride they place over their water supply, with 94% of the population 
showing satisfaction with the quality of the nation’s alpine springs.192 Water supplies, 
therefore, are seen as a national commodity, and an all-important element of 
Daseinsvorsorge. The FPÖ similarly celebrates the high quality of Austrian water in 
their political programme, insisting that alpine water alongside rich soil provides the 
some of the best conditions for agriculture in the world. 193  Such a valuable 
commodity therefore requires protection. The EU’s suggestion during 2013 that 
Austria’s water sector should be privatised was, therefore, met with great outrage.194 
According to the EU, the premise for such moves is due to the fact that: 
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 over 780 million people do not have access to safe drinking water and 
 over 4,000 children under five die every day from diseases associated to the 
 lack of access to clean drinking water. This is not only a tragedy, it is simply 
 unacceptable. This is why the EU provides almost EUR 400 million per year 
 to help 60 countries build infrastructure for drinking and waste water systems 
 and provide basic sanitation and hygiene worldwide.195 
 
Those countries with ample water, therefore, should provide relief to those other 
nations in the union that struggle with adequate water levels. For many Austrians, 
however, the EU’s moves to implement private control over public water are not 
exactly indicative of an act of altruism, but are rather designed to restructure the 
transparency and self-determination of Austrian public service models. 196  The 
rejection of water privatisation, therefore, is more to do with Austrians defending 
their own service models and commodities from outside influence than the simple 
pouring of a glass would suggest. As News.at noted during 2013, “Kein EU-
Wahlkampf” is handled in Austria “ohne die Sorge um ‘unser’ Wasser.”197 
 It was during this climate that the FPÖ continued its advocacy of the total 
local proprietorship over Austrian commodities – all of which was directly linked to 
the party’s overarching ‘us’ and ‘them’ formula. Pasqualoni cites the properties 
ascribed to water (from the rivers and lakes of which Austria happens to be 
particularly rich) by Austrian political parties – being clean, pure, and energising – as 
instrumental in constructs of the Austrian nation.198 Evidence can be sourced from 
Austrian ruling political parties during the early days of the Second Republic and their 
attempts to use water for the purpose of establishing an Austrian national identity.199 
Water continues to play an important role identity formulas designed by the FPO. For 
example, in Für ein freies Österreich, a book written by Michael Howanietz on behalf 
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of Norbert Hofer in 2013, the party celebrates the ‘purity’ of Austrian water.200 The 
pure, clean, and energising properties of water further evoke connotations that are key 
to how the FPÖ constructs Heimat and the Austrian nation, it’s ‘human landscape’. 
 While water can be used to characterise the properties and characteristics of 
the land and the national ‘In’ group, it is also used in critical attacks on the European 
Union. Although the EU charter, as we have seen, explains the privatisation and 
distribution of water as a result of observing the fundamental human rights of 
existence for all nations in the union, the FPÖ claim it is yet another example of the 
EU as an occupying force intent on exploitation, with Austria’s resources inevitably 
coveted to suit the designs of unelected bureaucrats in Brussels. Norbert Hofer, for 
example, argued in 2013: 
 
 Das österreichische Wasser ist ein wesentlichster Aspekt unserer 
 Daseinsvorsorge. Dieses lebenswichtige Element unserer Souveränität 
 über eine von Profitinteressen bestellte Richtlinie zu opfern, ist ein 
 beispielloser Vorgang, der einen lauten Aufschrei quer durch die Republik 
 zur Folge haben muss.201 
 
Heinz-Christian Strache even goes so far as to directly correlate Austrian water with 
his understanding of Heimat. On his Facebook page in January 2013, Strache 
declared: “Ich kämpfe für unser österreichisches Wasser als Heimat-, Grund- und 
Menschenrecht. Es ist Eigentum der Österreicher und das hat es auch zu bleiben.”202 
The FPÖ openly protests against the sale of domestic water overseas by the Austrian 
political establishment, leaders they argue have repeatedly attempted to liberalise 
irreplaceable heimischen Wasserresourcen, insisting under the heading of “Weißes 
Gold als von Begehrlichkeiten” that “Besonderes Augenmerk gilt unserem 
heimischen Wasserschatz, der Ziel von Begehrlichkeiten ist.”203 In their political 	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programme the FPÖ also refers to water ‘an oil of the future’, a ‘white gold’ that will 
increasingly become a commodity sought after by powerful groups all over the world, 
and therefore “dass die Verfügungsgewalt über österreichische Wasserschätze 
ausschließlich in österreihischer Hand zu bleiben hat.”204 On his Facebook account, 
Strache elaborates further on the deceptive deals being committed by the European 
Union in order to secure Austria’s resources for their own profit: 
 
 
Figure 1. 
 “Jetzt will die EU auch noch auf unser österreichisches Wasser zugreifen. 
 Unser österreichisches Wasser - unser weißes Gold - muß daher vor 
 solchen EU-Enteignungs-Plänen ala ESM geschützt und bewahrt werden. 
 Unser Wasser ist Eigentum aller Österreicher!!!! Und soll und wird es mit  der 
 FPÖ auch bleiben!”205 
 
 The narrative of foreign actors pursuing the destruction of Austria’s 
environment and the acquisition of her resources is continued by the FPÖ in its 
political comic Der blaue Planet. The use of comics provides an interesting new 
development in the Right-Wing populist approach to disseminating their political 
messages – such as those on the environment – to a larger audience. Emily Turner-
Graham explains that the youth wings of various Rightist political groups, such as the 	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FPÖ’s Ring Freiheitlicher Jugend (RFJ), use such media to target Europe’s young 
people by focusing on issues that are contemporary and important to them.206 The 
FPÖ use the comic medium to discuss politics to a younger audience through a style 
of communication they are familiar with and will understand. In the comic, the FPÖ 
portrays Austria’s resources as a type of ‘white gold’, which is coveted by 
internationalists pursuing foreign interests and profits. In the comic, a delegation from 
the Zentralplanet, which represent the capitalist bureaucratic mechanism of the 
European Union, cunningly explains their malicious plans: “Mit Euren... ähh unseren 
Fördergeldern könnt Ihr z.B. dann das Wasser wieder kaufen, das wir Euch vorher 
abpumpen!”207 Strache and his companions’ response to this threat is clear in this 
portrayal - foreign intervention into the distribution of Austria’s resources must be 
negated, and therefore their guests are met with cynicism and suspicion: 
 
 
Figure 2. 
Image taken from the FPÖ’s Der Blaue Planet.208 
 
In Der blaue Planet the FPÖ further elaborates on their policy of Umweltschutz gegen 
Globalisierung, using domestic water resources as a primary example. When Strache 
asks about selling water resources to foreign markets, he is given a dire warning: 	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“Kann ich mir vorstellen. Wollen Euer Wasser, Euern Zaster, Eure Freiheit kassieren. 
Dann geht‘s Euch so wie uns. Vorbei die Selbstbestimmung. Geld abliefern und 
mundhalten ist jetzt die Sache!”209 Consequently the Austrian Heimat is disfigured 
through industrialised mechanisms of resource extraction; the people lose their right 
of self-determination and their sovereignty of capital, and ultimately lose their own 
money from buying these assets back. For the FPÖ, the reality of outside intervention 
into the distribution of natural commodities presents a dire situation: 
 
 
Figure 3. 
Image taken from the FPÖ’s Der Blaue Planet.210 
 
This image, according to the FPÖ, is the result of foreign actors who are allowed to 
pursue their own corrupt interests and access Austria’s resources entirely unchecked. 
Austria’s natural beauty is diminished under the austere frames of industrial progress, 
the ecosystem is largely ruined, and the profits of such activities, of course, are going 
abroad. Therefore the protection of nature and resources from the pressures of 
industrial economies and foreign agents requires the acknowledgement of ecological 
integrity, natural beauty, and national sovereignty. Arguments such as these underpin 
the FPÖ’s Right-Wing populist approach to environmentalism and resource 
conservation, which explains environmental destruction as a result of foreign agents 	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or globalisation, and extreme finance capitalism that has reduced nature to a 
commodity. In the comic’s portrayal it is never the Austrians themselves that are 
responsible for such environmental mismanagement. The fault of the local Austrians 
lies only in their foolishness to believe the promises of foreign political bodies or 
corporations, or allow these groups access to the land in the first place. 
 The FPÖ’s desire to secure Austria’s water supplies is also due to the 
importance it places on renewable energies and self-sufficiency in the energy sector. 
Austria is a nation with large alpine ranges and vast water supplies, making 
hydroelectric power an ideal source of energy production. The FPÖ explain in their 
political programme: 
 
 Um Abhängigkeiten abzubauen und Österreichs Energieversorgung für die 
 Zukunft zu sichern, muss auch die Wasserkraft als bisher wichtigster Träger 
 erneuerbarer Energie in Österreich weiter ausgebaut warden.211  
 
Hydroelectricity is thus described as the obvious choice for Austrian self-sufficiency 
and an end to a reliance on the importation of fossil fuels. For hydroelectricity to be 
viable, however, you need control of your water. The protection of Austria’s water, 
therefore, as well as an advocacy for innovation in renewables such as Wasserkraft, 
demonstrates the FPÖ will to not only protect Austria’s public service models, but 
also to declare ownership over all resources and provide a self-sufficient future for the 
nation that no longer relies on guidance from the EU. 
 
2.1.4 – Agricultural protectionism  
 The FPÖ’s strategy to safeguard Austrians’ proprietary right to the nation’s 
commodities continues in the agricultural sector. In their political programme the 
FPÖ advocates agricultural protectionism by actively selecting local produce for 
domestic markets above of those that are imported.212 This is seen by the FPÖ as an 
important aspect of environmental management because it preserves the natural rural 
landscapes of Austria by investing in them.213 Protecting local produce will also 	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provide communities with a natural, local supply of healthy foods that are GM free, 
and factory farm free.214 The FPÖ advocates for the protection of local produce, as 
well as the indirect unveiling of foreign goods in supermarkets, through the 
implementation of clear ‘local’ labelling that will demonstrate which goods are 
Austrian and which are foreign.215 Rather than a modern, industrialised, and largely 
globalist approach to agriculture, therefore, the FPÖ choose to champion local 
farmers. For the FPÖ, agriculture and farming cannot be reduced to nostalgia or 
tradition, but must play a central role in addressing the challenges of the future, 
thereby proclaiming the interdependent of Ernährung, Umwelt, and 
Energieversorgung with Landwirtschaft.216 
 
 
Figure 4. 
FPÖ Salzburg 2010.217 
 
According to the FPÖ, local Austrian produce is seen as superior and fresh to factory 
farming, and should therefore be supported over all other outside markets. This is 
seen, for example, in the Salzburg FPÖ election billboard of 2010, which gives the 	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choice to support local, “Reinrassig & Echt” produce or to submit to EU 
“Knechtschaft.” The FPÖ responds to such concerns by stating:  
 
Die FPÖ wird nicht zulassen, dass unsere Selbstversorgungsfähigkeit auf diese 
Art und Weise untergraben wird und man unseren Bauern vorschreibt, was in 
Österreich angebaut werden darf und was nicht.218  
 
Therefore the FPÖ stand for the “Renationalisierung der Agrarpolitik”, and fair prices 
for “hervorragenden Produkte unserer Landwirte. Diese sollen nicht von EU-
Förderungen abhängig gemacht werden, sie sollen für gute Arbeit ehrlich entlohnt 
werden.”219  
 Through gratifying overtures to Austria’s local farmers and their concerns, the 
FPÖ continues to disseminate its perpetual ‘us’ and ‘them’ formula. The party’s 
agricultural protectionism directly addresses the concerns of the local industry, and 
portrays the FPÖ policies as directed specifically to the needs of the national ‘in’ 
group. Contrarily, the FPÖ’s agricultural protectionism is explained as a defence 
against the centralising power of the European Union, an attempt to renationalise the 
agricultural sector, and, as a result, negate the influence of foreign operatives in the 
industry. In the FPÖ’s political programme, for example, the party states that the EU 
is slowly procuring control of local and domestic agricultural sectors through a 
common agricultural policy for all of Europe.220 The FPÖ explain with outrage that 
around 400 million Euros flow into the centralised EU Agrarpolitik, fund - money, the 
party believes, that would be better spent locally within Austria.221 By placing local 
farming industries in opposition with foreign political bodies, the FPÖ successfully 
disseminate its ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy, which describes the European Union as an 
occupying force intent on robbing genuine Austrians of their livelihoods. For this 
reason, the FPÖ reiterate that the “EU-Agrarmisswirtschaft” is a great concern for 
Austria, leading directly to “irreparablen Schäden an unserer Heimat.”222 
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 These concerns are well received by a population that is already cognizant of 
flaws in the EU common agricultural policy. Through the promise of implementation 
of agricultural protectionism in Austria, the FPÖ attract the votes of grass roots 
farming communities, who feel disenfranchised or negatively affected by EU policy. 
In 2010, for example, die Presse reported that for every Euro Austria contributes to 
the EU agricultural budget, only 77 cents is returned to local industry, and is, 
therefore, in need of radical reform.223 Like the case of Austria’s water supplies, the 
FPÖ use these anxieties to perpetuate separatism from the EU. By championing 
localised industry and the farmers that feel they are not being adequately 
compensated, or, indeed, represented, the party attracts votes from the middle 
working class demographic who feel their jobs and livelihood may be either 
exploited, or lost. According to FPÖ arguments, the agricultural policies of the EU 
seek to undermine Austrians’ ability to choose what they grow on local farms, in an 
attempt to either flood the market with genetically modified foods or introduce those 
products directly to the agricultural process. Underlying this argument is the 
assumption that the European Union will flood Austria with foreign inferior produce, 
or change Austrian agricultural laws to serve the interests of large-scale factory 
farming above those of local ones. Therefore the FPÖ advocates ‘clean, green’ 
localised farming over that of the EU’s Agrarfabriken.224 It is with this politics of fear 
stratagem that the FPÖ successfully campaign their ‘us’ and ‘them’ scenario, with 
direct references to EU corruption and exploitation that is felt specifically in the back 
pocket of the working middle class agricultural sector.  
 
2.1.5 - Sustainable forests 
 The FPÖ also mention the forests as valued areas that require protection. For 
example, in their party programme the FPÖ states:  
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Der Schutz des Waldes ist daher von großem Interesse für Österreich. Ein 
Waldschutz setz soll sicherstellen, dass unsere Wälder auch für kommende 
Generationen Sicherheit und Erholung bieten.225  
 
The persistent theme of Austria’s topography as a type of national landscape, a 
commonly held treasure, and a home that must be preserved, continues with the 
forest. A communal place of recreation and a ‘safe place’, the forest is explained by 
the FPÖ to be yet another paragon of Heimat, which must be preserved by Austrians 
and kept for coming generations. The FPÖ also describes the forest as important for 
economic reasons (forestry), as a habitat for animals, as a recreational area for the 
population, as a protective barrier against mudflow and avalanches, as a source of 
drinking water, and the tourist industry.226 In general terms, the FPÖ describes its 
approach to forest management as follows: 
 
 Die FPÖ bekennt sich zu einer nachhaltigen Bewirtschaftung und  Betreuung 
 von Waldflächen. Die Nutzung des Waldes muss so gestaltet sein, dass 
 biologische Vielfalt, Produktivität, Verjüngungsfähigkeit und Vitalität des 
 Waldes erhalten bleiben.227 
 
The FPO’s Waldschutzgesetz therefore also approaches forest preservation in order to 
foster a harmonious human-nature relationship. For the party, forest as place holds an 
integral importance for Austria: “Wälder haben als Lebensraum für zahlreiche 
Tierarten, als Erholungsraum für den Menschen, als Wirtschaftsfaktor, zur Sicherung 
vor Lawinen oder Muren sowie zur Reinhaltung von Gewässern eine zentrale 
Bedeutung für die gesamte Gesellschaft.”228 The FPÖ therefore commits itsef to a 
sustainable „nachhaltigen Bewirtschaftung und Betreuung von Waldflächen. Die 
Nutzung des Waldes muss so gestaltet sein, dass biologische Vielfalt, Produktivität, 
Verjüngungsfähigkeit und Vitalität des Waldes erhalten bleiben.” 229  The FPÖ 
demands forest protection so that it can be utilised in a sustainable way for the 	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Austrian population, with both a level of wilderness and harvestable forest so as to 
find symmetry between ecologism and economics.  
The FPÖ also references the imminent global issue of climate change, and the 
affect this is having on Austria’s forests. As the party explains in their political 
programme: “Naturschutz sieht seine Aufgabe im Bewahren und Erhalten der 
Schöpfung.”230 Siting a common argument of our age as their impetus for action, the 
Freedom Party argues that due to the dangers of climate change, the forests need 
protection more than has been previously seen in history.231 The party suggests 
maintaining, or even extending, national parks in order to protect species of plants and 
animals alongside permission for the human population to hunt responsibly.232 They 
even suggest the implementation of ‘buffer zones’ to keep nature trails, roads, and 
other essential infrastructure away from the natural habitats of wild forest animals.233 
However there remains a clear premise throughout that these environmental 
objectives must be achieved sustainably and rationally, where a logical symmetry 
between nature and human activities is respected, “Beim Bewahren dieses 
Gleichgewichts sind Jäger und Naturschützer logische Partner und sollten aus 
freiheitlicher Sicht eng zusammenarbeiten.”234 
 These examples demonstrate a resolution to nationalise the Austrian 
environment, and secure its resources for the wealth and longevity of the Austrian 
population. It is not disputed that the Right-Wing populists have a clear programme to 
preserve the environment; however some of their goals demonstrate a more complex 
agenda. For the FPÖ, environmentalism signifies ownership of Austria’s immediate 
natural world arguably more than preserving the planet for humanity as a whole. The 
Right-Wing populist parties advocate ownership of land and nature (as well as the 
resources therein) as a counterargument to this perceived loss of sovereignty to 
globalist agents. Conservative land management practices, as a result, are as much 
about the right to speak for a territory, and the manner by which it will be preserved 
and managed, as they are about solely defending the natural world. The guidelines of 
conservation do not, therefore, focus on environmental issues as a global concern, but 	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rather from a limited Austrian focus. While the parties are committed to securing a 
sustainable and environmentally clean future, their primary concern is to achieve this 
for the sake of Austria specifically, and on Austrian terms.  
 In a practical sense, FPÖ ‘environmentalism’ follows an entirely logical and 
justifiable set of principles and demands, all of which is guided by protectionist 
policies and sustainable approaches to resource management. The beauty and 
diversity of Austria must be preserved, forest and rural ecosystems allowed to 
flourish, and environments left untouched by the often devastating human hand of 
industrial and economic progress. In their typical posturing as saviours and 
representatives of both people and Heimat, the FPÖ presents a programme that claims 
to have policies that will relinquish the corruption endemic in Austrian politics, along 
with the policies and infrastructure that pursue only profits at the expense of the 
natural environment. The FPÖ justifiably identifies an issue with the modern, 
capitalist Western ethos of consumerism and mass harvesting of the land for 
resources, and seeks to achieve a sustainable future where both society and 
environment can live together in harmony. Finally, the FPÖ reasonably suggest that 
what resources can be harvested by the nation should be done so for the benefit of the 
nation, and not for the profit coffers of international corporations and agents. This 
argument also includes a close examination of renewable energies and a reduction in 
the reliance on fossil fuels, which is undoubtedly the way of the future. Thus, in a 
practical sense, the FPÖ’s Umwelschutz policies follow an entirely reasonable 
political course, and would attract the sympathies of any environmentally conscious 
voter. However, the practical side of the their discourse on environmentalism is only 
one part of a larger ideological framework. Beneath the conservationist image resides 
a belief that the natural world plays a much deeper formative role in the identity of 
social groups. Humanity’s relationship to nature, and the way this association affects 
identity, is the foundation from which the FPÖ’s environmental principles develop. 
 
2.2 – Naturschutz 
 The FPÖ perceive nature as an integral feature of identity for Austrians. As 
early as 1994, the then FPÖ leader Jörg Haider outlined his vision of an 
environmentally sustainable Austrian state, which includes underlying cultural and 
political approaches for establishing an Austrian society that is founded on the 
grounds of an intact environment that houses an intact culture and ethnic group. This 
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thesis on the interrelated nature of an intact environment and identity is predicated on 
man’s inescapable and long established relationship to the natural world. For 
example, under the section titled “Freedom and Nature” in the English language 
edition of his book Die Freiheit, die ich meine, Haider argues “A humane state can 
only flourish when people have the freedom to live in harmony with nature,” and 
identifies a fundamental relationship between freedom and nature: “The freedom I 
mean looks on people as a part of nature and sees nature as a part of the people.”235 In 
order to secure Austria’s freedom and self-sufficiency, the community has “a 
responsibility to promote the environment.”236 If a community, or nation, can achieve 
an adequate level of harmonious coexistence with each other – then they will also, 
theoretically, find a congenial mode of existence with the natural and familiar 
topography of their Heimat. For Haider, “this ethic requires a profound change in the 
consciousness,” of the people, “to rid nature of the exploitation by man. Man is not 
only the advocate of his own freedom but the trustee of the earth.”237 Only through 
the preservation of nature can the culture and history of the community also be, 
consequently, preserved for future generations. In their political programme, 
consequently, the party states that “Naturschutz” is a task to preserve the 
“Schöpfung.”238  
 The synergy between social groups’ collective identity and the natural world 
demonstrates a revival in older Rightist perspectives on the integral relationship 
between identity and nature. In this discourse, nature provided as a commonly held 
home to negate the perceived negative consequences of modernity and alienation. 
Nature has always figured strongly in romantic nationalism as a metaphor for 
homeland alongside discourses of struggle, ethnicity and adaption.239 The cumulative 
environmental consciousness demonstrated by nationalist parties in developed 
Western nations is symptomatic of a broader trend, seen in Europe in particular, in 
which the revival of communal attachments to local environmental landscapes is 
typical. 240  The latest surge of environmental empathy in Western democracies 	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demonstrates, as such, a fundamental shift in the political orientation of Western 
electorates at international, national, and local levels toward environmental and 
regional consciousness.241 This shift is identified most noticeably in a renewed sense 
of territorialism, which is defined in part by a social group’s affinity with their local 
and natural surroundings. These modern movements are also typically nationalist, 
characterised through their refutation of modern identity markers and their will to 
identify collectively with more traditional modes of group classification, such as a 
shared sense of ethnicity.242 
 FPÖ youth spokesperson Manfred Haimbuchner describes his local 
Bundesland of Oberösterreich as a “Naturtalent”, describing “Sauberes Wasser, 
hochwertige Luftqualität und Artenvielfalt in der Tier- und Pflanzenwelt” that make 
the territory liveable and worth visiting.243 For Haimbuchner, the protection of such a 
“Paradies” requires bringing people closer to nature through an active “Naturschutz” 
programme.244 Haimbuchner also directly connects nature to Heimat in a 2014 video 
outlining Naturschutz, where he describes local nature as the ‘äußere Heimat’ to 
which Austrians belong: 
 
 Die Natur ist die äußere Heimat, denn was wäre unser Land ohne Wälder, 
 Flüsse, Wiesen und Felder? Was wäre unser Oberösterreich ohne Berge und 
 Seen, ohne Tiere und Menschen? Die Erhaltung von Arten und Lebensräumen 
 ist untrennbar mit meinem Verständnis von Heimat verbunden.245 
 
By linking the concept of Heimat with local nature, Haimbuchner and the FPÖ 
attempt to diminish the divide between people and nature, and also, therefore, connect 
nature with a national identity formula. In a modern age where nature has been 
divested of meaning, the sentimentality of the Heimat concept alongside images of 
natural surroundings permits the FPÖ to simplify the complexities of belonging and 	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identity, by distilling it down to the place that you come from. In a promotional video 
from 2012, Haimbuchner makes it abundantly clear that local nature informs the 
party’s sense of Heimat and Austrian identity: 
 
 
Figure 5. 
Screenshot taken from YouTube.246 
 
Alongside panoramic views of Austrian countryside, rivers, mountains, and forests, 
Haimbuchner describes Austrians as “natürlich naturverbunden”, and deeply 
connected to “unsere Heimat – unser Land!”247 Describing Austrians as ‘in close 
touch with nature’ demonstrates an attempt to dramatically reduce the existential 
divide between people and nature by the FPÖ, and heralding place (in this case 
nature) as a definitive feature of their national identity formula. While Western 
democracies have witnessed a renaissance in the politics of ethnoterritorial 
movements, the FPÖ has sought to capitalise on the perceived societal failures that 
have caused such environmental devastation. Their brand of environmentalism thus 
seeks to answer ecological issues with a narrative that encourages territorialism, 
ethnicity, and an ownership of the land. The mastery of nature through the pursuit of 
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anthropocentrism248 has alienated modern Europeans not only from each other, but 
also their natural surroundings. Society, as a result, is no longer a community in the 
truest sense; rather a series of individuals who believe that tradition and where one 
lives are irrelevant to identity. The practices that tie a community to their time and 
place, to their heritage and environment, have disappeared. The fusion of nature and 
Heimat by the FPÖ negates these developments, and attempts to reorientate the 
Austrian community around the nature that characterises their nation. 
 
2.3 – Landscape, identity and Heimat 
 Austria is a nation endowed with rich natural beauty. The epic natura 
landscapes of Austria are used by the FPÖ as a powerful visual tool with which to 
illustrate their definition of Heimat and national identity. Haimbuchner, for example, 
describes the “Oberösterreichische Natur- und Landschaftsschutzgesetz” as a quest to 
preserve “die heimische Natur und Landschaft in ihren Lebens- oder 
Erscheinungsformen.”249 The natural landscapes of Austria, Haimbuchner concludes, 
must be preserved for today and into the future, “damit unser Heimat-Land auch unser 
Wohlfühl-Raum bleibt.”250 In this statement Haimbuchner emphatically decrees a 
strong relationship between the people of Oberösterreich (the region where 
Haimbuchner is from), their local landscapes, and the sense of Heimat. Landscapes, 
much like nature, require protection because of their important role in fostering a 
sense of ‘well-being’ in the Heimatland. The extensive use of Austrian natural 
landscapes in Haimbuchner’s publicity is testament to the importance the party places 
on such ‘national topography’. Haimbuchner’s videos typically laud various natural 
landscapes of Austria, such as lakes, mountains, fields, farms, forests, and hiking 
trails, all of which is showcased as quintessential examples of the identity of place, as 
well as the ‘Lebenswert’, all Austrians share.251	  	    	   Underlying such publications is the argument that the concept of Heimat is 
specifically linked to the landscapes of the nation, with a particular emphasis on 	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natural topographies. This thesis, typical of many Right-Wing populist parties, 
attempts to place a special emphasis on the importance of the place of origin, of the 
home environment, to identity. The FPÖ’s overtures to the Austrian population to 
rediscover their roots in the landscapes of the nation is an indirect attempt to negate, 
or even refute, the more complex modern identity formulas – such as class, religion, 
profession, etc. Anthony Giddens also identifies a loss of identity of place in the 
modern Western by noting that in pre-modern societies, social relationships were 
informed by individual’s immediate surroundings, whereas with the onset of 
modernity, social relations are no longer limited to the ‘local context’. Giddens calls 
this the “disembedding” of social relations “from the local contexts of interaction and 
their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space.”252 An obvious example here 
is the Internet, radio, or television, all of which function as a means of communication 
that allows people to construct a sense of self through various sources that are not 
confined to one’s immediate sense of place. Modern transportation is another, which 
through the ease of travel has allowed for people to break free from the area in which 
they are born and construct identity based on the various places they choose to visit or 
dwell in. While these modern feats of technology have their observable benefits, they 
also have contributed to the negative consequences of ‘disembedding’, in which 
traditional and hereditable qualities of group identification, usually associated with 
the place in which one is born or lives, are abandoned from a more global, migratory, 
and cosmopolitan construction of self. 	  
This modern process of identity formation involves the dislocation of a 
community from their sense of “place” as a socio-spatial marker, which is understood 
in this context as “the idea of the locale, which refers to the physical settings of social 
activity as situated geographically.”253 Daniel Deudney summarizes this process of 
disembedding as the divorce of “who-ness” from “here-ness.”254 The modern world, 
with all its various forms of communication and methods of migration, allows 
relations to be conducted across broad geographical areas, and this has slowly 	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degraded the limited and local manner of social activity and collective identity 
traditionally informed by local place. Traditional modes of collective identity, as 
such, also begin to fracture under this form of social relations, along with the 
mythologies and biographical histories they preserve. A sense of collective identity 
informed by the place of birth or domicile, as a result, is diminished or negated 
entirely.  
 In order to respond to this problematic social imaginary and the 
‘disembedding’ of community from nature, the FPÖ approach local environment as a 
broader identity issue. Among Far Right and Right-Wing populist ideologues there 
has always been a fundamental rejection of these principles of ‘Enlightenment 
universalism’, or the “world view in which a system of places is a human, not a 
natural construction…”255 As Emily Turner-Graham explains, for the Far Right the 
sense of place (and thus environmental consciousness) is imperative because 
according to the Far Right worldview all ethnic and cultural groups “have a 
geographical area with which they are naturally and inherently connected. This area 
forms and consistently informs their ethnic and cultural characteristics.”256 In other 
words, social groups such as those nations embody require a homeland in which they 
can develop a distinct collective sense of self. In a modern world that has been 
dislocated from the identity-forming and identity-preserving influence of local nature, 
a renewed sense of environmental consciousness is one way the Right-Wing populism 
provides an otherwise frustrated and alienated population with a collective sense of 
home. Nature provides a spatial home that is immediate, recognizable, and, most 
importantly, acquired by birthright. It is not assigned by disproportionate monetary 
means or any other capitalist pursuit. Nature as a commonly held homeland is 
available to all in the ethnocultural group: it does not require societal advantage, and 
is something, therefore, that all those from the targeted demographic can relate to and 
believe in. Nature as identity, as a result, is a populist strategy to reverse the 
‘disembedding’ caused by the modern European social imaginary, and replace it with 
a fixed, stable identity that is accessible from the immediate spatial dimensions people 
experience.  
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 The ‘greening’ of nationalist sentiment symptomatic of Right-Wing populist 
‘eco-nationalism’ is, then, an example of collective identity constructed around 
human-nature interaction. In this narrative, the natural environment is a mirror for the 
collective identity of the ethnocultural group that claim that place as a native 
homeland. Distinctive natural topography must be protected because it is the architect 
of the ethnic nation’s unique identity. The natural world, specifically with all of its 
regional particularity, is subsequently loaded with symbolism to help determine the 
distinctiveness of the people that have dwelt there for generations. The populist 
Right’s discourse on man’s close relationship with local nature as a source of culture 
and collective identity is a convenient catalyst to convey a counter-ideal and 
imaginary to the modern social system that is informed by spatially vast and culturally 
diverse social agents. Such anti-modernist tendencies seek to replace modern social 
formations and attitudes with new ones, some of which can also be identified as 
resurrected from pre-modern systems of nature reverence. In order to resist the 
dislocating tendencies of this modern European social imaginary, which has 
deconstructed traditional modes of identity and reduced nature to a source of 
commodities, the populist Right attempts to evoke a sense of place that encourages 
both nature adoration and a national identity that is deeply rooted to the geography of 
the land. It is from this eco-nationalist perspective that the populist parties begin to 
transform natural topography into national landscapes and utilise them to discursively 
construct national identity. 
 Austria possesses ample examples of natural beauty and landscapes that can 
facilitate patriotic national identity narratives through emotive visual overtures in 
political media. Whether vast forests, clear alpine lakes, or towering mountainous 
panoramas, the natural topography of Austria is something locals boast of and tourists 
venerate. Margarete Lamb-Faffelberger notes that since the dawn of the Second 
Republic, referencing the splendid natural beauty Austria’s possesses has consistently 
evoked a uniquely Austrian sense of Heimat and identity.257 The beauty of the 
Austrian landscape is instrumental in helping to shape how Austrians see themselves, 
as well as how they wish to be perceived abroad.258 Ruth Wodak argues that upon 	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returning home from abroad, many Austrians contemplate their uniqueness in the 
world by identifying with, amongst other cultural elements, the distinctive beauty of 
their homeland’s landscape.259  
 Peter Westenthaler, one time member of the Austrian Right-Wing populist 
party the Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ), released the upbeat pop song Wir halten 
zam’ for the party in 2006, which patriotically celebrated the beautiful Austrian 
landscape and its importance to a sense of Heimat: 
 
 Wir Österreicher leb´n im schönsten Land der Welt 
 Schaut´s euch um, wir haben all´s was zählt 
 Berge, Flüsse, Wälder und die klaren Seen 
 Dieser Fleck der Erde ist doch wunderschön 
 
 Wir halten ´zam 
 Ein Leben lang. 
 Wir halten ganz fest ´zam 
 Für unser Heimatland.260 
 
The packaging of such clichéd sentiments within a popular music piece is an 
interesting example of the Austrian Right-Wing populist foray into mainstream 
circles. The lauding of Austria as “schönste[s] Land der Welt” uses the emotive 
power of national landscapes to encourage patriotism in the audience – a land of such 
beauty unsurpassed as to be the envy of the entire world. The inclusiveness of the 
song, of statements such as “schaut’d euch um, wir haben alles…”, with landscapes 
and natural topographies described as communal possessions, bring Austrians 
together as a definite social group with a unique and beautiful homeland. The phrase 
that provides the basis for the song title, “Wir halten ganz fest ´zam, 
Für unser Heimatland”261, further describes Austrians as a unified force (behind the 
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figurehead of Austrian Right-Wing populism), with a sense of Heimat that is, in part, 
defined through landscapes that typify the land Austrians call home. 
 In Hofer and Howanietz’ book from 2013, Austria as Heimat is described in a 
similar fashion, with the consistent use of emotive cues pertaining to the beauty of the 
land, and how fortunate Austrians are to have it as their Heimat: 
 
 Österreich sei ein „wunderbares“, ein „liebens- wertes“, ein „schönes“, ein 
 „fantastisches“, ein „faszinierendes“ Land. Und was sagen die Österreicher? 
 Sie sind nahezu ausnahmslos dankbar, in diesem Land geboren zu sein, in 
 diesem unserem Heimatland leben zu dürfen.262 
 
The process of encouraging group gratification for the land into which one is born 
helps the FPÖ consolidate its national ‘In’ group formula. In an interview in 2015, for 
example, FPÖ youth spokesperson Manfred Haimbuchner addressed the question of 
why the environment is so important to contemporary young Austrians by also 
emphasising the relationship between environment, landscape, and Heimat: “Der 
Schutz unserer Landschaften und unserer Umwelt stellt auch gleichzeitig einen 
Schutz unserer Heimat dar.”263 The strong use of the possessive pronoun unser in this 
statement demonstrates that Haimbuchner perceives both landscape and environment 
as things owned by the Austrian people. In a Facebook post in 2012, Heinz Christian-
Strache also explained the importance of landscape and Heimat: 
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Figure 6. 
Image taken from Facebook.264 
 
Described again using the first plural possessive pronoun, our, the landscape and 
Heimat of Austria as a possession of the people provides for Strache the grounding 
reason to remain strong in defence of the Heimat. Strache, furthermore, directly links 
the words Heimat and Landscaft. Emily Turner-Graham argues that the FPÖ 
maintains what is in fact a long held Rightist view that national landscapes and 
national identity are interrelated.265 Landscapes, therefore, although connected to the 
concept of environment, appear to transcend base topography and nature, and as a 
result speak for a deeper sense of communal, national identity that is embedded in the 
land with which Austrian people feel a special affinity. The use of the term 
Heimatland further mergers the two concepts of homeland and landscape, creating the 
idea of landscapes as a paragon of Heimat. The concept of Stolz and Verantwortung, 
further evoke a sense of strength, timelessness, and continuity, as Austrians must 
remain united in the defence of their national landscapes, Heimat, and national 
identity for future generations. Strache’s post aptly illustrates the powerful use of the 
human-nature-landscape interaction that underpins much of the FPÖ’s use of Heimat 
to facilitate a national identity narrative that constructed around an identity of place 
formula in juxtaposition to globalisation or the concept of a ‘global citizen’. 	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 Nature alone, therefore, does not signify landscape. The character of landscape 
is derived from the human interaction with nature, and the human meanings that are 
ascribed to those places as a result. Simon Schama explains that: 
 
Landscapes are culture before they are nature; constructs of the imagination 
projected onto wood and water and rock [. . .]. But it should also be 
acknowledged that once a certain idea of landscape, a myth, a vision, 
establishes itself in an actual place, it has a peculiar way of muddling 
categories, of making metaphors more real that their referents; of becoming, in 
fact, part of the scenery.266 
 
Landscape is thus a matter of human perception, and while the natural topography is 
real, the sentimentality of special meaning assigned to it is an abstract human 
imaginary. In other words, as Sam Turner puts it, “today’s landscape is a form of 
active material culture that has both shaped people and been shaped by them.”267  
Landscapes are also loaded with emotive qualities for those that perceive 
them, which transcend the limitations of base nature. This process allows landscapes a 
great power of coercion over those that imagine them. W J T Mitchell notes that 
“’landscape exerts a subtle power over people, eliciting a broad range of emotions and 
meanings that are difficult to specify.268 Kirby Farrell explains that when people 
imagine nature as landscapes, the landscape ceases to be nature alone, and instead 
“functions as a symbolic extension of the self.”269 Nature as landscape is not simply a 
picture, panorama, or entity, but rather an instrument for managing or constructing 
identity narratives. Farrell describes landscape in this way as a form of ‘psychic 
topography’, infused with social history that functions as “a record of the attempts not 
just to own the land, but to identify with it.”270 When discussing the concept of 
landscape, then, one must also consider existential identity, whether as individuals or 	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social groups. Derk Jan Stobberlaar and Bas Pedroli explain that, in relation to 
landscape imagery, existential identity is not only formed by physical attributes, but 
also symbolic meanings attached to the physical landscape, which is the basis of the 
“social and cultural environment.”271 As a result, we approach the Right-Wing 
populist concept of Heimat as a discursive construct that employs landscape as 
identity. This landscape identity, as we shall see, is very much determined by how the 
FPÖ perceives and interprets it. This imaginary, in particular, relies on a process of 
symbolically charging the terrain with desired national identity composites, and as a 
result expands upon the identity narrative so important in the FPÖ’s Heimat 
discourse. 
  We can therefore define landscape identity as the imagined or perceived 
uniqueness of a place, which when visualised together by a social group helps to 
foster or compose a national identity narrative that is geographically grounded. People 
tend to forge their identities (and national identities) by formulating a sense of 
belonging to a specific landscape where they were raised, have lived for an extended 
period (sometimes generations), or where they came to the realisation of self. Identity 
that is derived from these types of landscapes is called ‘place identity’, and it is 
formulated through the “inherent quality of the landscape as perceived by the 
people.” 272  We therefore identify a difference between nature as ‘space’, and 
landscape as ‘place’. Marcel Hunziker, Matthias Buchecker and Terry Hartig explain 
that in ‘space mode’, people perceive landscape as raw natural topography that 
provides for biological or survival needs, whereas in ‘place mode’ “people perceive 
the landscape primarily in terms of self-reflection (experiences, achievements) and 
social integration (values, norms, symbols, meanings).”273 In other words, cultural and 
social actions transfer meaning on space and nature, thereby transforming it into place 
identity and landscape.  
 As Daniel Williams explains, physical space becomes place only when 
meaning is attached to the geographical locale, which provides emotive and 	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affectionate bonds in those that perceive it and results in a long-lasting and deep-
rooted attachment.274 When space transforms into place, therefore, it helps nurture a 
sense of belonging, social integration, life values, and a sense of self.275 This is 
achieved through a social group’s interpretation of the place or landscape, which is 
also a self-reflective perspective. People’s identity is connected to place by first 
identifying one’s own environment, being identified by others in the environment, and 
finally accepting oneself as a part of that environment.276 The reciprocal procedure of 
human-landscape interaction between groups and place allows landscape to remind 
people of their own identity by loading the environment with human qualities, cultural 
values, abilities, and social histories all of which facilitate a sense of belonging. 
Landscape identity and place identity therefore force people into constant contact with 
the landscape in which they live to confirm who they really are, or who they believe 
or imagine they are. Landscape and place identity provides social groups a sense of 
distinctiveness and enables people to distinguish themselves from others. In other 
words, when a person distinguishes himself or herself as an Austrian from the 
foothills of the Alps, they are connecting themselves to the landscape of the 
mountains, as well as all the human values that are loaded into it. As Strobbelaar and 
Pedroli explain, it is through identifying with landscapes that place begins to act as a 
social category, and thus “place identification can be seen as synonymous with social 
identification.277 We therefore approach the populist concept of Heimat as an example 
of landscape identity, which provides their audience with a mode of social 
identification that is characterised by ‘Austrian’ values, qualities, histories, and a 
resultant collective sense of self that, while abstract and discursive, is at the very least 
geographically immediate. 
 
2.3.1 - Agrarian landscapes 
 Agrarian scenery is the first landscape of significance in the FPÖ’s Heimat as 
national identity discourse. The FPÖ states in its political Handbuch: “Das Schicksal 	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unserer Heimat ist eng mit unserer Landwirtschaft verbunden.”278 In this narrative of 
Heimat as agricultural life the FPÖ identifies a convergence of Umwelt, Heimat, 
Landeskultur and Kulturlandschaft, in order to depict an Austrian landscape identity 
that is synonymous with provincial, agrarian life. This is seen, for example, when 
rural and agrarian Austrian settings are listed by the FPÖ as worthy of preservation 
because they are culturally and historically significant to the identity of the native 
population. The traditions associated with the Bauerntum, and the economic and 
resource prosperity Landwirtschaft provides for the Austrian population, are highly 
valued by the FPÖ: 
 
Die österreichische Kulturlandschaft wurde über Jahrhunderte durch die 
bäuerliche Bearbeitung kultiviert und geprägt. Sie bildet gemeinsam mit den 
ländlichen Siedlungsformen, den Nutztierarten, den Bewirtschaftungsformen 
und dem ländlichen Brauchtum die Landeskultur.279 
  
In this extract there is powerful language describing rural Austrian landscapes as 
cultivated landscape that is rich in hundreds of years of history and tradition.  
The FPÖ’s argument on the validity of an Austrian Kulturlandschaft typified 
by agrarian settings and Landeskultur is predicated on the long-established 
inhabitancy of Austrians in the land, a sense of productivity and ownership, and the 
cultural affinity they share with each other and the environment through their shared 
sense of place. This identity narrative requires examples of Austrians sharing a long 
established, harmonious, working relationship with the landscape from which they are 
derived. Rural landscapes and agrarian communities provide the first justification. In 
this identity of place narrative, rural and agrarian communities are supported as 
examples of traditional Austrian identity, with a particular emphasis on these 
communities’ close and practical relationship with the natural world. In a video from 
2014, Haimbuchner on behalf of the FPÖ emphasises the long-standing traditions that 
are preserved in Austria’s agrarian landscapes and the people who live and work 
there: 
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Figure 7. 
Screenshot taken from YouTube.280 
 
Such imagery, which portrays Austrian farmers using traditional farming tools and 
wearing customary Tracht, discursively constructs an impression of Heimat in which 
traditional modes of existence (that are rooted to the land and informed by local 
culture) are normative. Agrarian landscapes, as a result, are understood by the FPÖ to 
be indicative of cultural inheritance and fruitfulness, a wonderful exposé of the beauty 
and authenticity of the Heimat concept in the party’s national identity discourse. The 
agrarian landscape is, as a result, loaded by the FPÖ with ‘Austrian’ qualities - hard 
work, innovation, tradition and community, all of which facilitates a sense of 
belonging through an abstract cultural interpretation of natural landscapes. The 
agrarian landscape provides the FPÖ with images of Heimat that are rooted in the soil, 
traditional, and in harmony with nature – all of which is then introspectively 
consumed by the audience as an important element in an national identity formula that 
is therefore worthy of preservation. Agrarian landscapes, in other words, are 
customary and unchanging. They preserve traditional community structures informed 
by an immediate sense of place, as well as by the inter-generational transmission of 
culture. They are entirely contradictory of the ‘global citizen’, and encourage 
communities to remain firmly rooted in the places from which they originate, thereby 
further emphasizing an insular and unchanging concept of national identity and home. 
 For the FPÖ, agriculture is understood in an idyllic and natural context, the 	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result of the toil of farming communities, who live harmoniously with the natural 
environment. The nostalgic, völkisch image of the peasant farmer has rich cultural 
symbolism: a patriot, who through conventional and organic farming, produces high 
quality goods for the longevity of the nation. The sentimental portrayal of farming 
communities, as true Austrians who live harmoniously with their native soil, is a 
useful technique in the political discourse of Austrian identity and landscape in the 
FPÖ ideology. In their Handbuch they emphasise the importance of farming 
communities to culture, nature preservation, and national identity, stating that “Ein 
freier und leistungsfähiger Bauernstand ist Voraussetzung für den Erhalt der 
natürlichen Existenzgrundlagen unserer Heimat.”281 The best agricultural method for 
the FPÖ employs a system of land-bound production, which takes into consideration 
“das kleinräumige natürliche Gleichgewicht Rücksicht, schont die natürlichen 
Ressourcen und schafft die für Österreich typische bäuerliche Kultur…”282 On the 
importance of what the FPÖ describes as ‘peasant culture’, the party explains that the 
ancestral ‘peasantry’ has dual economic and cultural importance, as both the 
providers of healthy food for national self sufficiency, and for the preservation of the 
national culture through the guardianship of cultural landscapes such as the Alpine 
settlement areas.283  
 In the BZÖ Grundsatzprogramm, under the title ‘Zukunft braucht Heimat’, 
position IV provides an image of the Austrian countryside and farm fields as Heimat: 
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Figure 8. 
Image taken from the BZÖ.284 
 
This nostalgic image of an idyllic, rural and mountainous land, with a church in centre 
surrounded by the fields of agriculture, transmits to the viewer a symbolically 
enriched landscape. The implied symbolism of this image exhibits an implicitly 
detailed narrative of the BZÖ’s opinion on Heimat and identity, based primarily on 
the rural farming characteristics of a more vintage and timeworn Austria. Again, and 
perhaps not by chance, the town design with church in the very centre appears to 
confirm the importance of Christian-Occidental values. In explaining state identity 
and the notion of Heimat, the BZÖ proclaim, “Nur aus starken Wurzeln kann eine 
gute Zukunft entstehen. Unser Werteverständnis fußt auf diesem Fundament.”285 
Society, like the farmer’s fields, requires strong roots and natural organic growth in 
order to reach its full potential. The landscape provided to visually demonstrate the 
deep natural roots of Heimat and identity, the idyllic and mountainous rural modus 
vivendi, demonstrates the importance of pre-established, customary and arguably 
autochthonous modes of communal identity in Right-Wing populist rhetoric. This 
grounded sense of organic and traditional fraternity is utilised as a counter-balance to 
what the BZÖ describe as the “zunehmender Migration und den Folgen der 
Globalisierung.”286 Thus the core human element in the landscape of pastoral idealism 	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propagated by the Right-Wing populist parties, and the culture that is symbolically 
charged within the panorama, demonstrates a customary agrarian society.  
In order to understand landscape as a symbolically charged element that 
reflects societal identity, one must consider the dualistic Right-Wing populist 
approach. In an almost Manichean good versus evil narrative, that of a grounded, 
traditional and Germanic agrarian society, which is symbolically charged into natural 
landscapes, versus the homogenising, denationalising and cultural decrepitude of the 
abyss that is modernism and globalisation. This ideology is not regressive, and does 
not, for example, negate development and technology. This narrative, does, however, 
celebrate the natural and sustainable approach of the ‘traditional’ Austrian farmer. For 
example, the FPÖ explains: 
 
Die österreichischen Bauern bewirtschaften und gestalten im Alpenbereich 
einen ökologisch besonders sensiblen Raum. Die Bodenkraft und der 
qualitative hochwertige Wasserhaushalt stellen zunehmend wertvolle Produkte 
der Alpenregion dar, die eine  sorgfältige, - nachhaltige - Bewirtschaftung 
erfordern.287  
 
The unique character of the Austrian farmer, and his or her rural lifestyle, is the 
symbolic heart of the Heimat. For the Freedom Party it is imperative to preserve the 
farming landscape of Austria, as “Österreich kann aus dem reichen Schatz einer 
weitgehend intakten Umwelt und einer kleinstrukturierten Landwirtschaft 
schöpfen.”288 The farmers of Austria have a special role as defenders of the national 
culture. Therefore customary modes of farming must be preserved as integral 
elements of state identity, “Der Arbeitsplatz Bauernhof ist uns daher ein hohes Gut. 
Die Struktur der bäuerlichen Familienbetriebe als Vollerwerbsbetriebe ist vor den 
Verzerrungen der europäischen Agrarförderpolitik zu schützen.”289 Here the dualistic, 
Manichean argument is clear, a traditional, sustainable and localised farming culture 
against the mass production, faceless factory harvest advocated at the heart of 
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European Union agricultural policies, which as we have seen, dominates their 
practical environmental policies.  
 For Austria’s Right-Wing populist parties, the values associated with Austrian 
farmers on the land are that of hard working, energetic, traditional, and provincial 
men. It is, therefore, a landscape in which they desire to be seen and a cultural 
landscape identity they wish to emulate. For example, during his 2008 election 
campaign, Jörg Haider released a billboard depicting himself within the golden 
cornfields of Austria, sleeves rolled up and ready to grapple, a true example of the 
machismo and energy of the typical ‘Austrian’ agrarian landscape identity formula: 
 
 
Figure 9. 
BZÖ 2008.290 
 
Haider delights in portraying himself as ‘one of the boys’, a provincial Austrian who 
is at home in the agrarian landscapes, and informed by a cultural landscape identity 
that represents the values of perseverance, strength, and provincialism. It 
demonstrates an Austrian identity that is deep rooted at home in the cultural 
landscapes of the Heimat, and is far from the cosmopolitan influences of urban life. 
Haider is hard working, in his prime, robust, and very much at home among his 
fellow ‘salt of the earth’ Austrians. Haider appears to understand the concerns and 
daily activities of hard-working Austrian farmers. It is therefore not by chance that 
such images and slogans were disseminated alongside the principle maxim of 	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‘Österreich den Österreichern’, as the landscape identity of provincial Austrian folk is 
championed by the Right-Wing populist parties as one strong example of the larger 
Austrian national identity. The image of the hard-working peasant within his 
accustomed rural landscape demonstrates a degree of ruggedness and machismo, 
which Right-Wing populist politicians consistently favour. The identity formula that 
develops in the fusion of landscapes and people is directed by the illustration of such 
cultural values, which in this case are developed from a perceived long legacy of 
human-nature interaction, such as those diligent qualities of the masculine and 
innovative farmer who works the land. 
 Support for local agrarian landscapes over a more globalized image of the 
world, and therefore the weakening of national identity formulas, is, thus, typical of 
Rightist ideology in Germany and Austria. As Olsen explains, the defense of small 
scale communities, such as agrarian ones, from a homogenizing one-world consumer-
capitalist culture, and the protection of local environments from globalist agents, are 
simply modern representations of “völkisch traditions that have long coloured Right-
Wing German and Austrian understanding of the interconnection between national 
identity and national environments.”291 Stobbelaar and Pedroli explain, furthermore, 
that this form of cultural landscape identity, which celebrates the culture preserved in 
agrarian environments, is informed by a merger of existential identity and spatial 
characteristics, and that cultural landscape identity is ascribed “socio cultural 
meanings that are linked to place… playing a role in the collective living world and 
confirming that ‘we-feeling’ of a group.”292 The FPÖ’s support for farmers, as well as 
the party’s consistent use of agrarian imagery in its publicity, combines existential 
identity with the spatial characteristics of Austria’s pastoral lands. Agrarian 
landscapes, as a result, help the party to facilitate its persistent ‘us’ narrative, which is 
fixed to the land and incongruous with modern migration or the global citizen with no 
affiliations to place whatsoever. The use of Heimat alongside this exclusive national 
identity formula only emboldens such discourse by emotionally, linking the age-old 
imagery of rural existence with a modern concept of what it means to be at home in 
Austria, and what it means to be Austrian.  
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2.3.2 - Alpine landscapes 
 The second Austrian locale that evokes a landscape identity in the FPÖ’s 
Heimat discourse is the Alps. In his book titled The Alps: A Cultural History Andrew 
Beattie asserts that a profound link exists between Austria’s Far Right and alpine 
settings, reminding us that “From nowhere in the continent (of Europe) does the far-
right sentiment linger on most tenaciously than in the mountain regions of Austria.”293 
Austria’s geographic position determines the nation’s ‘alpine’ characterisation, 
however it is the persistent observances to this designation with the mountains 
throughout history that make the Alps a cultural landscape. Heinz-Christian Strache 
has more recently utilised the powerful social media tool of Facebook to encourage 
his unique sense of Heimat and national patriotism, by emphasising the importance of 
(and his particular love of) alpine panoramas for Austrian identity. In the image seen 
here, posted by Strache in 2012, a patriotic scene of national colours and alpine 
landscape is projected with the adjacent comment: “Flagge zeigen .... Für unsere 
wundervolle und schöne Heimat Österreich! :-)”294:  
 
 
Figure 10. 
Image taken from Facebook.295 
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Österreich!” Facebook. Facebook. 26 Oct. 2012. Web. 26 Dec. 2012. 
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This particular image demonstrates the fusion of national landscapes, in this case the 
power and beauty of Austria’s alpine landscape, with national identity and patriotism. 
In the image, Austrian national identity is symbolically depicted with the use of the 
Austrian flag, which foreshadows a panoramic alpine background that portrays the the 
nation possesses. A publicity video from Haimbuchner from 2012 also uses alpine 
vistas while simultaneously explaining that Austrians are, by nature, connected to 
these landscapes, to ‘our’ Land and ‘our’ Heimat’: 
 
 
Figure 11. 
Screenshot taken from YouTube.296 
 
The use of alpine images alongside national identity and Heimat narratives constructs 
an image of the homeland with which many Austrians can empathise and 
subsequently feel a sense of patriotism. When observing the beauty and mastery of 
local nature, many cannot help but be in awe and experience pride and sentimentality. 
The mountains, as a result, become ‘our home’ - an exclusive interpretation of the 
landscape that belongs only to Austrians, and thus carries oblique references to 
separatism, nationalism, and insularism that emerge from a distinctive belief in 
ownership over the panoramas the landscapes depict. 
 National identity in alpine landscapes is further constructed by the FPÖ 
through the inclusion of symbology indicative of the Western ethos and civilisation. 
In 2012, for example, Strache released a poster celebrating the emotive power of the 
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Austrian Alps, alongside the rather nationalistic proclamation - “Mein Österreich, wir 
lieben dich und deine Natur!”:  
 
 
Figure 12. 
Image taken from Facebook.297 
 
The possessive quality of the slogan ‘My Austria, we love you and your nature’ 
further propagates the ‘us’ and ‘them’ formula so prevalent in FPÖ rhetoric. The 
FPÖ’s poster, furthermore, symbolically loads Austria’s alpine topography with a 
deeper existential meaning through the inclusion of the nationalist and religious icons. 
In the poster, the alpine landscape of Austria is clearly lined to Christianity and 
Western culture through the iconographical clue of the crucifix. The placement of the 
national flag and a crucifix alongside the mountains demonstrates to the observer that 
Christianity is an equally integral feature of Austrian identity: as natural in the nation 
as the Alps under which the population lives. The crucifix is also indicative of the 
broader anti-Islamic policy of “Abendland in Christenhand”298 disseminated by the 
FPÖ, which suggests that new immigrants, particularly from Islamic nations, have no 
connection to Austrian nature or culture and therefore are incapable of assimilation 
into the broader Austrian national consciousness. The poster, accordingly, not only 
shows which topography is typical in Austria, but also which values, cultures, and 	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298 For example see FPÖ Handbuch 2013, 50. 
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social groups belong there. The use of the Alps, subsequently, illustrates an image of 
Heimat that is insular and determined by Western values, and is, therefore, anathema 
to an open, all-inclusive view of the homeland.  
  The crucifix appears again in a poster shared by Strache in 2013, where he 
describes the FPÖ as the only true defenders of Austria: 
 
 
Figure 13. 
Image taken from Facebook.299 
 
Here alpine landscapes directly compliment Strache and the FPÖ. The slogans ‘We 
are Austria’s only protection mechanism’, and ‘Our heart beats red/white/red’ (a 
reference to the colours of the Austrian flag), are specifically linked to alpine scenery. 
A true Austrian party that only loves and represents Austria, with no other hidden or 
extended agenda, in other words, protects archetypal Austria. The values of Austria, 
symbolically depicted in the crucifix, and the quintessence of Heimat, illustrated in 
the Alps, are thus simultaneously defended by the FPÖ in contrast to other parties 
who would usurp these national identity formulas and replace them with more 
inclusive, globalist platforms. In the fore of this symbolically loaded image, Strache 
appears as the leader of the party and the nationalist ethos they represent. 
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 While the FPÖ use alpine scenery to illustrate an image of Heimat that is 
selective of the ethnocultural demographic that fits within its national identity 
formula, other parties have, in contrast, selected an opposing, and inclusive approach. 
During the Austrian presidential election, the Left-wing candidate and current 
president Alexander Van der Bellen adopted alpine imagery and the Heimat concept 
from the FPÖ in order to challenge their prevalence on the topic: 
 
 
Figure 14. 
Van der Bellen 2016. Image taken from Preussischer Anzeiger.300 
 
In the quote, Van der Bellen indicates his strong desire to contribute to the Heimat 
debate by contributing to the concept’s meaning from his own perspective. Van der 
Bellen appears to agree with the fundamental features of Heimat: a romantic fusion of 
childhood memories born and raised in the mountains, pastoral settings, alpine vistas, 
and local villages. His stance in front of a typical alpine vista, additionally, is not at 
all alien to the publicity strategy of the FPÖ. The difference between the political 
strategy of the one-time leader of the Austrian Greens and the FPÖ, however, is made 
clear in additional posters released during the campaign: 
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Figure 15. 
Van der Bellen 2016. Image taken from the Austrian Green party website.301 
 
Rather than the FPÖ’s linking of exceptionalism and exclusion with alpine images, 
Van der Bellen emphasises that the landscape, and the nation itself, belong to all those 
who reside there, regardless of class, gender, culture, religion, or ethnicity. Any 
demographic that lives in Austria has access to this understanding of Heimat, without 
any assumed prerequisites. Such an inclusive use of Heimat is indicative of Van der 
Bellen’s principles as a representative in favour of mass immigration and cultural 
pluralism.302 In an additional poster released during the 2016 presidential campaign, 
Van der Bellen further challenged the FPÖ’s separatist politics by including the term 
Heimat: 
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Figure 16. 
Van der Bellen 2016. Image taken from Vanderbellen.at.303 
 
Heimat, for Van de Bellen, requires solidarity – and this means an all-inclusive 
agenda for all Austrians regardless of their backgrounds, as well as new immigrants 
or refugees. Where the FPÖ used alpine scenery to evoke a sense of patriotism and 
nationalistic pride in one’s identity of place, Van der Bellen attempts to platform the 
beauty of Austria’s landscape as an example of the affluence of the nation as well as 
the justification for helping outsiders to join the nation’s prosperity and the beauty of 
it’s territory. The result of this debate on Heimat was the clash of diametrically 
opposed political platforms, one nationalist and exclusionary, the other inclusive and 
globalist, played out with the use of alpine landscapes to draw audiences towards 
either political message. 
 
2.3.3 - Alpine elevation and the cult of machismo 
 The alpine region of Austria is not only synonymous with rich natural beauty, 
but is also the location of masculinist, ultra-fit extreme sports and competitive 
triumphs. Indeed, there is something to be said for the pursuit of adventure and 
competition in the height of the mountains. As Johannes von Moltke explains, in the 
work of Heimat authors like the German Ludwig Ganghofer (1855 – 1920), “Alpine 
elevation was synonymous with physical and spiritual well-being.” 304  For the 
Austrian populist Right, ‘alpine elevation’ also means a place where heroic masculine 
virtues are found. For the Right-Wing populist parties, it is not sufficient to simply 	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celebrate the topography and beauty of alpine panoramas. Landscape as identity, 
rather, requires an exploration of the human virtues the terrain symbolises. As a 
result, the Alps as a national landscape are symbolically charged with desired national 
values, such as athleticism, power, adventurousness, transcendence, machismo, and 
determination. On the 21st of August 2012 Strache posted in his Facebook profile a 
picture of FPÖ Generalsekretär and powerbroker Herbert Kickl taking part in the 
heroically titled “Inferno-Triathlon”, a test of endurance in the mountains of 
Switzerland. The image, depicting Kickl climbing high in the the Alps, was joined 
with an adjacent comment from Strache: 
 
 
Figure 17. 
„GS Herbert Kickl bei seinem "Inferno-Triathlon" im Berner Oberland in  der 
Schweiz (Schwimmen 3,1 km, Rennrad 97 km - 2.145 Höhenmeter, 
Mountainbike 30 km - Steigung 1.180 Höhenmeter, Berglauf 25 km Steigung 
2.175 Höhenmeter)....In 11 Stunden und 48 min bewältigt!!! Größten Respekt 
für diese sportliche Leistung.”305 
  
This image is typical of the machismo exhibited by Right-Wing politicians, who 
characteristically take great pleasure in boasting their athleticism and active 
participation in sports. For example, Strache also delights in flaunting his athletic side 	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during his leisure time on the ski fields of the Alps. In a picture on one of his holidays 
on the slopes, Strache celebrated a hiking and skiing weekend in the mountains, to 
which he proclaimed: “Unsere österreichische Bergwelt und Natur ist ein Traum!”306 
In another similar image Strache boasts of his surroundings, “St. Jakob im 
Deffereggental in Osttirol, im Hochgebirge (2.700 Meter hoch), Naturschutzgebiet 
Hohe Tauern (an unserer südtiroler Grenze - ein Tirol) ist ein wundervoller Traum der 
Natur. Ein Stück einzigartiger rot-weiß-roter Heimat!”307 One viewer of this image 
proclaimed “Die Alpen Sind unsere Heimat!” another comments on Strache’s 
athleticism by stating “Super HC he he.”308 Strache uses Facebook to disseminate a 
veritable montage of pictures that are testament to his athleticism and alpine spirit, all 
of which are also symbolic of the determination of ‘Austrians’, as well as the Populist 
Party members themselves: 
 
 
 
Figure 18. 
 Strache and his FPÖ team ascend the summit, a symbolic depiction of 
 their machismo and dedication to their political mission. Image taken from 
 Facebook.309 	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Figure 19. 
 Strache at home in the heights: with a quintessential Austrian alpine 
 panorama to detail his conviction and mountain climbing abilities. Image 
 taken from Facebook.310 
 
 
Figure 20. 
 Strache crossing an alpine glacier near the summit. It is interesting to 
 note the success of such media campaigns, which seek to merge the 
 Austrian landscape with the party and their sense of Austrian national 
 identity. A Facebook user commented on this photo, stating “Der Himmel 
 passt alles Blau ;-))”, a reference to the new found political heights of the 
 FPÖ and their ‘blue’ brand of politics.311 	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Figure 21. 
In images such as these the FPÖ politicians wish to depict themselves as fearless 
men: masculine, powerful, and above the degeneracy of career politicians. Their 
attempt to depict themselves as an elite troop of athletic and dedicated men appears 
to work with their desired demographic, with one Facebook user commenting 
“Blaue Elitetruppe hoch oben.Kein Platz für Rot-Schwarz-Grün. Dieses Bild wird 
im Oktober nach den Wahlen Geschichte schreiben.”312 
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Figure 22. 
Strache and his team reaching 3798 meters on Grossglockner – Austria’s 
highest peak. The stark contrast between man and unfathomable nature is 
reminiscent of the heroic imagery in Bergfilm. Image taken from Facebook.313 
 
 
Figure 23. 
Heinz-Christian Strache, Johan Gudenus, and Herbert Kickl on top of the 
highest peak in Austria. The correlation between conquering Austria’s 
mountainous landscape and Strache’s political career is made by one 
Facebook user who comments “Do kommt da Haeupl nimmer rauf - muss im 
Wirtshaus mit der Fahne (vom Wein) schwingen. Net war?”314 	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In describing the dramaturgy of the Austrian Far Right, Adi Wimmer 
comments that Haider also repeatedly portrayed himself as an alpine 
adventurer.315 In his ‘Rambo’ guise, as Wimmer puts it, he would often be 
seen going rock-climbing, jogging, or scaling the highest peaks of his native 
Carinthia.316  
 
 
Figure 24. 
Haider in his ‘Rambo’ guise: demonstrating a fit and active lifestyle in the 
mountainous Austrian Heimat.317 
 
Strache continues his media-savvy campaign by posting motivational imagery on 
Facebook of man’s ascendency of the mountain as a suggestive ‘life philosophy’. The 
emotive, macho words of these images combine with the Alps to illustrate Austrian 
masculinity and bravery at its apex in mountain climbing: 
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Figure 25. 
Image taken from Facebook.318 	  
 
 
Figure 26. 
Image taken from Facebook.319 
  
The authoritative language used in these phrases, such as powerful men conquering 
difficult paths, is typical of the machismo illustrated in Right-Wing populist 
narratives. The visual theme of man’s battle to ascend the mountain and conquer 
nature is also entirely reminiscent of the Bergfilme of Peter Ostmeyer, Arnold Frank 	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Facebook 20 July 2015. Web. 2 Jan. 2016.  
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and Leni Riefenstahl, all of whom created movies with images of men and women 
scaling steep cliffs and battling the elements of nature.320 Moltke notes that for many 
scholars, Bergfilm is perceived as “a general flight from modernity to heroic 
idealism.”321 In this case of the Right-Wing populism today, it appears that images 
such as this one encourage the audience to turn away from the mainstream political 
spheres and into their own ‘heroic’ form of politics. Many Facebook users apparently 
share Strache’s vision, with such comments as: “ja,unser Weg ist steil und 
schwierig.aber haben wir den bezwungen...Hc,dann haben wir für immer gewonnen!”, 
and, “gerade die Herausforderung ist es,die uns den schwierigen Weg beschreiten läßt 
und schlußendlich zum Erfolg führt !!!!”322 Moltke argues the images of Bergfilm 
investigate the Alps for their particular graphic qualities, that is, the self-reflexive 
exploration of space that takes on further significance with respect to the theorizations 
of the role of space and place.323 Here, the Freedom Party encourage the virtues of 
machismo they believe are endemic to their side of the political struggle, meanwhile 
encouraging an Austrian identity based on alpine landscapes that are loaded with the 
heroic virtues of mountaineering.  
 The motivation behind the use of alpine landscapes in FPÖ publicity, then, is 
not only to celebrate the beauty of nature, but also to emphasise the perceived cultural 
significance of that landscape identity to the public. Thus the audience is encouraged 
to imagine the landscape through the symbolically charged perception of the man in 
the image, such as Strache or Haider, and not dwell only on its pictorial aesthetic. As 
a landscape symbolically charged with a cultural identity for all Austrians, the 
populist Right encourages their audience to see the Alps as a unique topography for a 
unique people, who together can boast a national identity that is constructed on the 
machismo of alpine adventurers who embody the virtues of a fit, athletic, versatile, 
and determined people. The mountains portray a rather heroic image of Austrians as 
an elevated people, free from the bonds of servitude or the faceless decrepitude of the 
lowland urban world – which through its cosmopolitanism and capitalism has lost its 
sense of place and identity with the natural topography of Heimat. While the Alps and 	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the alpine adventurer is a popular image in the FPÖ’s arsenal, it shares a place with an 
additional, equally important national landscape that is derived from the mist-
shrouded, archaic ground of the forests. 
 
2.3.4 - Forest landscapes 
 The final major landscape used in FPÖ publicity is the forest. Many FPÖ 
members go to great lengths to market their image alongside forested settings. FPÖ 
youth spokesperson Manfred Haimbuchner, for example, often chooses to use the 
forest as a location for his promotional media, such as the picture from his website: 
 
 
Figure 27. 
Image taken from Haimbuchner’s website.324 
 
Haimbuchner’s persona as a clean and green member of the FPÖ and 
Landeshauptmann-Stellvertreter in the Oberösterreich Landesregierung (where he 
focuses primarily on Naturschutz), his self-proclaimed love of nature, fishing, and 
hunting, all fits in perfectly with his role as a true Austrian citizen that is in touch with 
the forests that he calls home.325 The forest, for Haimbuchner, is valuable because of 
the national treasures it preserves. In his video promoting his service in the Landesrat, 
Haimbuchner celebrates the forests of Austria for the biodiversity of species, the clean 
water, and the prized natural environments and monuments.326  
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 For the FPÖ, however, the forest preserves more than just a vast array of flora, 
fauna, or resources. It is also from the forest that national identity and the sense of 
Heimat are preserved, developed, and even characterised. For example, FPÖ-
Landesparteiobmann Markus Abwerzger asserts that forests, mountains, and 
meadows are not only an essential aspect of tourism, “sondern sie sind unsere Heimat, 
unsere Natur und unser Naherholungsgebiet“327 The forests, in other words, hold a 
special significance for Austrians that transcends the banality of resources or tourism. 
Forests and nature define the Heimat and therefore the nation itself. Haimbuchner’s 
love of “heimische Natur”328, of which he speaks about at length on his website, is 
indicative of the FPÖ’s broader identity of place platform that characterises its 
national identity discourse. In his video showcasing nature as the “äußere Heimat” 
Haimbuchner asks the question “denn was wäre unser Land ohne Wälder…?”, before 
going on to state the “Erhaltung von Arten und Lebensräumen ist untrennbar mit 
meinem Verständnis von Heimat verbunden.”329 For Haimbuchner, then, Austria 
would not be the same nation, and any understanding of Heimat not genuine, without 
the forest and its role in the national identity narrative. In the same manner that 
Austrians would not self-identify without their own culture, behaviourisms, history, 
mythologies, and common language, without native forests Heimat would cease to 
have its typical outward characteristics.  
 In the FPÖ’s Heimat discourse the ‘outer Heimat’, typified in this case by 
forested locales, also conflates with an inner sense of collective identity. The union of 
identity and the physic topography that helps to humanise the environment is derived 
through references to the long history the Germanic peoples (and, indirectly, 
Austrians too as a member of the German Kulturgemeinschaft) share with the forests. 
This cultural landscape identity, which combines the forest and grove with the 
Germanic warrior machismo of the past, is seen, for examplr, in the FPÖ’s comic Der 
Blaue Planet. One image, in particular, depicts Strache as a type of ancient Germanic 
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god or warrior-hero: a muscular example of Germanic Mannestum who is rising forth 
from the sacred groves of the Heimat: 
 
 
Figure 28. 
Image taken from Der Blaue Planet.330 
 
It is interesting to note that while Strache and his fellow Austrians are derived from 
such sacred forests, the foreigners of the European Union, who Strache is rising 
against, are from the faceless urban sprawl of the ‘Zentral Planet’. Applegate explains 
that the German retreat into nature, so endemic in the use of Heimat, represents a 
search for a source of collective identity not to be found in the urban environment. 
Only nature “could be the appropriate symbol as well as source of Heimat feeling.”331 
For members of the Heimat movement, the was an Allegemeingut, and their 
redefinition of nature and man’s relationship to it had come to see the forest as a 
commonly held treasure of the people.332 The forest, as a result, was symbolically 
charged with the history and cultural identity of the people who dwelt there.  
 The image of Strache, which symbolically depicts the ‘man in nature’ avatar, 
has deep historical roots in Germanic culture. The forest holds a very mystic and 	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integral role in the German-speaking world’s cultural landscape identity imaginary, 
and this key concept has endured into the modern worldview of the Austrian populist 
Right. The Roman historian Publius Cornelius Tacitus (AD 56 – 117) describes the 
Germanic people in his book Germania a warrior culture of pure blood that lived 
beyond in the Rhine in bristling, deep forests.333 Significantly, the Germanic people 
did not like to confine their religious ceremonies indoors, and “Their holy places are 
woods and groves…”334 Furthermore, Simon Schama highlights that the metaphoric 
use of the forest has deep roots in Germanic mythology. Schama recounts in his book 
Landscape and Memory the cult initiation of the god Wotan, in which Germanic 
tribes celebrated their collective identity, rebirth, and renewed strength in sacred 
groves by committing sacrifices on tree trunks.335 This act is believed to stem from 
the rites of the Germanic deity Wotan, identified in Norse mythology as Odin, who 
hanged himself on the ash tree Yggdrasil (the Nordic symbol of the universe) in a 
ritual death and resurrection, in order to obtain the archaic wisdom of the runes, or 
‘mysteries’, of life and the universe.336 Odin’s runic incantations demonstrate that 
from a very early inception, culturally determined identity characteristics were closely 
connected to the realm of nature in the pre-Christian Germanic world. 
 From the mystic ethnogenesis of the forests, Germanic identity continued to 
imagine and develop. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the fifteenth century 
spelling Heinmut is a compound noun constructed of the two German words 
Hein/Hain and Mut.337 This clearly illustrates an interesting etymological example of 
the synthesis of nature mysticism and masculine cultural elements in the development 
of Germanic identity. As the ancient Germanic tribes had originated in the forests, so 
too would the modern Germans find their warrior identity within the sacred groves of 
their ancestors. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century a tendency toward 	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Naturbegeisterung continued to transform the German forest, the grove, and the oak 
in particular, to natural monuments of national significance. The primordial and 
natural geographical dimensions of Germany became symbolic of the German people 
as a whole, with the fatherland as the central paradigm to that collective unity. For 
example, in his play Hermannsschlacht (1769), the German poet Friedrich Gottlieb 
Klopstock described the German Vaterland by evoking symbolic depictions of oak 
forests and sacred groves that housed the united Germanic armies of the Cheruscan 
warlord Arminius: 
 
 You are the thickest, shadiest oak, 
 In the innermost grove, 
 The highest, oldest, most sacred oak, 
 O fatherland.338  
 
The result of the developments of these Germanic ‘forest-feelings’ was a collective 
belief that the local forests represented a cultural landscape identity that preserved the 
virtues of a proud and militant warrior society - with the oak and the grove/forest as 
the most sacred manifestation of imaginary. 
  Although these examples speak of a Germanic forest consciousness that 
helped to indirectly shape the character of Germans and later of Germany itself, it 
does not retract from the FPÖ position. Although the FPÖ, as we have seen, go to 
great lengths to define themselves as culturally separate to Germans, the party does 
recognise the Austria’s modern day cultural origins through referring to an Austro-
Germanic ethnogenesis. 339 A dominant political of the FPÖ, furthermore, is to 
successfully oscillate between pro-German nationalist imagery and a determined pro-
Austrian platform of exceptionalism. Through the recognition of Germanic ethnic and 
cultural roots, the FPÖ can celebrate stereotypical German nationalist imagery while 
also maintaining a distinct degree of Austrian distinctiveness.. While Austria has 
developed its own unique identity, it is still seen to contribute to the broader German 
cultural community due to the strong historical and cultural links its citizens 	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supposedly share with Germans. The template of the valiant Germanic freedom 
fighter of prehistory who fought hard to defend his or her forested homeland, 
therefore, can easily apply to modern day Austrians due to the cultural and ethnic link 
they share with their forebears and the ‘man in nature’ avatar their legacy has 
bestowed upon them.  
 The Germanic warrior of prehistory, therefore, rises again in these 
symbolically charged landscapes, as the populist Right use cultural landscape identity 
to extol the virtues of manliness exhibited by both ancient Austrians in the forests, 
and modern Austrian patriots. On the 29th of September Strache posted a picture on 
his Facebook profile celebrating his party’s relationship with ‘our’ beautiful 
Heimat.340 The defiant body language says much of Strache’s desired public image. 
Strache is at his peak, and very much at home in forest and the Alps:  
 
 
Figure 29. 
Image taken from Facebook.341 
  
 The paradox of the forest as a cultural landscape identity is complimented 
through the staging of folk festivals that achieve a synthesis of human character and 
forest landscape. For example, Heinz Christian-Strache posted images on his 	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Facebook profile of himself in the forest at Plöschenberg in Kärnten to celebrate the 
Sommersonnenwendfeier of 2012:  
 
 
Figure 30. 
 Political banners, state Wappen, and the forest as locale. “Sonnwendfeier 
 2012 in Kärnten.”342 
 
 
Figure 31. 
 The local flags of Kärnten alongside local beer, fire, forest, and the FPÖ 
 “21.6.2012 - Gestrige Sommersonnenwendfeier.”343 
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Figure 32. 
 “Flamme Empor :-)” It is interesting to note that the mysticism of the 
 forest setting alongside almost pagan festivities is recognised by a  Facebook 
 user, who comments on the photo “Natur gibt Kraft.”344 
 
 
Figure 33. 
Participating in the forest festival in quintessential Austrian Tracht. “War  ein 
toller Abend gestern :-)”345 	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Figure 34. 
 Full moon and fire ritual in the Carinthian forests. “Sonnenwende 2012 :-) 
 Plöschenberg in Kärnten!”346 
 
 
Figure 35. 
 Full moon forest mysticism: an almost pagan avowal of Heimat Österreich. 
 “Ich wünsche euch eine harmonische und positive Vollmondnacht :-)“347 
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Popularising themselves with local festivals as well as natural aesthetics, the Freedom 
Party build upon old traditions to enact a sense of Heimat. The party are, in many 
cases, emulating the processions of older Heimat movements. In her discussion of the 
Pfälzerwald Verein, Applegate describes a scene that has become the contemporary 
epitome of the cultural activities of the Austrian Right-Wing populist movement. She 
explains that, in an attempt of local character, the Verein celebrated midsummer in an 
authentic traditional fashion, a unique blend of pagan bonfires and brass bands, joined 
together with poems that celebrated both the native forests and the word Heimat in 
their evocation of the poetry filled past of folksongs and fairy tale.348 Today Austria’s 
Right-Wing populist parties are also inviting their audience to enter their brand of 
Austrian identity that is at home in the landscape of the forest. The images depicting 
Strache’s party in the forest attending folk festivities clearly demonstrate the type of 
solidarity typical of these outdoor festivals, where those of likeminded character join 
together to celebrate the Austrian forest, as national landscape, and Austrianness, as a 
human landscape. With the colours and Wappen of Kärnten behind him, surrounded 
by the green depths of the Carinthian forest, Strache is seen in the first image 
reaffirming his party’s connection to the forest and the histories of the people that live 
in those regions. The power and mysticism of the looming fire in the darkness all but 
compliments his party’s image as a powerful movement.  
 The forest adoration typical of both the contemporary Right-Wing populist 
parties and previous Heimat movements is also evident in the ideology of National 
Socialism. Adolf Hitler, Paul Joseph Goebbels, Hermann Göring, Heinrich Himmler, 
R. Walter Darré amongst others all wrote and spoke about humanity as a part of 
nature, and were therefore subject to her laws through the guidance of a ‘Providence’ 
which enacted its will through the rhythms of nature.349 Robert A. Pois argues that the 
Nazi ideology of Blut und Boden demonstrated part of their larger tendency to 
venerate a kind of nature religion, attempting to supplant Western traditions and 
replace them with a mythology rooted in the indigenous Germanic concept of the 
Volksgemeinschaft and sacred soil.350 The twentieth century Bulgarian born social 	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psychologist Elias Canetti (1905 – 1994) also spoke of the importance of the forest in 
German society. Canetti explains that in no other modern nation has the ‘forest-
feeling’ lived on like for the Germans, and it is with a deep and mysterious delight 
that “he loves to go deep into the forest where his forefathers lived; he feels at home 
in the trees.”351 The German professor of forestry Franz Heske (1892 – 1963) also 
described this feeling in his book German Forestry, stating: 
 
German culture sprang from the forest. It is a forest culture. In holy groves the 
ancient Germans worshipped their gods. Christian missionaries had to fell the 
mighty ancient oaks that were dedicated to the Thunder-God, before the new 
religion could take root. In the old forests, the present generation seeks to 
recapture that reverential awe…352  
 
The forest, as seen in this extract, is a sacred site to which the German people return 
in order to discover their roots, history, and identity. The ancient Germans and their 
gods had originated in the forests, so too would the modern Germans find their 
warrior identity within the sacred groves of their forefathers. 
 One film in particular, Ewiger Wald (Eternal Forest), released in 1936, stands 
out for its artistic ability to directly focus on a Germanic “forest feeling” as an 
example of an ethnically derived cultural landscape identity, based on the concept of a 
Volksgemeinschaft rooted in tribal traditions sourced from the organic and living 
forest. In Ewiger Wald the German forest also stands as a biological metaphor for the 
German people, as well as for the political nation, which are mythologized as natural 
and pure.353 During the film the narration emphasises the symbolic relationship 
between the forest and the German people, stating, “We originated in the forest. We 
live like the forest. From the forest we built our living space. Our souls grow like the 
forest,” then later prophesizing “Deep in the forest will be born the nation’s 
knowledge, the nation’s victory.”354 A pure, strong, and pagan German people are 
shown throughout the film, emerging from epic forest and mountain landscapes to 	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create a new Reich in harmony with nature and the biological race laws of National 
Socialism.  
 While references to the environmental politics and ideology of Nazism, as 
well as the links between forest imagery and Germanic warrior avatars, may seem 
tenebrous, it does appeal directly to a certain demographic that consistently votes for 
the FPÖ. Many young Far Right voters are swayed by references the Germanic 
heroism and machismo of prehistory, usually located with a forested setting. Emily 
Turner-Graham, for example, explains that for many in the Far Right, including a 
large number of young FPÖ voters, social groups are not only connected to local 
nature but are also a profound organic product of it.355 Their collective identities are 
believed to develop from the long-standing relationship they have with historical and 
national topographies such as forests. Such an ideology can fuel arrogance and even 
in some cases dangerous extremism. The premise that nature, such as forests, 
continues to affect identity suggests that the social group is still endowed with the 
heroic, and even violent, tendencies of bygone, fierce eras. Thus the Far Right 
individual comes to see the forest as the conduit from which he or she may channel 
the powerful warrior avatars of long lost forebears, who fought perceived and real 
invaders with sword and shield. The emotive images of Strache as an ancient 
Germanic warrior-god are not without result in the minds of those that are eager to 
heed the, at least culturally, pan-German ethos. Members of the FPO’s Ring 
Freiheitlicher Jugend in the Austrian province of Tirol, for example, composed 
footage of its members walking through forests and nature, with captions reading 
“Because we love our homeland, because its fun to fight for the homeland, because 
we are true patriots, will you also fight for your homeland? Because Tirol needs 
us.”356 The youthful members of the Ring Freiheitlicher Jugend thus rejoice in the 
heroic tales of nature and battle, of which, they attest, they are participants: a 
nationalist phalanx ready to do battle like those ancient Germanic warriors of the 
Teutoburg forest. The use of the forests as the Germanic ‘ethnogenesis’, therefore, 
appeals to this demographic in an innocent but rather direct way.  
 The racist manifestations of the forest as a cultural landscape identity in the 
German-speaking world, however, do not entirely retract from the validity of the 	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concept. There existed, as we have seen, a pre-established Germanic ‘forest-feeling’, 
which since the earliest historical accounts of Germanic society had symbolically 
represented a sense of community and identity within the spatial confines of the 
forest. National Socialism took this concept and contorted it to suit a biologically 
derived sense of community that would prove to be a premise for war and 
subsequently devastate both Germany and Europe. This thesis does not suggest that 
Right-Wing populism shares such ambitions, only that the parties share symmetry 
with pre-existing notions of Germanic cultural landscape identity, the forest, and the 
virtues of Mannestum. Where National Socialism applied these avatars to the theatre 
of war, Right-Wing populist politicians seek to consolidate Austrian identity by once 
more evoking these avatars to demonstrate the idealised sense of the Austrian man. 
National Socialism sought to illustrate a pure ethnic group preserved within the 
confines of the forest as Heimat, the contemporary Austrian populist Right seek only 
illustrate the forest as a commonly held home that in both a spatial and temporal sense 
affirms collective identity. Machismo on the battlefield is no longer necessary in these 
debates, and as such the Right-Wing populists replace direct military with examples 
of heightened physical and philosophical aptitude. The forest has, however, continued 
to be used as a location by the populist Right in which they can advocate a sense of 
cultural landscape identity that is informed by the masculine virtues of the more 
ancient Germanic tribes. 
 
2.4 - Conclusion 
 The FPÖ’s use of Heimat relies significantly, then, on natural landscapes and 
simpler, rural lifestyles that typify a nostalgic and romanticised image of Austrian 
national identity. The identity of place narrative that underlies the landscapes of 
Heimat allow the populist parties to remind Austrians of deep biographical roots that 
they share with these locations. The physical landscapes of Heimat denote a 
demarcated and bounded territory, with which the Austrian social group identify and 
to which they feel they belong. The mountains, rivers, fields and farms of Austria are 
places of national value, whose inner meanings can only be comprehended by those 
who share a long, pre-established habitation in the territory. The resources that 
Heimat provide are also therefore only for the native population, and foreign 
intervention to accrue such capital must not be tolerated. 
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 The FPÖ’s perceived ownership over nature, and the nationalisation of 
quintessential Austrian landscapes, emboldens the party’s image of identity and 
Heimat. It is a land that belongs only to Austrians, and speaks of their own unique 
identity and exceptionalism. The FPÖ’s members, therefore, delight in photo 
opportunities in rural locations because they seek to exemplify the nature (local) 
versus urban (cosmopolitan/globalist) oppositional discourse typical of its Heimat 
discourse. The parties stand for traditionalism, masculinity, long established domicile, 
and a set of attitudes and knowledge bases that exemplify rural Heimat motifs. 
Cosmopolitism, cultural pluralism, and the progressive attitudes that typify inner city 
rural life have no place in the party’s self-appointed image. The FPÖ’s adoration of 
natural, physical landscapes is also focused on preserving an ‘intact’ environment for 
the sake of sustaining an ethnoculturally ‘pure’ human landscape. Their belief in the 
close symbiosis of man and nature, accordingly, means that the natural and human 
landscapes of Heimat are but two sides of a singular concept. 
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Chapter Three 
 
 ‘Deutsch statt nix versteh’n’: Heimat as language and ethnoculture 
 
3.0 – Introduction  
 During the campaign leading up to the 2010 regional election in Vienna, the 
FPÖ contributed to the Austrian national identity debate with the slogan ‘Deutsch 
statt nix versteh’n’. The slogan was seen as a deliberate affront to migrant groups, as 
it contrasted the purity of the German language with a non-standard form of 
Gastarbeiterdeutsch that typically used such infinitive constructions.357 Accompanied 
by an image of the Austrian flag, the slogan seemed to be suggesting, as Ruth Wodak 
explains, a link between Austrian identity and the German language. 358 359 For the 
FPÖ, language is more than just a means of communication. The FPÖ views language 
as instrumental to the national identity formula, and therefore sees linguistic identity 
as the key cultural feature in the human landscape of Heimat. In the FPÖ political 
programme, language is approached in a possessive sense, with the party stating that 
it is ‘our’ language, preserved in ‘our’ writers, thinkers, and traditions that make ‘us’ 
what ‘we’ are.360 Defining national identity through common linguistic traditions 
supports the party’s conception of Heimat as ‘home’ to a human landscape that 
conforms to distinct ethnocultural boundaries. As established in the previous chapter, 
the physical landscape of Austria is connected to the human one through an imagined 
acculturation of nature and a belief in ownership over the land. Similarly, the human 
landscape of Heimat is characterised by the linguistic expressions of a culture that has 
long biographical roots to place, helping to justify the populist Right argument that 
speakers of a native language also exhibit the broader values and cultural identity of 
the language that is spoken.  
 Heimat is a concept that is shared specifically among German-language 
cultures. 361  Any attempt to divorce ‘Germanness’ from Heimat is therefore 
consistently marred by the important role language plays in the concept. Language 	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361 Blickle 1. 
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has been the powerful vehicle of expression by which many Heimat enthusiasts since 
the nineteenth century gave poetic voice and character to the spatial dimensions and 
cultural idiosyncrasies of their native lands and populations. For the FPÖ, language 
continues to both form and inform Heimat, but with new additional Rightist 
implications for the Austrian national identity narrative. The FPÖ uses language to 
outline the borders of Austrian ethnoculture, which they believe shapes both national 
identity and Heimat. The ethnic boundaries of the human landscape of Heimat are 
defined through the FPÖ’s appropriation of the term Muttersprache, which has been 
evolved by the party and given new meaning. A focus on Muttersprache, and the 
ethos that language and culture are transmitted through family lines, validates this 
monocultural, monoethnic image of Heimat. Muttersprache, and the affinity with a 
language acquired by birth and through conforming to the Austro-Germanic cultural 
group, offer the FPÖ a powerful way to demonstrate that language must be preserved 
as an example of Austrian ethnocultural identity. Neither the Right nor the Left, 
indeed, can deny that language is important to collective cultural identity. Many Left 
Wing groups actively campaign to support the language of minorities.362 However, as 
this chapter will explore, the FPÖ’s appropriation of the term Muttersprache is used 
in a platform that focuses on the Austrian majority, on the people whose parents both 
come from Austria and speak German. The party’s desire to safeguard the German 
language in the nation, as this chapter will investigate, requires the promotion of an 
exclusive sense of cultural and linguistic belonging and a framework for national 
identity that is not extended to minority groups or immigrants. 
 The FPÖ’s use of Austrian German dialect, and its more general celebration of 
High German as a root language, authenticates the party position that defines 
Austrians as a distinct, closed community with a consistent culture and ethnicity. 
Establishing cultural borderlines in order to determine national identity also permits 
the party to distinguish Austrians and their Heimat from ‘Outsider’ social groups and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 Former Austrian chancellor and ex-chairman of the SPÖ Werner Faymann, for example, 
has actively supported the protection of Slavic and Roman linguistic groups in Carinthia, 
noting their historical presence in the region. The Green party of Austria has also extended 
this campaign of linguistic preservation to newly arrived immigrants as a basis of preserving 
their original cultural identities. See Cinar, Meral. Collective Memory and National 
Membership: Identity and Citizenship Models in Turkey and Austria. Houndsmills, 
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lands. This division between native and other is founded on the premise that one 
cannot simply learn or acquire a Muttersprache, rather it is inherited through 
membership in an ethnocultural group from birth, or by long established domicile in a 
region. Such membership cannot be simply granted. This chapter examines the FPÖ’s 
tendency to portray those that do not fit with the parties restricted body politics 
(Kulturnation) as degraded Ausländer who come to Austria only to exploit the 
nation’s wealth. Language, as we shall see, plays an important part in the FPÖ’s 
portrayal of these groups because those that come for nefarious reasons, allegedly, 
have no desire to learn the language or assimilate. These outside groups, as a result, 
dissolve the linguistic purity of Heimat as well as making native Austrians’ lives 
increasingly difficult due an inability to reliably communicate. Central to this thesis is 
the idea that language says much about the identity, values, and national allegiances 
of the people who speak it. This explains, in part, why the FPÖ have very little to say 
about British, Australian, Swedish, or French migrants, for example, but have 
reserved entire aspects of their political programme to an attack on non-Indo-
European, largely Islamic, cultural groups. The FPÖ, then, turns to language as a 
place for articulating a cultural critique of the distinctiveness and purity of the 
Austrian Heimat as an “imagined community”363 that must be preserved from other 
non-European ethnic groups. 
 
3.1 – The FPÖ’s conceptualisations of Austria’s human landscape  
 Language is just one immediate feature of the overarching cultural community 
or social group who speak it. The FPÖ also imagines the ‘human landscape’ of 
Heimat through broader examples of ethnocultural similarities among ‘true’ 
Austrians. The term ‘human landscape’ refers in this thesis to the social group that, 
according to the FPÖ, identifies Austria as their native land: whether by birth right, 
shared cultural affinity, or by long biographical ties to place. This social group is 
therefore a part of the landscape of Heimat itself, and in every sense shapes the 
imaginary of that place through their linguistic traditions, cultural models, and 
historical narratives. The FPÖ stresses that the language, customs, values, history, and 
mythology of Austria inform national identity, and when imagined and performed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 See Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism. Verso, 1991. Print. 
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together, they harmoniously govern a behaviour pattern that is typically ‘Austrian’. 
For example, when approaching the concept of Austrian identity and the character of 
the nation directly, the FPÖ consistently refers to national identity that has developed 
from a shared Germanic history, culture, and, more importantly, language. 364 
Although Austrians are described as one part of the Germanic ethnocultural group, the 
FPÖ also notes that Austrian cultural heritage has developed from, and adheres to, 
what is described as core ‘European’ values and the European Kulturraum.365 The 
FPÖ explains that European culture has its roots in the deepest antiquity, while 
Christianity, Judaism, humanism, and the enlightenment have also influenced this 
ethnocultural genesis.366 With regard to Christianity, the FPÖ’s argument focuses 
primarily on the cultural roots of Christianity and values associated with the religion 
as distinct from other cultures and worldviews. For example, the FPÖ refer 
specifically to ‘Kultur-Christentum’, which has affected the European sense of 
identity, belief system, values, and inference of place in the world as distinct from 
others.367 However, the slogan of the FPÖ’s 2014 Bundesparteitag in Graz, "Für ein 
freies Europa. Zuerst Österreicher, dann Europäer" demonstrates that the FPÖ 
principally identifies the nation and the people as Austrian, and only secondarily as 
European.368 
 The FPÖ discursively constructs its conception of a modern Austrian national 
identity through an assortment of these cultural elements derived from antiquity. The 
party use the uniformity of a shared culture to demonstrate the homogeny of the 
Austrians as an ethnic group. The FPÖ describes Austrians who conform to their 
definition of Austrian national identity as ‘die heimischen Volksgruppen’, and Austria 
as a nation informed by these cultural characteristics as ‘Heimatland Österreich’, all 
of which must be preserved for future generations.369 Furthermore, the FPÖ seeks to 
emphasise the importance of preserving the ethnic and cultural integrity of native 
European ethnic groups, of which the Austrians are one example. This is seen, for 	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example, in the FPÖ’s political programme, where the party pledges itself to the 
“Schaffung eines europäischen Volksgruppenrechts auf ethnischkultureller Basis.”370 
For the FPÖ, the preservation of the autochthonous ethnocultural identities requires 
an end to multiculturalism. Therefore in their political programme they emphasise 
their commitment to a “Europa der Vielfalt der historisch gewachsenen, autochthonen 
Ethnien“ and reject any notion of „ein multikulturelles Europa.“371 To negate the 
alleged incursions by agents of foreign culture and the resultant fragmentation of the 
native Austrian Leitkultur caused by multiculturalism, the FPÖ stresses the 
importance of place of birth and biological lines to its national identity formula, 
declaring that Austria is “kein Einwanderungsland” and that they therefore pursue 
“eine geburtenorientierte Familienpolitik.”372 These statements follow a typical Far 
Right bellwether, which commonly depicts the alleged decrepitude of native 
European cultures and links it to an encroaching or planned downfall of Western 
national identities and civilization through mass multiculturalism or the 
encouragement of cultural pluralism.  
 The FPÖ’s examples of national identity given above describe the Austrian 
human landscape as a specific ethnic group, who has been shaped by the long cultural 
heritage that they share. The peppering of such terms as der Kulturraum, das 
Ethnischkulturelle, and Volksgruppen through their speeches and party literature 
demonstrate that the Right-Wing populist participants define the Austrian social 
group through the unison of a distinct culture and ethnicity. Cultural and ethnic 
heritage therefore lay at the foundation of the parties’ perspective of national identity. 
Although they cite the influence of Judaism and Christianity, the Judeo-Christian 
religions are only supplementarily referenced to illustrate the common values of the 
greater Occident of which Austria is a part. While religion is important in Right-Wing 
populism, the Kulturraum to which Austrians primarily belong is German, and 
therefore ‘Austrians’ are firmly entrenched within the ethnocultural Germanic group. 
The primary example of this relationship, of course, is the linguistic identity all 
German-speaking nations share. While culture is the basis from which national 
identity is constructed, it is the linguistic tradition of Austria that preserves this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 FPÖ Handbuch 2013, 284. 
371 FPÖ Handbuch 2013, 284. 
372 FPÖ Graz Parteiprogramm, 5. 
	   128	  
cultural heritage. Language, as we shall now see, is the principal bearer of Austrian 
cultural identity and Heimat, and it is therefore through linguistic nationalism that the 
Austria’s Right-Wing populist parties define who belongs in Austria, as well as 
identifies who does not. 
 
3.2 - Linguistic nationalism: Heimat and language  
 Language has always been central to the understanding of Heimat. Peter 
Blickle explains that Heimat is where one feels at home, and most importantly, where 
one’s own language is spoken.373 Language has been called the “tongue of Heimat” 
and is seen as the vehicle of expression by which Heimat is preserved, created, and 
discovered.374 Kai Hammermeister explains that Heimat is not simply a region, a 
state, or a fatherland, rather Heimat is language, and as language is a place that is 
“stable and reliable, something into which we are born once and that afterwards 
remains a comforting surrounding.”375 The familiarity experienced through a common 
language draws people together as a group, allows them to express themselves, and 
gives an audial interpretation to otherwise silent spatial environments. The language 
of Heimat, in other words, confirms geographical affiliation through particularity and 
familiarity. Heimat is therefore not only an “optic identity” that one can perceive and 
perhaps touch, but is also an “oral identity” that one speaks in a shared language. The 
optic identity of Heimat is symbolically reproduced in language, orally shaping a 
familiar and beloved landscape that is immediately recognized as home. The oral 
identity of Heimat, therefore, is formed by the affinity between people and place, 
which is verbalized through a common language that is believed to belong to the land 
from which it was derived. Language is therefore not a single feature of Heimat, but 
the means by which the entirety of Heimat is made known and accessible.376 As 
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Blickle explains, “Heimat is, in fact, so intimately connected to language that when 
all its property claims are stripped away, one may say ... that language is Heimat.”377  
Language as Heimat, furthermore, symbolizes community and group identity 
overall. Blickle notes that in the Heimat concept there is a persistent and challenging 
interaction between language, identity, geography, politics and notions of self.378 
Language in the concept of Heimat nurtures the allegiances and commonality a social 
group requires in order to comprehend where, and with whom, they belong. Michelle 
Ricci Bell notes that Heimat and language preserves, and even signals, community 
specifically.379 Nations are the largest and most successful political communities that 
have yet been devised. Language as Heimat, therefore, also has a powerful effect on 
national identity overall. The idea of common unity through language was taken by 
many nineteenth century German nationalists in order to define national identity. For 
example, in his Addresses to the German Nation Johann Gottlieb Fichte explains that 
the Germans of his time must thank their ancestors for their victory over the Roman 
invaders, because it allowed Germans to preserve their “language, and their way of 
thinking – for being Germans still, for being still borne along on the stream of original 
and independent life; to them we owe everything we have since been as a nation.”380 
Language, in other words, was the principle bearer of culture and national identity: 
the foundational pillar of identity from which the concept of being a German citizen 
developed. Fichte goes on to note that wherever the German language was spoken, 
one could consider himself both a citizen “of the state where he was born and to 
whose care he was in the first instance commended” as well as a member “of the 
whole common fatherland of the German nation.”381 A common language, therefore, 
is not only at the centre of individual identities, but is also an assimilating force that 
assists to construct national identities and commonality through linguistic traditions. 
 In the context of national identities, Jan Blommaert and Jef Verschueren 
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similarly explain that language “assumes the character of a clear identity marker.”382 
Furthermore, as Elie Kedourie explains, an “original language” was historically the 
most important element by which the nation was “recognised to exist and have the 
right to form a state of its own.” 383 Patrick Stevenson also notes that “language is 
seen to be central both to the practical, instrumental process of national building (for 
example, in relation to citizenship), and to the symbolic, integrative processes of 
developing a national culture (for example, in relation to national identity).”384 The 
congruence between Heimat and national identity is demonstrated through the 
symbolic and integrative application of language in societies. A national identity and 
a sense of Heimat are both constructed, in part, by language similarities that help to 
encourage singular identity and even common purpose. As Stevenson notes, 
“Standard languages, in particular, are seen as both a vehicle for articulating and 
achieving common political goals and a manifestation of a common purpose and 
singular identity.”385 The pursuit of common purpose and the establishment of a 
singular identity, furthermore, allows for the generation of shared feelings of 
patriotism for one’s culture, language, and national group. Much like language in the 
construction of national identities, the language of Heimat has, since the nineteenth 
century, encouraged national patriotism through cultural privatism, all of which has 
greatly affected the introspective self-understanding of the social groups who 
participate. 386  Thus common language means more than simply the ability to 
communicate; rather it also encourages group solidarity and community, cultural 
catharsis, and the linguistic identity by which national identities are arranged and the 
affinity with one’s Heimat is experienced. 
 Language also plays an important role in the formation of collective social 
identity because it dictates conformity with certain behavioral patterns that are 
informed by the social history and the culture from which the language is derived. 
The historically grounded and geographically rooted knowledge that informs social 	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identity is what Pierre Bourdieu calls our ‘habitus’.387 ‘Habitus’ is a system of bodily 
dispositions, such as language, that are formed out of a desire to be, and to reflect 
what is.388 For Bourdieu, our ‘habitus’, which is informed through historical and 
cultural knowledge, predisposes us to act, think, and behave in a certain way, as well 
as recognise the differences in others who do not follow the same habitus as us. In the 
context of language, our use of a mother tongue therefore affords us a wide spectrum 
of cultural knowledge and social history that defines us as a group, as well as affixing 
that group a geographical grounding as a homeland. As such, our ‘habitus’ is a 
unifying, constructing, and classifying power, which invests “socially constructed 
organising principles that are acquired in the course of a situated and dated social 
experience.”389 These social histories, which are constructed and developed over 
generations, provide individuals with dimensions of social personae, such as belief 
systems, behaviour, and other sociocultural elements, which are all linked to 
epistemic stances on how groups identify themselves from others.390 Language, in 
other words, exhibits group personae and is therefore a fundamental feature of group 
categorisation, which also potentially fosters a separatist narrative of ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
 The ‘language as Heimat’ narrative, so systematically detailed by Heimat 
enthusiasts and nationalists since the nineteenth century, continues in the rhetoric of 
the contemporary Austrian populist Right, who also look to language as a principal 
example of Austrian culture, national identity, and Heimat. The FPÖ cites a link 
between language and the conception of Heimat in its political programme, where 
language is identified as a crucial component of “unserer geistigen Heimat”, and 
something, therefore, to be both respected and preserved.391 They also stress that in an 
age of “Identitätsvernichtung” and the “Entfremdung der Völker von ihren Wurzeln” 
at the hands of global “Großkonzerne” and worldwide “Finanzjongleure”, the 
protection of “Kultur und Sprache” requires special attention.392 The FPÖ, as a result 	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of these assertions, announces “der Schutz und die Pflege unserer Sprache” occupies 
the very centre of its “Kulturpolitik.”393  
 Strache reiterates this political position in a rap song he released during the 
2008 Austrian general election. In the song, called ‘Viva HC’, Strache asserts that 
“wir”, presumably the FPÖ, stand for “Uns´re Heimat uns´re Leute” for “uns’re 
Sprache” and “Kultur.” 394 Language, as such, is seen by the FPÖ as the principal 
example of broader ethnoculture. In the chapter Heimat und Identität of the FPÖ’s 
political programme, for example, the party stresses that language is “die wichtigste 
Trägerin des kulturellen Ausdruckes.“395 For this reason, language is given primacy of 
place in the FPÖ’s Heimat and cultural identity discourse, and the FPÖ describes 
language as one of the fundamental “identitätsstiftende Säulen.”396 The German 
language, therefore, is at the center of the FPÖ’s identity and Heimat narrative. For 
the party, language is important to Heimat because it provides a clear ethnocultural 
boundary within which Austrians are afforded a distinct cultural identity.  
 The FPÖ justifies its Germanic interpretation of Austrian ethnoculture by 
reminding their audience that German is the Landessprache of Austria.397 Austria’s 
constitution also recognises German as the official language of the nation, although 
certain rights are accorded to recognised linguistic minorities.398 The FPÖ, however, 
is not interested in acknowledging minority groups. In the Graz party programme, the 
FPÖ describes true Austrians as those of ethnic German extraction, using language, 
history, and culture as markers of identity, stating that the “Sprache, Geschichte und 
Kultur Österreichs deutsch (sind). Die überwiegende Mehrheit der Österreicher ist 
Teil der deutschen Volks-, Sprach- und Kulturgemeinschaft.”399 Here the FPÖ is 
speaking for ‚die überwiegende Mehrheit’, or the language and culture of the 
Germanic majority. As a result of this Germanic view of Austrian identity, any critical 
analysis of the non-Germanic linguistic traditions of Austria, such as Slovene, is 
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absent – despite the fact these languages play an important role in a number of 
regional Austrian dialects.  
 The renunciation of non-German languages in Austria is in fact a typical FPÖ 
policy. As early as 1977 the then 29 year old Jörg Haider ran an anti-Slovene 
campaign in his native Carinthia, with a particular interest in the prohibition of 
bilingual place name signs and schools, all of which assisted him in procuring a seat 
in federal parliament in 1979. 400  Such an anti-Slovene campaign was 
characteristically well received in Carinthia, as even today many ethnically Germanic 
Austrians look down on Slovenians.401 The enduring debate around bilingual signage 
in Carinthia is testament to language’s pivotal place in the identity of the region. As 
late as 2005, Haider was still actively engaged in campaigns alongside Heimat 
organisations to remove the presence of the Slovenian language in Carinthia, which 
also resulted in the ‘Ortstafelsturm’ – a procession of cars and convoys driven by 
ethnically Germanic Austrians, who stormed the region removing any place name 
signs in the Slovenian language.402 By focusing on German cultural heritage, and 
language in particular, as the foundation of Austrian identity, the FPÖ ignores or 
rejects other ethnic minorities that reside within the nation - some of which, such as 
Slovenians, are not new migrants, but actually have long standing ties to the land.  
 The animosity between Slovenian and German Austrians is in actuality a 
negative manifestation of the important role language has played in the development 
of Austrian identity. Ruth Wodak et al explain that the Austrian constitutional 
stipulation of German as the official language illustrates that belonging to the German 
linguistic group has played and continues to play a significant role in the construction 
of an Austrian national identity.403 She also notes that many Austrians imagine 
cultural ideas (mentality, character, behavioural patterns) alongside language to 
construct an identity of common descent and an “innate nationality.”404 Therefore 	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more than just the official national language of Austria, linguistic and cultural identity 
has helped to define the character of ‘Austrianness’. However this narrative has 
largely failed to recognise ethnocultural minorities who also live in Austria, some of 
which have done so for generations, and is also easily exploited in the Right-Wing 
populist discourse of linguistic nationalism, which uses the concept of Heimat and 
language in order to dictate who is a ‘true’ Austrian and therefore belongs in the 
nation.  
 The concept of language as Heimat and national identity also has the 
capability to demonstrate ethnicity and nativism, and therefore has a biological 
application in relation to the image it constructs of society and nation. The FPÖ also 
recognises this possibility, and implicitly alludes to ethnicity as Heimat through their 
special use of the term Muttersprache. Ruth Wodak notes that linguistics plays a large 
role in ‘border and national identity politics’, which are both increasingly defined 
through a sense that the national language is the ‘mother tongue’.405 Policies, in other 
words, that advocate a return to or preservation of ‘the mother tongue’ or ‘national 
language’ see to illustrate or design the nation state by projecting a homogeneous 
culture, language, and territory. 406  Gillian Stevens explains that languages are 
repositories of culture as well as a symbolic feature of ethnicity, and therefore a 
“person’s mother tongue is a strong indicator of self-identification with an ethnic 
community.”407 Similarly, the FPÖ defines the importance of Muttersprache as 
follows: 
 
Die Muttersprache ist das Ergebnis einer biographischen und familiären 
Prägung. Sie ist daher die Sprache, in der man denkt, fühlt  und träumt. Die 
jeweilige Muttersprache ist daher als Trägerin des kulturellen Ausdrucks das 
bestimmende Kriterium der Zuordnung zu einer größeren Kulturgemeinschaft. 
Sprache ist nicht nur ein Verständigungsmittel, sondern auch ein Hort der 
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geistigen Überlieferung – ein geistiger und ideeller Schatz, der von Generation 
zu Generation weitergegeben wird. 
Here the FPÖ indicates that a person’s Muttersprache is culturally derived from a 
single ethnicity because it is the result of a biographical and family character that is 
transmitted from one generation to the next. Muttersprache is also identity because it 
is at the core of our experience, and is therefore the language of one’s inner 
sentiments, experience, and indeed world. Finally Muttersprache also acts as a 
conduit for cultural expression, and the refuge where heritage and tradition is stored 
and passed from forefathers to descendants. Therefore Muttersprache is also mündlich 
überliefert, and its purity implies continuity in the Austrian community, as well as an 
example of cultural identity that, if largely ‘intact’, demonstrates authenticity.  
 The FPÖ’s emphasis on the importance of Muttersprache to identity imitates 
the popular thesis that being a native speaker of a language, and therefore possessing 
that language as your mother tongue, implies certain prerequisite criteria: 
 
a) Language is inherited through birth into a specific social group that is 
commonly associated with the language,  
b) Inheriting a language as a mother tongue means that you can speak it 
fluently, 
 c) If one cannot speak the language proficiently one cannot claim it as a 
 mother tongue,  
d) People are usually citizens of one country; therefore people can only be 
native speakers of one mother tongue.408 
 
The Austrian FPÖ’s demand for the preservation of the Austrian Muttersprache, 
which emphasises language’s biological roots rather than its communicative function, 
demonstrates that they view language as a symbol of ethnic and cultural 
identification. Muttersprache is a native tongue that is shared by all Austrians and is 
therefore underscored by the party to be a common socio-cultural feature. The 
concept of ‘mother tongue’ has long been a salient prerequisite of belonging for all 
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Far Right groups.409 One may only ever have German as their native tongue in Austria 
if they were born there (and be typically of Germanic extraction as a result). 
Therefore new migrants are denied membership of this Heimat and national identity 
narrative, because they can never truly claim German to be their first, or native, 
language. A Muttersprache requires fluency and genealogical ties to the social group, 
which is unfeasible for new migrants or people of non-Germanic ethnic heritage. 
Language, as a result, affords the Austria’s Right-Wing populist parties a firm 
platform with which to demonstrate their perspective of the national ‘in’ ethnocultural 
group of Austria, as well as the validation for divisive politics that calls into question 
the right of ethnic minorities or migrants to live in the Austrian nation. 
 
3.3 - Language and the national ‘In’ group in the FPÖ’s comic series 
 In order to further define native Austrians through linguistic features, the FPÖ 
utilises mythology as a political medium. This is seen in the party’s comic series, 
which draws on the myths and legends of Austria, as well as fanciful portrayals of 
Austrian society both present and future. The three publications are “Der blaue 
Planet” (2009), “Sagen aus Wien”(2010), and “Sagen aus Österreich” (2013). The 
legends and cartoons in the series provide the reader with an Austrian social history 
that uses linguistic strategies and sociocultural activities to define Austrian identity 
and Heimat. The FPÖ explain the special relationship between language and 
mythology in their political programme:  
 
 Unsere Märchen, Mythen und Volkslieder künden vom Wesen unseres 
 Volkes. Erzählen, Vorlesen und Singen sind somit schon in frühester 
 Kindheit von großer Bedeutung für das Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl.410  
 
In other words, to speak one’s myths and fairy tales aloud is to enact a shared cultural 
identity (located in both the myths and language that express them) and ritualistically 
experience a subsequent Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl with your social group. The 
use of linguistic patriotism within a series that depicts an alleged shared ethnocultural 
history provides an interesting example of the role of language in nation building and 	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nationalism. Linguistic nationalism typically engages language in order to imagine a 
common past, which assists to strengthen the national conscious through features of 
linguistic purity, linguistic patriotism, and linguistic distinctiveness.411  
 Anthropologists and ethnologists have long cited the close link between 
mythologies and the phenomenon of language. The French ethnologist and 
anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908 – 2009) explains that “myth is language: to 
be known, myth has to be told; it is a part of human speech.”412 Mythologies have 
been passed down between generations through oral tradition, and therefore linguistic 
character and traditions have played and continues to play a pivotal role in their 
construction. Lévi-Strauss further stresses "Myth is language, functioning on an 
especially high level where meaning succeeds practically at 'taking off' from the 
linguistic ground on which it keeps rolling."413 Therefore the manner by which a myth 
is told, or the speech that articulates it, will indicate much about the origin of the 
legend, its meaning and purpose, and which group subsequently claim ownership over 
it. The Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung (1875 – 1961) describes myth as a form of self-
realisation, and that myth is, in fact, a “primordial language.”414 The French linguist 
and mythologist Roland Barthes (1915 – 1980) also cites the relationship between 
myth and language, where he states, “the world enters language through a dialectical 
relation between activities, between human actions; it comes out of myth as a 
harmonious display of essences” and that myth is “depoliticized speech.“ 415 
Language, in other words, is derived from myth, and it is from a social group’s shared 
heritage and mythic past that a common language (and linguistic identity) develops.  
 The FPÖ’s comic series uses clear linguistic strategies in the myths to 
emphasise their understanding of language as Heimat. The FPÖ’s first comic, Der 
blaue Planet, provides the audience with a portrayal of two parallel worlds. The first, 
Der blaue Planet (a reference to a world that is governed by the FPÖ – whose party is 	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the colour of blue in the Austrian political spectrum), depicts a community that is 
largely defined by the purity of its language. The homogeneous population, whose 
leader is a cartoon illustration of Heinz-Christian Strache, all follow the conventions 
of the German language, as well as displaying Austrian distinctiveness through the 
local provincialism demonstrated in regional vernacular. Der blaue Planet therefore 
maintains a distinctly Germanic view in relation to Austrian identity, and the lack of 
other competing cultures demonstrates a degree of social harmony and congruence for 
the national ‘in’ group. There are few indications, if any, of multicultural influences, 
and thus the local population still refer to each other through the local Austrian 
greeting, seen for example here: 
 
 
Figure 36. 
Image taken from Der blaue Planet.416 
 
There are no foreign languages spoken in Der blaue Planet and therefore no ethnic 
minorities or indication of ‘alien’ culture or multiculturalism. The German language, 
rather, is the foundation from which the FPÖ’s stylized image of Heimat is conceived 
in Der Blaue Planet. 
 The importance of the purity of language, culture, and Heimat is made 
particularly clear when Strache visits the ‘Zentralplanet’, nicknamed ‘Absurdistan’. 	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‘Absurdistan’ is an Islamised, multicultural version of Austria ruled from Brussels by 
the European Union. The FPÖ’s image of ‘Absurdistan’ is a land where Socialist 
policies have taken over; illustrating a rather ‘absurd’ and foreign image of Vienna. 
The use of the Persian suffix –stan, or ‘place’, indicates that Austrian national and 
cultural identity has become either Islamic or pluralistic. This is demonstrated through 
the vanquishment of Christianity at the hands of the agents of Islam, the abandonment 
of local vernacular, the disregard for the German language, and the dominance of a 
multilingual society in its stead: 
 
 
Figure 37. 
Image taken from Der blaue Planet.417 
 
The depiction of a Bandenkrieg is typical of the FPÖ’s association of foreigners with 
criminality and civil unrest. Immediately arresting in this image is the absence of the 
German language, with the exception of the bastardised form of “Sheysse Pub.” 
Instead, the heroes of the comic are confronted with civil war and an assortment of 
foreign characters, languages, and global corporations. The dichotomy of the peaceful 
tranquility of Strache’s Heimat and the destructive scenes in the multicultural and 
globalised ‘Absurdistan’ demonstrate the uniqueness of Austria as Heimat, and show 
what could happen if it were diluted or lost. The disappearance of the German 
language, as seen in the comic, is allegedly one such way this dystopia could occur. 	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  As a result of the Socialist pandemonion depicted in the FPÖ’s Der blaue 
Planet, the native Austrian population in ‘Absurdistan’ has become a minority. This is 
explained by the FPÖ in a dialogue between Strache and a freedom-fighting version 
of himself, a Doppelgänger from the Zentralplanet called Stra-Che418: 
 
 
Figure 38. 
Image taken from Der blaue Planet.419 
 
 
Figure 39. 
Image taken from Der blaue Planet.420 
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As a representative of the self-governing Heimat that preserves a homogeneous 
ethnoculture, Strache as HC man is quick to linguistically express his identity of place 
with the traditional Austrian greetings of servus and Grüß Gott. Strache’s Austrian 
salutations demonstrate his conformity to the ethnic and cultural identity his Heimat 
has taught him from birth. The FPÖ indicates here that the ‘real’ human landscape of 
Heimat is not just defined by citizenship (ius soli), but by a clear understanding and 
use of local vernacular. In other words, genuine Austrians are characterized by the 
nativist principles (ius sanguinis) that foster a cultural or even linguistic sense of 
‘belonging’.421  
 Conversely, Stra-Che’s ominous warnings about the forbidden use of native 
dialect imply the gravity of the situation in ‘Absurdistan’, where autochthonous 
linguistic and cultural traditions have been displaced. The enforced proscription of 
local vernacular demonstrates applied linguistic tyranny brought about through 
multiculturalism. Instead of traditionalism and Heimat, the FPÖ illustrate a corrupted 
Austrian identity that is lacking any traditional cultural traits – vernacular included. 
While aspects of the language have failed to remain intact, so too have other 
customary forms such as clothing, with Stra-Che compelled to wear Islamic attire in a 
pluralistic society that has turned against, or simply overrun, the host population. The 
cartoon is therefore clearly reacting to the perceived threat of Islamic migration, as is 
noted in the Middle Eastern attire and minarets on Stefansdom. Although Stra-Che 
still speaks German, it is implied here that the term “Grüß Gott” – or any reference to 
Christianity or other non-Islamic cultural traits – are forbidden due to Islam being the 
dominant religious paradigm in ‘Absurdistan’ (the future Vienna). The archetypal 
Austrian greeting is no longer acceptable, therefore, presumably because of the 
ascendancy of Allah. Vienna has thus become Islamised due to the large amount of 
Muslims now living there. The minarets on churches and the Arabic script written on 
the walls of the city are all clear indications that the enemy is Islam, and those that 
defy Islam (such as Strache) will be killed under this system. 
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3.3.1 – Mundart in the FPÖ’s comic series 
 While Der blaue Planet provides the audience with an ominous prediction of 
the future, the FPÖ’s collection of Sagen returns to the past. The series is 
characterised by the use of regional dialects to illustrate a linguistic and cultural 
commonality between the audience and the protagonists or heroes in the myths. The 
party affirms the importance of provincial Austrian identity in its political 
programme, where it refers to a distinct Austrian linguistic identity by highlighting 
the diversity of regional dialect:  
 
Zur Pflege der Sprache gehört ebenso das Bewusstsein über die Bedeutung der 
verschiedenen Mundarten und deren Weitergabe, da sie den Reichtum und die 
Vielfalt der Sprache sowie der Regionen widerspiegeln.422 
 
While the FPÖ seemingly celebrate through dialect the regional distinctiveness of the 
Austrian linguistic whole, the party’s acknowledgement of dialect has deeper 
implications. The party’s desire to safeguard regional Germanic dialects in Austria is 
is a part of a preservationist policy for Austrian identity. The use of dialect over 
standard German, however, affects the self-identifying narrative in Austria in two 
central ways. Firstly, the use of dialect rightly preserves the diversity of dialects that 
exist in the nation, albeit from a Germanic perspective only. However, the FPÖ are 
seemingly playing on the cultural divide between those who speak Mundart, namely 
the working class, farmers, and those from rural areas, and the Standard German 
spoken by the educated, professionals, and much of the urban demographic. It is well 
documented that the FPÖ attracts votes from the working class above all other 
demographics.423 Intellectuals and professionals, accordingly, are known to vote for 
Centrist or Left-Wing parties. Perhaps, as is the case with Switzerland and Swiss 
German, the FPÖ are suggesting that real Austrians use their dialect (as a result of 
their identity of place), rather than the ‘high brow’ nuances of Standard High German. 
The politicians in the FPÖ, as a result, continue to play their ‘one of the boys’ 	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narrative, and thus appear, through the use of dialect for example, to represent 
genuine working class Austrians and their interests. The FPÖ’s empathy toward the 
working class, therefore, manifests itself through the linguistic cues the party 
employs.  
 The use of dialect is particularly prevalent in the cartoons within the FPÖ’s 
comic series. Although dialect is the vernacular of choice for the protagonists and the 
FPÖ figures in the comic, Standard German is not rejected overall. While the text 
from the legends in the comic series is all in Standard German and taken from various 
external sources, the additional dialogue in the cartoons written by the FPÖ utilizes 
local Austrian dialect and vernacular to demonstrate a distinct regional identity that is 
connected German but also distinctly Austrian. The FPÖ’s comic series is an effective 
example of its celebration of distinctively ‘Austrian’ linguistic traditions, as opposed 
to only multi-national Standard German. The use of dialect designates the speakers as 
the group that is ‘at home’ in both modern Vienna and the city’s imperial and mythic 
past. This approach of beginning their narrative of Austrian identity with Viennese 
provincialism and dialect is hardly surprising. During Austria’s history, the urban 
dialect of Vienna influenced all Austrian language areas due to the prevalence of the 
imperial city, and the many people that flocked there during periods of 
urbanisation.424 It is logical, therefore, that the FPÖ begin their imaginative construct 
of Austrian national identity here, both in relation to the city’s history and to its 
dialect.  
 Regional dialect has long been celebrated in the German-speaking world as a 
pure form of language and of Heimat, and has also had a close relationship with the 
development and reception of native folklore. For example, Celia Applegate notes 
that German Heimat enthusiasts as early as the nineteenth century understood regional 
Mundart as a spirited form of folklore, “which in its forms of poetry, tale, dialogue, 
aphorism, essay, and even joke became the leading medium for the popular creation 
and celebration of folk identity.”425 The varying character of Mundart, furthermore, 
also helped to distinguish regional identities from the rest of the broader German 	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population.426 Alon Confino also refers to the nineteenth century study of Swabian 
dialect, which according to one Heimat enthusiast embodied Swabian distinctiveness: 
“The language of our people offers one of the most important means to know its 
peculiarity … (Our language) still streams in the localities of our Heimat with its 
blend of power, originality, nativeness, and simplicity.”427 The German philosopher 
Martin Heidegger (1889 – 1976) also identifies dialect as both the origin and most 
pure form of language and Heimat: 
 
The essence of language has its roots in dialect. If dialect is the mother’s 
language, the homeliness of the home, the homeland has its roots in it as well. 
Dialect is not only the mother’s language but, at the  same time and still more 
so, the mother of language.428 
 
For Heidegger, dialect speaks of rootedness and indigenousness. Hammermeister also 
explains that, according Heidegger, dialect brings into view “nature and people, a 
region and its inhabitants.”429 Blickle refers to Heidegger’s concept of dialect as the 
“the language of Heimat.”430 Dialect, therefore, helps to create an image of a people 
and their region or Heimat, and evokes an oral mythology and set of traditions that 
somehow speak of their collective identity and origins. 
 Christoph Hubner similarly notes that the FPÖ’s use of dialect in the comic is 
a clear attempt to show that the party is close to Viennese (and Austrian) traditions.431 
Sagen aus Wien is directed specifically to “Liebe Wienerinnen, liebe Wiener!” and 
the corresponding opening prologue reminds the Viennese of their long shared sense 
of tradition and history encapsulated in the myths of the region.432 Sagen aus Wien, as 
the name would suggest, depicts many examples of central Bavarian Viennese dialect 
spoken by the native protagonists. This is seen, for example, in der Heidenschuss, a 	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folkloric account of the 1529 Turkish siege of Vienna. In the cartoon the native 
Viennese defenders speak in local Wienerisch, referring to their group as “wir 
Wiena.”433 The slightly altered version of der Heidenschuss in the FPÖ’s Sagen aus 
Österreich uses the even more traditional Wienerisch “wir Weana”, replacing the i for 
an e.434 In the accompanying cartoon created by the FPÖ the native population are 
housed behind the walls of the city, with the Turkish army camped outside. Here, 
language and imagery assists to magnify the degree of separation between the Turks 
and the Viennese: 
 
 
Figure 40. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Wien.435 
 
The foreigners are divided from the native population by an insurmountable ‘wall’ 
that is both a tangible structure as well as a cultural and linguistic partition. The walls 
of the city, as a result, are a symbolic representation of the differences in ethnoculture 
(of which language is one example) and collective identity between the two groups. 
No one questions the right of the Viennese to defend themselves from the Turkish 
invaders in seventeenth century. The image, however, is also powerful portrayal of 
the FPÖ perspective on who belongs in modern Austria and who does not. The use of 	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dialect allows the FPÖ to demonstrate the purity of the Austrian language and culture, 
both of which are neither directed to nor accessible to outsiders. The Austrians 
defenders therefore proudly assert, once again in Viennese dialect, that the Turkish 
invaders should leave: “Eh kloar! De solln sich schleichn.” The verb schleichen, 
which has different meanings in High German and Austrian dialect, is also used by 
the Viennese defenders in die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683, a folkloric 
account of the second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683:  
 
 
Figure 41. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Wien.436 
 
The Austrian dialect meaning of sich schleichen, ‘go away’ or ‘get lost’, is used here 
rather than the High German meaning ‘to sneak’. The use of the Austrian dialect 
meaning infers that the Turks do not belong in Vienna’s past or the present, and 
should therefore leave. However, ‘dass sich jemand schleichen soll’ also appears as 
metaphor in der Heidenschuss, as the Turkish invaders are trying to ‘sneak’ in to the 
city, ‘sich in etwas schleichen’. Therefore it appears that the FPÖ are exploiting both 
the High German and dialect meanings. As Hubner notes: 
 
Diese Metapher drückt Abneigung aus, wobei sie mehr aus dem 
Mundartlichen kommt, denn die Schriftsprache bringt dem Wort „Schleichen“ 	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eine andere Bedeutung. Da aber in diesen Strache-Comics viel mit der 
Mundart ausgedrückt wird, fällt das Schleichen wohl eben auch in dieses 
Schema. 437 
 
There is also the possibility of interpreting sich schleichen as to lurk, to slink, or to 
creep as a snake, implying the threatening nature of the Turkish invaders. There is 
also the conjecture of ‘to crawl’, as if on one’s hands and knees, symbolising that the 
Turks are inferior to the native Viennese. 
 Heinz-Christian Strache is also illustrated in the comics engaging in dialogue 
with Austrian dialect. In die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683 Heinz-Christian 
Strache appears as the leader of the town and the purveyor of its defences. The 
reader’s understanding of who is native to the city and who is an outside threat 
continues to be directed through the FPÖ’s linguistic strategy. In this strategy, 
Wienerisch is once more employed to culturally demarcate those that belong in 
Vienna. For example, in the cartoons Strache, or ‘HC’ a he is referred to, directs his 
defensive campaign against the invading Turkish army with Vienna dialect and 
nomenclature: 
 
 
Figure 42. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Wien. 438  	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In the frame Strache rises as a mythic Germanic hero and defender of the city, finding 
his political moment in the enmity stirring between cultures and ethnic groups. With 
Viennese dialect he directs his campaign for the youth of the city to rise up against the 
Islamic threat at the gates, while his political opponent (and then mayor of Vienna) 
languishes in the background. Strache’s insistence that the boy sling pork sausage at a 
Moslem is a symbolic attack on the culture and religion of Islam. Banned in the 
Islamic faith, the consumption of pork is a powerful way the FPÖ further contributes 
to the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy. Cuisine, and the regional dialect with which to 
name it, thereby becomes a powerful tool with which to antagonise the perceived 
incompatibility between Austrian and Islamic culture. Austrians eat pork, and the 
image from the comic symbolically suggests that Austrian identity and culture should 
be put directly into the face of all those that may believe differently, or, indeed, 
disagree with the culture of the Austrian majority.  
 The young boy is the embodiment of a ‘true’ Austrian and Viennese, and 
therefore wears the coat of arms of Vienna upon his armour. The simultaneous use of 
dialect by the Viennese youth and Strache indicate that they understand each other, 
recognise each other’s purpose and goals, and are working together as native 
Austrians against a foreign ethnoculture. ‘HC’ directs the blonde Viennese boy to 
unload his slingshot at ’Mustafa’, in a reference to the grand vizier of the Ottoman 
Empire, Kara Mustafa (1634 – 1683), who was the unsuccessful leader of the Turkish 
siege at Vienna in 1683.439 ‘Leiwand’, Viennese dialect for the Standard German sehr 
gut, and the abusive Viennese-Austrian Schimpfwort ‘Nudelaug’, an ‘idiot’, directed 
against the Kara Mustafa, immediately demonstrate the native Viennese boy’s native 
identity through localised, if not marginally adolescent, Viennese vernacular. But in 
addition to this, there are typical culinary-cultural artefacts in the cartoon that can be 
identified through language as both Viennese and Austrian. The FPÖ choose to use 
the local Vienna nomenclature instead of the High German Burenwurst, namely 
Hasse (‘A hot one’ – figuratively referring to the Viennese sausage) as well as the 
Vienna dialect Buckl instead of Standard German Brot. The FPÖ’s aim is the 
preservation and popularisation of the Viennese sausage and the Viennese sausage-	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stand culture with young people, all of which demonstrates local character through the 
use of local nomenclature, custom, and behaviour in the form of the preference for 
local cuisine.  
 The local dialect used by the FPÖ in their comic encourages the Viennese 
audience to empathise with the imagined collective identity preserved in the myths, 
thereby recognising their own distinctive language traits and shared social history as 
primary features of their collective self. Reading and understanding the Viennese 
dialect, therefore, reinforces the feeling of being a part of a national and cultural ‘in’ 
group. Dialect, therefore, reads like a code for the ethnoculture that understands it, 
and is therefore inaccessible to migrants or non-Germanic social groups. The use of 
coded dialect allows the FPÖ’s target audience to experience feelings of solidarity 
and distinctiveness, because Viennese dialect is something that they immediately 
recognize as something that belongs only to them – their own distinct cultural feature. 
To have pride in one’s shared cultural identity and common language, as a result, 
further justifies the collective expression of cultural and national patriotism in the 
public sphere. The use of familiar dialect, therefore, encourages a perceived 
commonality between the comic’s heroes, the FPÖ, and the ‘true’ modern Viennese.  
 Strache has persistently delighted in depicting himself in the image of a local 
Viennese man, and the use of dialect in the FPÖ comic series is one such way he 
achieves this for himself, his party, and the desired Austrian-Germanic demographic 
more generally. In his Lebenslauf on his website, Strache describes himself as “Ein 
echter Wiener” presumably due to the fact he was born there in 1969. 440 Strache’s 
assertion that he is truly Viennese by a matter of birth is therefore a parenthetical 
remark about new migrants to Austria, who were neither born in Austria nor 
understand or use the dialect, and thus do not fit the FPÖ’s Heimat and identity 
mandate. Jump forward to 2016 and Strache has updated his profile, describing 
himself as “ein echter Österreicher”441, therefore shifting from the regional to the 
national. 
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 Although the comic attempts to depict the Viennese as an ethnocultural 
Germanic construct, the FPÖ’s reliance on linguistic modes of identity in effect 
hinders their argument of the homogeneous Germanic cultural origins of the Viennese 
population. It is true that the Viennese dialect is, for the most part, an eastern central-
Bavarian dialect. 442  However as hinted at previously, the historico-cultural 
development of Vienna as an imperial city home to many cultural groups has allowed 
for diverse linguistic influences to inform the dialect. For example, by the end of the 
XIX century, Vienna’s Czech population was second only to Prague, and so it is not 
by coincidence that there is a large Czech influence in the Viennese dialect.443 The 
linguistic heterogeneity of the language is of course not mentioned in the FPÖ’s 
Sagen aus Wien, which instead leaves its audience with the impression that the local 
identity of Vienna has been entirely established upon the pure linguistic foundations 
of the Germanic ethnocultural group. 
 The FPÖ’s second comic, Sagen aus Österreich, was released by the FPÖ 
during the general Austrian elections of 2013, and continues the theme of language 
and identity by applying localised provincial vernacular, dialect, and linguistic 
traditions to all of Austria’s regional histories. For example in “der Schatz von 
Landskron” a local farmer of Carinthia engages in a conversation with local 
Kärntnerisch, demonstrating his long relationship and affinity with the region of 
northeast Carinthia:  
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Figure 43. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Österreich.444 
 
The farmer’s distinguishing use of the backing/rounding of a, demonstrated in the 
character å, is an example of the vowel phenomena attributed to the mix of the South 
Bavarian German linguistic tradition with the Slovenian dialect typical of the 
Carinthian region. 445 The backing/rounding of the vowel a in Carinthian dialect also 
demonstrates a sound change typical all over Austria, in which the point is made in 
popular dialect texts to write the phone as ä, despite having only a phonetic rather 
than phonemic significance in Austrian German.446 In this conversation the native 
Carinthian farmer nostalgically reflects on the ‘good old days’ when Austria had its 
own national currency, and were thus not reliant on the transnational EURO currency. 
As well as demonstrating local Carinthian and Austrian linguistic tradition, the FPÖ 
are using regional dialect to advocate their platform for the reinstatement of Austria’s 
own national currency, thereby displaying self-determined economic nationalism 
through the use of localised language traits.  
 The rich tapestry of local Austrian idiosyncrasies identified in the comics’ 
regional dialect and nomenclature displays a distinct Austrianness, however the 	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perspective of Austrian identity remains decidedly Germanic. The German language, 
as well as its regionally Austrian variations, remains for the FPÖ a valuable element 
of national identity. The FPÖ applies this thesis to demonstrate the risk of what may 
be lost if the characteristics of the Heimat are not preserved. In this case, language 
must be protected as the bearer of the cultural heritage and identity that informs the 
Austrian sense of Heimat and therefore makes the nation both decidedly ‘Austrian’ 
and a part of the German community of cultures. Therefore, those that conform to the 
German language, as well as Austria’s regional dialects, also follow the accepted 
culture, customs, and behaviour patterns deemed typical of Austria. These images 
provided by the FPÖ are significant, because they provide their audience with a visual 
cue to the FPÖ’s opinion of how a heterogeneous Austrian society looks when it 
conforms to the cultural knowledge and ‘habitus ‘supposedly embedded in the 
German language. To understand German and the Austrian dialects as one’s 
Muttersprache is to both consciously and subliminally follow the conventions of 
Austrian cultural identity in all its forms – to be included in the FPÖ’s human 
landscape of Heimat. However, according to the FPÖ this traditional mode of Heimat 
Österreich is in danger from ‘Outsider’ groups, and the degeneration of language and 
compliancy with Austrian culture in the modern multicultural nation is one way the 
FPÖ depict a ‘Heimat in peril’ in their literature. 
 
3.4 - Language use and the ‘Outsider’ group in the FPÖ’s comic series 
 Language also plays an important role in the direct marginalisation of other 
social groups that are identified as outsiders by the FPÖ. The comics, furthermore, 
depict those that do not follow the conventions of the German language as groups that 
in fact pose a danger to native Austrians. In each case the Heimat and the native 
Austrian population is at risk and in need of protection from these groups. The 
‘Outsider’ groups are principally identified as the globalising agents in the ruling 
political establishment as well as the EU who advocate policies of mass immigration, 
and immigrants or foreigners that endanger the Heimat and intimidate native 
Austrians with direct violence and the indirect dissolution of the Austrian Leitkultur. 
In the comics, language represents more than a means of communication by the 
‘Outsider’ groups. Instead, the variances in language between native Austrians and 
their enemies demonstrate a fundamental discordancy between native and ‘Outsider’ 
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identities in the modern Austrian nation, as well as the alleged flaws of multicultural 
society. 
 The ‘Outsider’ group that attracts the most critical attention in the comics are 
the Turkish, who also symbolically represent Islamic religion and culture more 
broadly. The FPÖ continue to use their linguistic strategy to demonstrate the 
perceived unassimilable nature of Islam and ethnically Middle Eastern national 
subgroups into Austrian society. These groups, whether new migrants or second or 
third generation Austrians, do not speak the language as locals and therefore do not 
conform to the conventions of Austrian cultural and national identity. In Sagen aus 
Wien’s “Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683”, the Islamic threat of 1683 is 
repackaged by the FPÖ to depict the Muslim minority in Austria today, as well as the 
rising number of Islamic immigrants on the nation’s borders. The FPÖ’s cartoons 
must therefore be approached as a party-sanctioned discourse between “Austrian” and 
“Turkish” ethnicities in modern Austria, in which is developed a narrative of the 
ethnonational differences between the native Austrian majority and the Turkish ethnic 
minority. 
 In the cartoons, the first way the reader discerns that Muslims do not conform 
to the conventions of the Austrian way of life is in their corruption of the national 
language: 
 
 
Figure 44. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Wien. 447 	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Members of the Turkish Army speak neither Standard German nor one of the many 
regional dialects. They also do not speak Turkish, as the invader force would have 
done in 1683. Instead the FPÖ have them speak a corrupted form of German typical 
of ethnic Middle Eastern groups in modern Austria, specifically Turkish migrants. 
The extended use of the character ü over almost all other vowel choices attempts to 
communicate to the reader the phonetic quality of the Austrian-Turkish ethnic dialect, 
or ‘ethnolect’, and its alien character from the accepted and traditional Vienna dialect 
exhibited by those native Germanic characters, such as Strache, who conform with 
Austrian Leitkultur. This is principally achieved by making fun of Turkish, in which ü 
appears frequently.  
 Ethnolect refers to language spoken by ethnic minorities that is 
unconventional or corrupted compared to the majority language. It is not a foreign 
language, but a ‘bastardisation’ of the native language that results from a mix of 
different ethnicities and cultures. Ethnolect refers, therefore, to “a variety of the 
majority language (or "host language"), which is used and regarded as a vernacular 
for speakers of a particular ethnic descent and is marked by certain contact 
phenomena.”448 Here contact phenomena refer to the result of the social interaction 
between two different subgroups in the same nationality, which usually results in a 
merger of vernacular and a correspondingly new social identity. Ethnolect in German-
speaking societies specifically is described as a merger of the foreign migrant and the 
native host languages, and is therefore:  
  
characteristic of speakers from a migrant background who are born or raised 
in the host country … I define ethnolects as ways of speaking that are 
associated, by speakers themselves or other social groups, with ethnic 
minority groups…”449 
 
The corrupted use of the German language in the comic, the exaggerated use of 
umlauts, and the phonetically uncivilised character is at first glance a brazen attempt 	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at parody by the FPÖ, in which they depict the comical attempt of a foreign tongue to 
master Austrian-German vernacular. The result is a phonetically laughable depiction 
of German, in which the speakers are portrayed as either uneducated or uncouth. 
However as an ethnolect the language in the comic marginalises speakers from 
Turkish migrant backgrounds as invaders and outsiders, and therefore identifies this 
social group as one that is not integrated into the human landscape of Heimat Austria.  
 The Turkish ethnolect is also reminiscent of ‘Kanak Sprak’, which is a term 
loaded with xenophobic connotations against ethnic minority groups in German 
speaking societies. 450 The word ‘Kanak’ is derived from the indigenous inhabitants of 
New Caledonia, and was used in colonial times in a derogatory way, similar to the 
word ‘Nigger’.451 However the term, and the style of ethnolect spoken in Kanak 
Sprak, came to imply a certain degree of pride and solidarity amongst ethnic 
minorities in the German and Austrian hip-hop scene. Their collective identity and 
sense of self-esteem is derived from their ‘foreigness’, as the Turkish rap artist ‘H-
Run’ from Frankfurt explains:  
 
Jeder Ausländer hier, sei es ein Türke, Jugoslawe, Marokkaner oder weiß ich 
nicht, ist eine Kanak für mich, weil er in seinem eigenen Land nicht akzeptiert 
ist und hier nicht... Wir sind ein eigenes Volk! Alle Ausländer, die in 
Deutschland leben. Unsere Eltern sind wiederum keine Kanaken, die sind 
Türken.452  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
450 In his article Talking "Kanak": Zaimoğlu contra Leitkultur, Tom Cheesman explains that the 
phrase Kanak, which began as derogatory term for people of color, developed into a label for 
the pseudo-ethnicity and subnational identity of Turkish minorities in Germany. Cheesman 
argues that the term Kanak Sprak, taken from the title of Feridun Zaimoğlu’s book that 
recounts dialogue between ethnically Turkish youth in Germany to question the political 
narrative of a state sanctioned Leitkultur, describes a style of language typical of Turkish 
groups in German speaking societies that is neither correct German nor correct Turkish. For 
Cheesman, this demonstration of ethnic dialect is symptomatic of contrary identities 
developing within the German nation, and in particular, a new identity for Turkish minorities. 
This new identity is largely in opposition to the old policy of obligatory integration, which is 
applied by the forced conformity of German citizens to a national identity that is informed by 
a traditional, conservative German middle-class Leitkultur. See Cheesman, Tom. "Talking 
"Kanak": ZaimoğLu Contra Leitkultur." New German Critique.92 (2004): 82 - 99. Print. 
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Kanak Sprak, therefore, is the language of a different ethnoculture that is developing 
contrarily to the majority Leitkultur in German and Austrian society. In Austria, for 
example, terms used to antagonise the language of minority groups is not dissimilar 
from Germany, although it should be noted that public awareness of ethnic language 
varieties is much lower in Austria than that of Germany.453 Nonetheless, terms found 
in Austria include Türkenslang, Kanak Sprak, Türkendeutsch, Türkenpidgin, 
Dönerdeutsch, and Balkandeutsch (a reference to the large amount of immigrants for 
the Balkans.454 Indeed, in a similar way to the FPÖ’s discourse on language, it is the 
expression of identity and culture in Kanak Sprak that illustrates its influence as a 
feature of the collective self of ethnic minorities in German speaking territories. As 
Yazemin Yildiz explains, Kanak Sprak is “the foregrounding of language in the 
articulation of marginalised social identities.”455 The manifestations of the Kanak 
phenomenon, demonstrates “the transgressive quality of their discourse, linked to 
some kind of non-normative use of the German language” and this subsequent 
linguistic representation of minorities looks to “the German language as a crucial site 
of this representation.”456 In Austrian public discourse surrounding ethnic linguistic 
variances, as a result, there are references to situation in Germany and fears are 
expressed that, like in Germany, parallel societies will emerge: an immigrant society 
and a native Austrian one.457 Such anxieties play directly into the FPÖ’s strategy to 
highlights linguistic variances as examples of separatism and accusations of a refusal 
to assimilate among ethnic groups.  
 The violation of the social and cultural boundaries of ‘Germaness’ or 
‘Austrianness’ illustrated in Kanak Sprak (while perceived positively by ethnic 
minorities) is against the very core of the populist Right’s Heimat and language 
politic. For the FPÖ, language must be preserved in its pure form, and the 	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Area: An Overview." Multilingualism and Language Diversity in Urban Areas. Eds. 
Siemund, Peter, et al. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2013. 177 - 208. Print. 186. 
454 Muysken and Rott 186. 
455 Yildiz, Yasemir. "Critically "Kanak": A Reimagination of German Culture." Globalization 
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development of contrary social and linguistic or cultural identities is anathema. The 
FPÖ’s use of Kanak Sprak, therefore, is not a celebration of the diversity of Austrian 
society, but a warning of the imminence of parallel immigrant societies establishing 
themselves in Austria. The purpose of ethnolect in the comics is provided as a 
cautionary tale about the future of the German language and the character of the 
Heimat. Yildiz explains that the threats to national and cultural identity posed by 
globalisation and linguistic diversity has led many German-speakers to perceive 
German as something that should be unchangeable, which leads “to the ideological 
fantasy of an organic and pure German which has remained untouched, as if it were 
outside of time and history.”458  
 While it may be true that no language is totally pure and fixed, the defence of 
cultural boundaries is nonetheless the foundation the FPÖ’s creed. It is from this 
ideological position that they expand upon the dangers posed by linguistic diversity in 
language and other cultural features of collective identity. The FPÖ are using the 
alleged break down of language to play a politics of fear with the Austrian population, 
and produce in the comics a dangerous ‘Other’ that is capable of violating the 
‘sanctity’ of language and Heimat. The perceived threat of Islam is central to the 
Freedom Party’s divisive strategy, which encourages separatism by fuelling anxiety of 
or antagonism towards towards migrant groups from Muslim nations. The variances 
in language between native Austrians and their enemies demonstrate a fundamental 
discordancy between native and ‘Outsider’ identities in the modern Austrian nation, 
as well as the alleged flaws of multicultural society and the threat it poses to the 
native autochthonous population. This incompatibility is established by portraying the 
hostility of the foreign cultural knowledge, behavioural patterns, and social histories 
the language represents, and in many cases this argument is directed against the 
religion and culture of Islam. The difference in language is, therefore, not only a 
disparity of communication, but an example of the inability of diverse identities to 
harmoniously coexist within the same nation, surmised from the imminent possibility 
of harm posed by the ‘Outsider’ group to the native one. A failure to conform to the 
national language, for the FPÖ, demonstrates a lack of appetite to integrate, or a 
refusal to accept the Austrian Leitkultur as identity, thereby posing a threat to its 
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enduring survival. In addition, the threat posed by the Turkish army alongside its 
symbolism to current day issues shows the FPÖ’s belief that migrant groups from 
Islamic countries would forcibly impose their way of life on Austrians. 
 One way that the FPÖ demonstrate the danger of Islamic groups is through the 
threat of ‘religious war’ – which is a central feature of their habitus and vernacular in 
the Sagen. It is religious war that drives the ambition of the Turkish invaders from 
1683, and the FPÖ compares that historical fact to modern day ethnic Turks, whether 
citizens of Austria or migrants: 
 
 
Figure 45. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Wien.459 
 
It is in ethnolect that the Turkish army declare their attack against the infidels, or 
unbelievers. Their language and vernacular therefore demonstrates their Islamic 
identity. The differences in language use between the Turks and the Austrians within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
459 In the image there are numerous cryptic nuances towards the answer of who is allegedly 
leading the enemies of Austrian Leitkultur and national identity. The violent scene depicts the 
crescent moon of Islam and the Turkish flag being held by invaders, who are ‘carried in’ by a 
horse that is branded with the Communist hammer and sickle. Presumably the heads of 
vanquished native Austrians, perhaps symbolic of their self-determination and identity, stand 
as an example of the existential crisis Vienna faces both today and in 1683. This image is 
symbolic of a typical narrative used by members of the Far Right, who claim cultural and 
ethnic pluralism is a policy of the Left in order to garner votes from new national subgroups. 
The horses (members of the Far Left) are therefore ‘carrying in’ the Turkish invaders 
(migrant groups). FPÖ Wien, 13. 
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the comic, therefore, is a sociolinguistic approach to national identity, which also 
attempts to illustrate the alleged unassimilable nature (and serious threat) of Islamic 
groups in European societies.  
 The use of such linguistic strategies to deny Middle Eastern ethnic groups in 
Austria, as well as newly arrived immigrants of similar cultural extraction, a place in 
the human landscape of the nation is symptomatic of the broader anti-Islamic rhetoric 
disseminated by the FPÖ, which gained significant momentum since Strache’s 
ascendency to leadership in 2005. As S. Rosenberger and L. Hadj-Abdou explain, 
since Strache’s leadership Islam has increasingly become a discursive tool in the 
FPÖ’s discourse to portray members of the Islam faith as a dangerous national 
subgroup that is a foreign threat to the Austrian people, to the imagined Austrian 
nation, to the Heimat, to as well as to the idea of ‘Europe’ by extension.460 Sagen aus 
Wien was released as part of the FPÖ’s campaign during the district council elections 
in Vienna, where the party had spoken at length about the link between Vienna’s 
rising crime rate and professional foreign crime gangs and immigrants unwilling to 
obey the law or assimilate.461  
 Images such as the violent scene depicted in Sagen aus Wien’s “Die zweite 
Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683” are similarly provocative, and encourage society’s 
distrust toward Islamic migrant groups. The Turks speak in an ethnolect, display a 
different culture, and are hostile to the host population. Their sultan wishes to convert 
Austrians to Islam, and transform Vienna’s iconic Stephansdom into an Islamic 
mosque. The invader force in “Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683” is 
therefore symbolic of an ethnolect and foreign culture that is taking over Austria. The 
story’s contextual parallels between historical and modern Austria converge in the 
FPÖ’s comics to help establish the rejection of the unassimilable ‘Other’, 
demonstrated in the form of the Middle Eastern migrant ethnic groups and Islam as a 
culture and religion. The Turkish-Islamic ethnolect is therefore not only used to 
demonstrate a comedic portrayal of ethnic groups with an Islamic heritage, but also to 
encourage its readers to identify the imminent social threat posed by that group as the 	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‘Outsider’ either attempting to get into Austria, or living within the borders of the 
nation already. The FPÖ is using language, cultural differences, and history to play on 
deeply ingrained social anxieties directed toward Turkish minorities in Vienna. The 
Guardian Online explains that Austria is diametrically opposed to Turkey joining the 
European Union, and in an outburst the Turkish ambassador to Vienna stated that 
Austrians are largely xenophobic and treat their Turkish national subgroup “like a 
virus.”462 This is the desire of the party - to encourage enmity between native and 
foreign groups, and to successfully use Islamophobia and the fear of cultural 
pluralism or the loss of national identity as political leverage.  
 It is from the alleged threat native Austrian culture faces, brought on by the 
invasion of foreign ethnoculture, that the FPÖ strongly stresses its ambition to defend 
Heimat and Leitkultur. Language continues to play an important role in this narrative, 
as seen in the FPÖ’s Sagen aus Österreich:  
 
 
Figure 46. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Österreich.463 
 
In a cartoon on the final page, Strache warns of the ever-present encroachment of 
Islam in Austrian society that is facilitated from within by a treacherous political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
462 Traynor, Ian. "Austria Treats Turks 'like a Virus', Ambassador Claims." The Guardian. 
Guardian News and Media, 12 Nov. 2010. Web. 18 July 2016. 
463 FPÖ Österreich, 3. 
	   161	  
establishment. Strache’s statement is a reference to a political billboard that was 
written in Turkish and disseminated by the SPÖ around Vienna in 2013. The political 
background behind this comic is very important. The SPÖ and Greens had been 
campaigning on the platform that they would extend the right to vote to non-Austrians 
on a local level.464 This premise was met with great outrage by the FPÖ, with Johann 
Gudenus stating that Austria is a democratic republic, and that rights should only be 
afforded to its own citizenry – not foreigners.465 For the FPÖ, the Left are important 
votes by bringing in foreign groups from Islamic areas. The SPÖ’s billboard is shown 
in the comic with its Turkish text above the FPÖ slogan Daham statt Islam. For the 
FPÖ, the dichotomy of the two opposing political placards demonstrates that one 
party recognises the Leitkultur and linguistic identity of Austrians, while the other 
seeks to foster ‘Outsider’ identities, such as Turks, over the native Austro-Germanic 
population. Strache’s reference to ‘Klartext’ in the comic frame is therefore also a 
reference to speaking in the native German language, which the SPÖ failed to do in 
this instance: 
 
 Viennese: Schau, ein türkisches SPÖ-Plakat! Sollt ma nicht eigentlich 
 Deutsch können, bevor man Stattsbürger wird und wählen darf? Eh 
 kloar. Nur die Sozi und die Grünen kapiern das net!466 
 
For the FPÖ the direct threat stems from ethnic groups from the Middle East region 
and the culture of Islam. However, the Austrian political establishment and the 
European Union are also identified by the FPÖ as foreign agents that seek to supplant 
Austrian Leitkultur and foster multiculturalism and a multiplicity of identities in 
modern Austrian society. This is seen for example in Sagen aus Wien’s die zweite 
Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683, where SPÖ major of Vienna Michael Häupl is 
portrayed as a drunken coward, and is seen describing his leftist principles, which are 
responsible for the establishment of multiple ethnic and cultural identities in the city, 
in particular Islamic and Turkish ones: 	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Häupl: Die Verteidiger sind alle teppert! Mir is wurscht, wenn die  Türken 
kommen, samt Minarett und Muezin und Kopftüchlzwang! Ich bin schließlich 
ein Mann von Welt und ka Rassist! Und Wein-Saufen und Bratl-Essen tua ich 
dann heimlich im Keller. – Des Türkengwandl und die Wasserpfeifn hab ich 
mir eh schon zuglegt! 
 
Like the Left-Wing rats elsewhere in the comic, although Michael Häupl is native and 
therefore uses Viennese dialect, a special and even more inflammatory role is 
reserved for him: the role of the native traitor. In the extract, Häupl is shown to 
support the foreign habitus of Turkish minorities over native Austrian Leitkultur. He 
does this through his claim that he is a man of the world and is therefore amenable to 
the diversification of cultures and new identifies informed by foreign social agents. 
The FPÖ portray this ‘progressive’ and ‘modern’ type of heterogeneous identity 
formation as the new trend of socialisation perpetuated by the Left, which is 
antagonistic to the traditional mode of identity affixed to the land in which people, 
such as Häupl, are born. In particular, Häupl chooses the customs, culture, and 
behaviour patterns of the Turks over native Austrian ones, and implicitly suggests that 
Austrian Leitkultur will become a minority in the nation, thus Austrians will have to 
act out their native customs in their own houses and not in public. However, it is 
when Häupl talks of aiding the Turks to enter the city to his left wing colleagues, who 
appear as stoned half rat – half university students, that his true ambitions for the 
ethnic and cultural diversification of the autochthonous Austrian population is made 
apparent: 
 
Häupl: Helft’s ma! Mach ma des Tor auf! Lass ma’s eine! Wien braucht a 
Zuwanderung! So lendenlahm, wia die Österreicher sind. Es braucht a frisches 
Bluat!  
 Left-Wing youth: Nur wennst uns fix versprichst, dass die Türken sofort 
 Gemeindewohnungen kriagen und wöhln dürfen!467 
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Häupl refers to the need for ‘fresh blood’ among the Austrian gene pool, which is an 
allusion to the desire for the ethnic diversity of the native population. Furthermore, 
the FPÖ explain in a footnote that the term lendenlahm is used in reference to the 
statements made by 1999 SPÖ-Bundeskanzler Viktor Klima, “der die Österreicher 
sinngemäß als lendenlahm bezeichnete, um so die Massenzuwanderung zu 
rechtfertigen.”468 The request from the Left-Wing youth to first address the needs of 
the Turkish minority above the native Austrian majority is typical of the FPÖ’s ‘left-
wing betrayal’ narrative, in which those of a Leftist persuasion are typically drug 
addicts, lazy, impotent, and commonly fostering a political mentality that is either 
treacherous, or hostile to traditional Austrian identity and Leitkultur. References to 
impotence further play on the fears that migrants (with a much larger birth rate) are 
‘coming for our women’, and that they will ‘out-breed’ us. The Left is therefore 
portrayed as those that are willing to undermine the traditional “system” of Heimat, 
which is informed by Leitkultur, and diversify the nation through mass immigration in 
order to achieve their own corrupted ambitions. This is seen elsewhere, for example, 
in the lyrics to Strache’s 2010 rap song ‘Wiener Blut’, in which he seeks to 
demonstrate a clear link between Häupl, the political Left, Islamisation, and forced 
ethnocultural diversity: 
 Islamisten auf dem Vormarsch! Minarett samt Muezzin. Das wollen Rote 
 installieren aber sonst kein Mensch in Wien! 
 Sozis woll’n mich mundtot machen, weil ich sag, was Sache ist! Du brauchst 
 nur die Heimat lieben, schreit der Häupl gleich: Faschist!469 
In contrast to the multicultural ‘chaos’ presided over by the political Left, the FPÖ 
urges a return to traditional modes of existence: 
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Figure 47. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Wien.470 
 
The image is a rather Heimat kitsch illustration of an imagined traditional Viennese 
form of life. The society is directed by the German linguistic tradition, rather than 
multiculturalism or multilingual dialogue. The operetta Wiener Blut by Johann Strauss 
II (1825 – 1899) plays in the background, which indicates the rather artistic 
manifestations of Austrian culture. The dual meaning of Wiener Blut is not without 
design, as the FPÖ also implies that the blood (or ethnic community) of the Vienna 
must remain pure as well.  
 In his own rap song “Wiener Blut”, Strache further emphasizes the betrayal of 
native Austrian identity, stating that while other cultures and values are fine abroad, 
they are a foreign habitus in Austria and should never be competitive to the Austrian 
Leitkultur. Once again, Häupl and the political Left are identified as the conspirators 
that instigate a foreign habitus and identity within the Austrian nation: “Andre 
Länder, andre Sitten, gerne auch in Istanbul, Istanbul in Wien hingegen, findet nur der 
Häupl cool.”471 Finally, Strache raps to his audience his explicit message that the 
preservation of a native Austrian identity and Leitkultur is predicated on the cessation 
of Leftist political and foreign cultural influences, because the Left are in a conspiracy 	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against the native host population to supplant them with foreigners: “Zu viel Rot und 
zu viel Fremdes, beides tut hier niemand gut! Deshalb lautet die Parole: Mehr Mut für 
unser „Wiener Blut“.472 
 The Right-Wing populist idea of Heimat, therefore, requires intact examples 
of culture and language that are authentic and unmixed. Multiculturalism is therefore 
anathema, and any new migrant would be theoretically required to undertake strict 
actions towards total assimilation. Language is the first step toward successful 
integration, and in Sagen aus Österreich the FPÖ stress the importance of this. The 
comic’s das Purbacher Türke recounts the 1532 Ottoman invasion of Austria, which 
according to legend resulted in one Turkish soldier being accidently left behind near 
the town of Purbach. The soldier, as a result, was forced under threat of death to be 
baptised and enter serfdom in Austria. The soldier, as a result, abandoned his previous 
allegiances and identity, and, although forced, essentially integrated into Austrian 
society. The FPÖ eagerly utilise this myth in order to stress the importance of 
language and integration: 
 
 
Figure 48. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Österreich.473 	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The image instructs new migrants of their obligations as Austrian citizens: to learn the 
language and to integrate. Although the Turkish migrant does not fully enunciate the 
purity of the language provided by the Austrian teacher, on the final page of the myth 
he does, despite the inability to speak German fluently, at least attempt to assimilate: 
 
 
Figure 49. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Österreich.474 
 
In the image the Turk’s ethnolect has not disappeared, but he has rejected his Turkish 
roots and attempted to transform into an Austrian citizen. He has shown 
enlightenment by realising things are better in Austria (because there is no Sharia law) 
and not only integrated, but positively disrespectful of his former religion. It is 
apparent in the comic that the Turk, who now dresses in Austrian clothes, drinks 
Austrian wine (an indication of his rejection of Islam and the ban of alcohol), and is 
riding a pig (a reference to the Islamic ban on the consumption of pork), is no longer 
his former Turkish self but rather a fully assimilated citizen of Austria. He speaks the 
language, and harbours no loyalty to his former Sultan or land. This attracts the 
approval of the Austrians, who in turn accept the Turk for his total transformation and 
integration. The FPÖ are therefore indicating the importance of total assimilation, of 
which language is the first step. Forced language and cultural acquisition indicates 	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that the FPÖ does not want a diverse mix of new identities within the nation. As a 
result of this ethos, any new migrants must effectively transform themselves into 
‘traditional’ Austrians. Total assimilation, however, is a difficult criterion to comply 
with. These requirements placed upon new migrants, such as a perfect command of 
the German language, would be largely unattainable – something Austria’s Right-
Wing populists are arguably aware of.  
 
3.5 - Language in FPÖ social policy  
 In Austria, migrants from third-world nations must currently sign an 
Integration Agreement with a language requirement of level B1 (German) within two 
years of entering the country in order to be granted citizenship or residency.475 
According to the Common European Framework of References for Languages that 
designs the levels of grading, level B1 indicates: 
 
1. Understanding main points of clear standard speech on familiar matters 
regularly encountered in work, school, leisure, radio, and Television. 
2. Understanding texts that consist of everyday or job related language. 
3. An ability to deal with most situations likely to arise whilst travelling in an 
area where the language is spoken. Aptitude to enter any conversation on 
topics that are familiar, of personal interests or everyday life (such as hobbies 
etc.) 
4. Can connect phrases in a simple order to describe experiences and events, 
dreams, hopes, and ambitions. Can narrate a story or relate the plot of a book 
or film. 
5. An ability to write simple, connected text on topics which are familiar or of 
personal interest.476 
 
The guidelines indicate that language verification for residency or citizenship requires 
an above average level of German proficiency. German language skills are of course 	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required for the employment of migrants or refugees, which through both work and 
socialisation rapidly progress the assimilation process of individuals. Such a process 
of language acquisition, with numerous courses and programmes, costs money. 
According to a report from Breitbart in 2016, Austria spends a total of 133 million 
euros per year on language courses to deal with the influx of asylum seekers during 
the refugee crisis, with the projection of two billion euros of taxpayer’s money 
devoted to migrants in the course of 2017.477 Such figures are met with outrage by the 
FPÖ. On his personal website, Strache attacks the ‘integration’ policies of the SPÖ 
and the Greens, which have funnelled funds through dubious channels into 
“integration societies” that do not work – all of which comes out of Austrians’ own 
pockets.478 According to Strache, the current language courses do not work, and while 
Austrians continue to pay, newly arrived Muslims do not integrate or learn the 
language, form parallel societies, and even radicalise against the host population.479 In 
place of this “subvention of Left-Wing multiculturalism”, the FPÖ also propose 
compulsory language classes for migrants and asylum seeers, with an additional focus 
on obtaining a clear understanding of the “heimischen Werte, Normen und Gesetze” 
in Austria.480 
 A command of the German language and understanding of Austrian values, 
then, is the foundation of the FPÖ’s roadmap to successful integration. For the party, 
language expresses the common socio-cultural features of the native population, and 
an ability to communicate in German is a basic tenet of social assimilation for new 
migrants. For example, according to the FPÖ “Die Beherrschung der deutschen 
Sprache “must be a central requirement for „die Einbürgerung“ of all migrants and 
refugees.481 A petition for the ‘naturalisation’ of new migrants and asylum seekers 
into traditional Austrian identity does not require German proficiency as much as it 
demands German as the first language (or only language spoken both privately and 
publically). Naturalisation therefore speaks more of total assimilation, and implies a 	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demand upon migrants and asylum seekers to gain a fluency in German so that a 
native Austrian model, demonstrated through language in particular, finally replaces 
their original ethnoculture. The language of all Austrians both established and new, in 
other words, is German and must remain German. It is not enough for migrants or 
asylum seeers to achieve basic everyday German skills. Rather German must also 
become their’ Muttersprache – their only language of choice. As a result, the FPÖ 
rejects the diversification of linguistic patterns in Austria. New migrants must be 
naturalised as typical ‘Austrians’, and be precluded from adding their own 
ethnoculture to the human landscape of the homeland.  
 Language use in Austria is at the core of a debate over immigration and 
assimilation. It is central to a discussion that transcends language as communication 
alone, digressing at every turn into the abstract realms of culture and national identity. 
Josef Bucher, leader of the BZÖ until 2013, explains in his political manifesto that the 
government of Austria should only accept those immigrants and refugees who want to 
assimilate with Austrian culture and learn the German language.482 The FPÖ similarly 
demand that all refugees and migrants must accomplish an active “Erwerb von 
Sprachkenntnissen.”483 To enforce this, the FPÖ assert that there should be no more 
than 30% of students per class that do not have German as their mother language, no 
students in school without base German language skills, no access to housing for 
those that cannot speak German, and the expulsion of those migrants who fail to 
assimilate.484 The FPÖ further defend the figure of 30% by stating that a command of 
the German language is necessary to follow instruction in schools and to participate in 
a normal education. 485 To enforce this the FPÖ insists that persons without Austrian 
citizenship or without German as their mother tongue must pass a German test one 
year before school commences. 486  However, a solicitation to limit students in 
Austrian schools with a non-German linguistic background to a specific figure also 
demonstrates that the language policies of the populist Right have deeper socio-
political implications. Identifying an ‘Outsider’ demographic, as well as restricting 
their ability to access basic institutions such as schools, demonstrates the desire to 	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regulate foreigners in the nation as a whole. The implication underlying such 
statements, for example, is where any surplus students might be housed, or whether 
they would indeed be ejected from the nation. The request that migrants and refugees 
should also be denied housing or schooling entirely if they do not achieve the 
assimilation mandate further illustrates an apparent direct attack on migrant groups’ 
rights under Austrian law. The language policies of the populist Right, therefore, are 
not only created to preserve the German language and corresponding Leitkultur, but 
also to reject and marginalise the influence or presence of foreign ethnoculture in the 
nation by restricting or controlling their numbers and their rights.  
 The demand for German language use in is not only limited to Austrian 
schools. In the FPÖ’s political programme it states that while the German language 
must always be the language of instruction in German schools, this process begins 
with the family and in the home. 487 In other words, true Austrian families should be 
speaking German at all times, regardless of ethnocultural backgrounds, and 
irrespective of private or public domains. In a recent Facebook post Strache reiterated 
the catchphrase “Zuerst Deutsch, dann Schule! Und Deutsch auch als 
Pausensprache!” alongside an image with the slogan ‘Deutsch statt nix versteh’n’: 
 
 
Figure 50. 
Image taken from Facebook.488 	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Strache’s statement indicates that German should be used in all facets of societal life 
in Austria: as a first language in the home, in one’s leisure time, as well as in the 
school. 489  Additionally, the use of such statements alongside an image that 
condescendingly mocks the German language inefficiencies of minorities further 
marginalises those groups that do not have German as their mother tongue.  
 The FPÖ, however, justifies these language policies by referring to a logical 
request that migrants should respect Austria’s native culture. In their political 
programme the FPÖ assert that the Austrian Leitkultur is formed by a pride in ‘our’ 
Heimat, language, history, and traditions, and a respect for these examples of 
‘Austrianness’ is a prerequisite for any case of migrant integration. 490 The FPÖ 
believe that all Austrians, including migrants or new citizens, must abide by Austrian 
societal laws and cultural norms. Therefore it is not the duty of Austrians to adapt to 
new ethnocultures or migrant groups, “sondern die Aufgabe eines jeden Fremden.”491 
Language is an important example of conforming to the desired society because if one 
sounds Austrian, one is also a step closer to behaving and thinking as an Austrian 
should, and therefore experiencing an affinity with Austrian Leitkultur while also 
identifying with the nation.492 While the argument that the native culture and identity 
of the host nation must be preserved is a valid one that is expressed throughout many 
Western nations, there is also a persistent politics of exclusion that dictates the terms 
of the populist Right’s solutions to immigration and cultural pluralism. For example, 
the FPÖ end their discussion on integration with a rather ominous warning to those 
who they believe do not conform, stating that they have “Null-Toleranz” for 
“Integrationsverweigerung” and that the party would persistently monitor the 
integration of migrants and enact strict deportation measures for non-compliance.”493 
 The social group most cited by Austria’s Right-Wing populist parties 
to be incapable of integration is the Turkish minority in Austria, and a great amount 	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of party literature is dedicated to justifying this assertion. In their political programme 
the FPÖ provide an article from the daily Viennese newspaper Der Kurier, which 
under the title “Türken fällt die Integration schwerer” explains that the great majority 
of migrants to Austria feel well integrated and willing to abide by the rules, however 
“Unter den Türken gibt es aber nicht unbeträchtliche Vorbehalte."494 For the FPÖ, the 
reason for this is clear. Turkish immigrants are incapable of integration because they 
are disinclined to observe the culture and laws of the nation. This inability to 
assimilate is, according to the FPÖ, due to the Turkish community being restricted by 
Islamic religious belief, rather than the laws and values of the host population 
alongside whom they reside. In other words, Turkish minorities do not actually 
identify themselves as ‘Austrians’. To justify this argument the FPÖ turn to statistics, 
stating that more than half of Turks in Austria want Sharia law over secular law, 
while three quarters believe that following the commandments of their religion is 
more important than democracy. 495 To reverse or control the influence of Islamic 
culture the FPÖ also return to language use. In their party programme the party insists 
that German must be the language of instruction in all Islamic prayer houses in 
Austria.496 To speak in Arabic, therefore, is seen as a direct affront to Austrian 
identity, and a means of encouraging foreign ethnoculture over the host population, 
and must therefore be negated. This populist, Rightist thesis goes to the core of their 
perspective on the integration of Islamic groups, who they believe are hostile to the 
Germanic language and culture of Austria. For example, in a Facebook post Strache 
angrily posted an image of a newspaper title, in which a Turkish integration 
consultant to Austria stated that obligatory German courses are a provocation to 
Turkish minorities: 
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Figure 51. 
Image taken from Facebook.497 
  
Statements such as these fuel the flames of Far Right resentment. Strache is justifying 
the party’s position on immigration and cultural pluralism by giving strong evidence 
to indicate that new ethnocultural groups have little desire to assimilate with the 
native Austrian population. Indeed, in this example even the German language itself 
is allegedly viewed as negative incitement for minorities with definitively non-
Germanic, non-Austrian identities.  
For the FPÖ, the action needed against such unassimilable and allegedly 
‚criminal’ groups is clear: “Wer als Fremder in Österreich wegen eines Verbrechens 
verurteilt wird ist in sein Heimatland auszuweisen.”498 Those people that do not 
conform to the rules of the host language, culture, and society, are therefore seen to be 
foreign to the human landscape of Heimat Österreich. Foreigners or migrants have 
their own Heimatland and their own Muttersprache. They are therefore not identified 
as Austrians and as a result can be expelled for crime, prolonged unemployment, and 
also for the inability to assimilate. Those that do not conform or assimilate, then, are 	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grouped together by the FPÖ alongside those who have become “kriminell”, and must 
be deported for not respecting the values and ethnoculture of Austria.499 This is bold 
rhetoric by Austria’s populist Right, who attempt to compare a failure to integrate 
with criminal status, suggesting that not conforming to traditional Austrian Leitkultur 
is akin or as bad as breaking the law. Such a political philosophy demonstrates not 
only the will to preserve Austrian German language and culture, but is also a 
justification for the marginalisation of foreign ethnocultures and the expulsion of 
‘undesirable’ social groups that do not conform to the Austrian human landscape 
ethos. Language use, therefore, becomes imperative in both the definition of Austrian 
identity and the rights and expectation of every citizen according to the FPÖ.  
 
3.6 - Conclusion 
 The FPÖ, then, uses the party programme and other publications like comics 
to promote language purity as crucial in the defence of Heimat and national identity. 
The party uses language as a domain from which to articulate their cultural critique on 
Heimat, and therefore discursively construct a national identity and sense of 
community that appeals to their monoethnic, monocultural narrative. If language 
remains unadulterated and autochthonous, the collective Austrian identity and image 
of Heimat does as well. The objective in the FPÖ’s language as Heimat narrative is to 
validate the interconnectivity between language and behavioural patterns, in order to 
demonstrate the inner habitus they believe typifies Austrian identity. The prominence 
of language in their political ideas and literature is used to determine ‘true’ Austrians 
as members of the German cultural community, as well as demonstrate Austria’s 
contribution to that community in the form of regional dialect. Native dialect, always 
within the parameters of Alemannic linguistic traditions, is used by the FPÖ to 
establish an intersection between language, culture, and society, and the party use that 
intersection to discursively construct an Austrian national identity and Heimat that is 
informed by native ethnocultural elements. This construct, which uses linguistic 
traditions to depict real Austrians as those that are of Germanic ethnocultural 
extraction, therefore attempts to categorise Heimat Österreich and modern Austria as 
an ethnic nation. Austria as Heimat is an ethnic nation because its members require a 
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shared common descent, a long biographical relationship to the land in which they are 
born, a shared social history, and a common culture. These elements in unison allow 
Austrians to imagine their Heimat and nation through the presumption of common 
descent, which also undermines the feasibility of multiculturalism and mass 
immigration. 
 Language is, as the intergenerational vessel for a social group’s habitus, a 
foundational cultural element in the FPÖ’s conception of the Austrian collective self 
and ethnic nation, and as such requires strict protocols for its preservation. The 
political policy of language preservation allows the FPÖ a course to justify their anti-
immigration policies. The party achieves this by attempting to draw attention to the 
unassimilable and even hostile character of other ethnic groups in Austria, who are 
shown to refuse to conform to the conventions of the Austrian-German language, and 
therefore to the nation’s way of life. Such degrees of ‘foreignness’ can result in a 
multiplicity of identities in Austrian society and the eventual demise of the traditional 
identity of the host nation, which the FPÖ argue is the clandestine ambition of 
immigrants, the European Union, and the current Austrian political establishment. It 
is upon this argument that the FPÖ continues to canvass the idea of forced language 
acquisition for migrants, as well as the need to preserve a monocultural, and indeed 
monoethnic, image of Heimat. Denying migrants access to school unless they can 
adequately speak German further prevents them from ever learning the language and 
thus ensures, albeit indirectly, that their migration is ultimately unsuccessful both 
personally and psychologically. Without adequate access to resources, migrants can 
never hope to reach the adequate language levels of B1 required for residency.  
 Language, therefore, is used FPÖ to characterise, as well as draw a boundary 
around, the native Austrian ethnoculture. Language as ethnoculture, furthermore, 
informs the parties’ understanding of Heimat and discursively constructs the identity 
of the legitimate human landscape that dwells there. The FPÖ uses language, and the 
preservation of native linguistic traditions, as an example for why it is necessary to 
defend Austrians as a social group and community with a consistent culture and 
ethnicity. For the human landscape of Heimat to be a unique and distinctive 
ethnoculture, it requires the existence of an unbroken and largely intact (or unmixed) 
lineage that is informed by culture and the values of its own social history. Linguistic 
traditions, therefore, must be respected and never altered, and foreign ethnolects (as 
well as foreign identities more generally) must be limited or negated entirely. If 
	   176	  
language represents the social history, cultural knowledge, values, and the identity of 
‘cultural nations’ such as Austria, then it is also important to establish the origins and 
application of the FPÖ’s conception of cultural identity in their Heimat discourse. The 
formative cultural elements in the FPÖ’s definition of Austrian identity, as we shall 
see, are largely defined by the social history, myths, and traditions of the Germanic 
Kulturgemeinschaft.  
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Chapter Four 
 
In Österreich lebt die Tradition: Heimat, history, and mythology 
 
It is a serious question whether a political community can achieve a political 
order without developing a foundation myth.500 
 
4.0 – Introduction 
 ‘Narrative’ has been a pervasive term among academics over the past two 
decades that is commonly used for uncovering the cultural theory of the past. 501 
However narrative in this context refers to a form of representation that 
communicates a story as well as a method of discursively constructing reality to an 
audience. This chapter explores the linking of modern concepts of Heimat with more 
anachronistic models as outlined in the FPÖ’s definition of Austrian history and myth. 
The link between antiquity and modernity will be explored through the FPÖ’s 
paradigm of historical continuity, which is established through party literature that 
links Heimat with a deep and sentimental nostalgia for the past. 
 As has been established in previous chapters, maintaining a culturally 
homogeneous Austria informed by Austrian-German characteristics is an essential 
part of the FPO’s political objectives. In their particular view of Austrian identity they 
use nativist historiography and myth building to clearly demarcate the cultural 
boundaries of the Austrian nation. Their Heimatrhetorik, therefore, uses a ‘politics of 
the past’ to demonstrate a ‘pure’, autochthonous community and Heimat. This 
definition of people and Heimat is antagonistic by design towards outsiders, who 
through the lens of myth and history are illustrated as a disparaged or threatening 
‘Other’. The parties achieve this argument of ethnocultural separatism by suggesting 
that experiencing an affinity with one’s Heimat can only be achieved by identifying 
with Austrian history and traditions. As we shall see, only a very specific type of 
‘Austrian’, who exhibits the necessary biographical character, and who conforms to 	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this historical discourse, is permitted a place in the Right-Wing populist definition of 
Heimat. The parties’ use of Heimat is therefore entirely exclusive, and employs the 
sentimentality of a ‘wholesome’ and ‘uncontaminated’ antiquity in order to indirectly 
reject notions of cultural and historical pluralism, as well as multiculturalism. This 
collective, repackaged past is produced to encourage patriotism and a sense of 
belonging, as well as a general distrust towards those foreign groups that are either 
nonconformist or a threat to this identity mandate. 
 
4.1 - Heimatgeschichte 
 Although history is an important feature in the FPÖ’s definition of Heimat and 
identity, the use of the past to illuminate the present is by no means a contemporary 
Right-Wing populist invention. History has played an important role in concepts of 
Heimat since the nineteenth century. Although the Heimat imaginary does not require 
history, it is greatly enhanced by it. As a feature of Heimat, the purpose of history is 
to provide a compendium of the past with which people can readily identify and 
accordingly experience patriotism for their social group and geographical location. 
Heimatgeschichte, or the recording and celebration of previous modes of native life 
and custom, played an integral role in fostering this sense of local belonging, and was 
also successful in uniting various regions into a cohesive national identity narrative. 
Far from observing the orthodox conventions of disciplined historical research, 
Heimatgeschichte provided a special, localised form of history with which ordinary 
people could readily identify and feel empathy.  
 Celia Applegate’s research into the local German Heimat movement in the 
Pfalz provides good evidence of history’s ability to construct a Heimat imagination 
and sense of collective identity. Applegate explains that during the nineteenth century, 
Heimatgeschichte arose in the Historical Association of the Pfalz as a popular 
medium to promote local historical, archaeological, and ethnographic research.502 
Applegate concludes, rightly so, that through the popularisation of Heimatgeschichte, 
history now contributed alongside nature and folklore “to the emergence of a 
popularly held local identity, attesting both to the distinctiveness of the Pfalz and its 
participation in a broadly German culture.”503  	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 Heimatgeschichte, or ‘the history of Heimat’, however, was far from a 
scientific approach to historical data and past events. Alon Confino explains that:  
 
…while history is detached from the concerns of the little people, Heimat 
history is empathetic; while history explores impersonal trends, Heimat history 
focuses on everyday life; while history is a science,  Heimat history is an art; 
while history is an artificial construct, Heimat  history is an authentic, popular 
discourse.504 
 
Heimatgeschichte, therefore, was the popularization of bygone provincial and family-
orientated landscapes, often incorporating kitsch narratives that bestowed upon its 
audience feelings of nostalgia, sentimentality, and belonging. Despite Heimat 
history’s lack of scientific objectivity, it rather authentically illustrated a popular past 
for the people it served.  
 Heimat history also claimed the authority of ancient pasts, which helped to 
inform and authenticate collective cultural identity. Between 1890 and 1918 in 
particular, regional Heimat associations, museums, and publishers evoked the 
distinctiveness of the regional past, while at the same time establishing a link between 
‘Germanness’ and the identity of the nation.505 The significance of Heimat museums 
was their specific capacity to exhibit the past as a site of identity.506 Heimat museums 
were portals for Volkskunde and designed specifically to recall the past by recording 
communities’ previous ways of life.507 Everything from old farming equipment, to 
local costume, or scenes of every-day life and habitation, Heimatgeschichte aroused 
empathy and a nostalgic sense identity through an assortment of items, stories, or 
images about days of yore. In his Heimat book about Stuttgart, Wilhelm Seytter 
states: 
 
Heimat studies ... enter affectionately into people's simple and daily life, down 	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from the ivory tower of scholarship into the valleys and meadows of civil, 
family, and even personal life.... Heimat is not a prosaic system  of concepts, and 
Heimat studies are not a logical theory. Heimat has  been given to us by the 
disposition of our ancestors.508 
 
Heimatgeschichte, in other words, provided audiences with a narrative on the 
character and temperament of their forefathers as well as a window into nostalgic 
scenes from the past, all of which also indirectly affected their own self-identification. 
In a modern world that had experienced a rapid divorce from traditionalism, or the 
past from the present, Heimat museums and the concept of Heimat more generally 
were used as tools to lessen this existential divide. The various regional identities 
depicted in Heimatgeschichte illustrated a unified assortment of German heritage, and 
this amalgamated custom became the typical way the past was evoked in Heimat 
conceptions. The compendium of German heritage illustrated in Heimat history, 
therefore, functioned as an example of ‘sameness’ among German speaking 
communities. Confino calls this uniformity of heritage a “national common 
denominator”, with each region being the sum of its parts in the entire national 
community, and all Germans therefore sharing “a particular relationship to one 
another, sharing a past and a future.”509  
 Heimat historians, as a result, succeeded in merging local pasts to greater 
German national identity. History, therefore, was not only instrumental in the forging 
of Heimat conceptions, but also national identity in a politico-cultural context. In a 
political climate that saw the emergence of a greater German nation that was forged 
on many smaller identities, Heimat historians not only compiled local pasts to 
contribute to the national character, but to preserve. Rapidly changing environments, 
political orders, and national sovereignties and borders could as easily been perceived 
as hazardous to the longevity of smaller, local identities as it was about ensuring 
national identity and stature in the world. Much like the FPÖ’s desire to preserve the 
local identity of a small nation like Austria from the globalizing force of the European 	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Union, many Heimat historians diligently set about the task of documenting local 
identity so that it would not disappear as the world rapidly progressed and 
transformed around them. Heimat historians, in other words, sought to repel the 
homogenization of identity in the German-speaking areas of Europe, much as the FPO 
claim to be the last line of defense in a battle to save national and cultural identity 
from cultural pluralism and the political dominance of the European Union. 
 
4.2 - The historical constructions of national identity 
 The reconstruction of history, while significant to Heimat conceptions, is also 
instrumental in the building of cohesive and enduring national identity discourses. 
Although the architects of Heimatgeschichte used the past to recreate a 
‘commonplace’ and altogether ‘ordinary’ example of the everyday national self, 
national identities are also, in fact, consistently constructed around historical 
narratives. By the term ‘nation’ we do not refer directly to the political sense of an 
internationally recognized governmental body, population, or state; rather to an 
ethnocultural unit that has “meaning apart from the shape of political boundaries.”510 
History plays a significant role in the construction of nations and shared identities 
outside the direct realm of conventional political science. The idea of a nation, much 
like the concept of Heimat, is based upon certain integral ideas. The nation assumes a 
commonality that binds people together and demonstrates, from politically to socio-
culturally, that they are a single unit. This notion of collectivism can, as we have seen, 
be derived from language and territory, but can also be formed from shared ‘culture’ 
and history.511 History, however, is a loaded term with various applications. In the 
context of national identity constructions, history is applied as both an academic 
discipline and a form of ‘collective memory’.  
 As many scholars show, the discipline of history was regularly used to promote 
a collective national self, as history was merged with the present, albeit in a 
recurrently repackaged form, to help nurture national allegiances. Communities 
require histories in order to define themselves. Histories are valuable to identity 	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formation because of the cultural narratives they preserve.”512 For example, Stuart 
Hall refers to the nation as a “system of cultural representations”, of which history is 
one example. Hall explains that national cultures conceptualise identities by 
manufacturing meanings about the nation “with which we can identify; these are 
contained in the stories which are told about it, memories which connect its present 
with its past, and images which are constructed of it.”513 The ‘narration of national 
culture’ utilises what Hall calls ‘discursive strategies’, one of which is: 
 
A narrative of the nation that is told (and retold) in national histories, providing 
a set of “stories, images, landscapes, scenarios, historical  events and rituals” all 
of which represent the combined experiences that give meaning to the nation.514  
 
Stefan Berger and Bill Niven similarly explain that the “rise of history as a 
professional discipline in the nineteenth century was intimately connected with the 
rise of the idea of the modern nation” and that history itself “became national 
history.”515 Montserrat Guibernau too argues “history contributes to a certain image 
of the nation and represents the cradle where national character was forged.”516 Uri 
Ram similarly defines the concept of ‘nationality’ as a collective narration: a story 
that people recount about themselves in order to give authenticity and meaning to 
their present social world.517  
 Anthony David Smith also concludes that a common historical memory is the 
primary feature of national identity within a named population (a nation).518 For 
Smith, national identity “involves some sense of political community, history, 
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territory, patria, citizenship, common values and traditions.”519 Smith further cites the 
‘ethnic’ variant of nationalism, in which the proto-national ethnic origins of nations 
are seen to predate modernity, and be possessed of a “nativist history – a belief in the 
virtues of indigenous history and its special interpretation of the history of the nation 
and its place in the world.”520 The world, therefore, is divided into nations “each with 
its own history, destiny, and character.”521 Smith argues that one original prerequisite 
of what we define as modern ‘nations’ is a collective sense of primordialism, which 
through cultural attributes such as historical territory, kinship, language, and custom 
dictate self-identification, and resultantly create the sense of communal belonging 
“we call ethnicity and ethnic community.”522 The nation, therefore, is made up of 
members who “are bound together by a myth of common origins and a shared historic 
culture, and they form a single cultural community living according to vernacular 
codes in a historic homeland.”523 Although the concept of the political nation is a 
modern construct, it does find its roots in the distant personal histories of European 
groups. Both a ‘homeland’ and ‘nation’ are home to a ‘we’ group, and it is the 
continuity of ethnic allegiances that has played an important formative role in the 
formation of modern nations.524 Nations, then, are arguably rooted in a pre-modern 
assemblage, and therefore history plays a decisive role in their transmission over time. 
Indeed, history’s efficacy in the construction of national identity is due to the cultural 
narratives of sameness that it preserves.  
 Nations also require well-defined territories, and these spaces are commonly 
given a unique character and meaning through their historical narratives. The 
spatiality of the landscape, in other words, is characterised by its own, distinct, 
temporality. The territory of the nation, as a result, must be a specific ‘historic land’. 
The historic land is a ‘homeland’ to those that dwell within it, and “becomes a 
repository of historic memories and associations, the place where ‘our’ sages, saints, 
and heroes, lived, worked, prayed and fought. All this makes the homeland 	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unique.”525 It is the historic land with its tales of the ancestors that provides group 
identity and communal belonging, because it authenticates the existence of one 
distinct national identity and connects it to a territory and nation. Berger similarly 
cites the persistent use of ‘national histories’ in the construction of national identities, 
which legitimate “diverse forms of nationalism and feelings of national belonging.”526 
Berger goes on to emphasise that historians were as willing as other participants in 
national identity discourses to “anchor the present in a viable past, thereby 
guaranteeing the future of the nation.”527 Modern histories, therefore, have since the 
nineteenth century consistently been written to cover the origin of nations and their 
linear march towards the future, to the point that it has been said that modern history 
was “bonded to nations.”528 
 The selective use of histories as narratives of national identity assists to create a 
sense of community around which nations and identities are forged. Guibernau cites 
that a discerning use of history provides national groups with a “collective memory” 
with “transcendental moments” that allow people “to increase their self-esteem by 
feeling part of a community which proved capable of great things and that might also 
be ready to become again a beacon in the world.” 529 History, Guibernau continues, 
provides members of nations with examples of why they are ‘superior’, and, as a 
result, “contributes to the construction of a certain image of the nation and represents 
the cradle where national character was forged.”530 The historiographical quest to 
source meaningful events from history and reproduce them as examples of the 
nation’s grandeur demonstrates that, on a sociological level at very least, the past is 
often selectively constructed or retold in order to be applicable or perceived as 
valuable to the present.531  
 In the context of national identity, then, history is not an objectively applied 
discipline, but rather a selective process of ‘valuable myth building’ in order to 	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validate, authenticate, and disseminate modern national identity narratives. History, 
therefore, is not always entirely a factual affair, and can be utilised for various 
national objectives – some of which may be fictional or even, at times, nefarious in 
their designs. Many groups, including political bodies, can manipulate the events of 
history to suit their agenda: images of past soldiers may be evoked as examples of 
present day power, institutions long resolved or forgotten can be resurrected, previous 
political positions (especially in relation to foreign policy) revisited, and, most 
importantly, the descendants of foreign threats from recorded history sworn once 
more to be contemporary enemies. To capture the imagination history must be 
emotive, not necessarily factual. The chronology the of dates, or the factuality of the 
descriptions, pales into insignificance when faced with the efficacy of impassioned 
story telling that draws people together as groups and provides them a history, a 
purpose, and an identity. As Walker Connor concludes, national identity does not 
“draw its sustenance from facts but from perceptions; not from chronological/factual 
history but from sentient/felt history.”532 History, as a result, always maintains a 
potent role in the construction of national identities by providing participants with an 
emotive past that in many ways glorifies or authenticates the present.  
 
4.3 - Collective memory: Imagining national communities 
 The French historian Ernest Renan (1823 – 1892) in his famous lecture on 
‘What is a nation?’ explained history as a prerequisite to the formation of national 
identity, and that a nation required “the possession in common of a rich legacy of 
memories.”533 The faculty of memory, however, differs from history. ‘History’ as a 
database of national myths and what is known as ‘collective memory’ is far more 
useful in the construction of national identities than an objective, scientific discipline. 
Maurice Halbwachs (1877 – 1945) was the first major theoretician of the concept of 
‘collective memory’, where he noted the juxtaposition between history and memory. 
Halbwachs argued that collective memory is plural – it is experienced and imagined 
as a group - and thus different from the singular notion of history as the pursuit of an 	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objective analysis of the past. Collective memory, therefore, affects a social group’s 
identity through narratives and traditions that help to foster for its members a sense of 
community:  
 
It is in society that people acquire memories. It is also in society that they 
recall, recognize, and localise their memories… We appeal to our memory 
only in order to answer questions which others have asked us… We note, 
moreover, that in order to answer them, we place ourselves in their perspective 
and we consider ourselves as being part of the same group as they do.534 
 
The divorce of official history from more emotive and collective national memories 
was seen most noticeably from the nineteenth century, where professional history as a 
discipline sought integrity through an analysis of the past that was neither selective 
nor subjective.535 Collective memory contrarily reproduced the past in a way that 
could be imagined, and therefore indirectly experienced, by the audience, and this 
helped to encourage national ties and loyalty. For example, Jay Winter explains 
‘collective memory’ is the interpretation, embodiment, and repetition of scripts about 
the past that “galvanize the ties that bind groups together and deposit additional 
memory traces about the past in their own minds.”536 Halbwachs, as well as other 
historians such as Pierra Nora, therefore, attested that ‘history’ and ‘memory’ are 
different ways of dealing with the past.537  
 However, it is more credible that history and memory are in fact two ways of 
imagining and making sense of the same, and otherwise unfathomable, past – of 
which both are utilised to achieve different objectives. The discipline of history is still 
memory, but it is perceived through and analysed with the assistance of many 
documents. History is therefore a discipline that teaches and supports learning, 
whereas memory is a faculty that is experienced and therefore perceived 	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subjectively.538 Indeed, it is argued that memory is the emotional charge that gives 
history its life and value, and this emotive force cannot be eliminated without also 
eliminating the roots of history itself.539  
 The thesis that national identities are susceptible to influence and alteration 
through the manipulation of historical narratives is largely founded on the works of 
modernist and post-modernist scholars such as Eric Hobsbawn, Ernst Gellner, and 
Benedict Anderson. Hobsbawn, for example, identifies traditions (and, as such, 
culture and history) as systems utilized by capitalism and political elites to create an 
artificial social bond in the community, which assist in national harmony and social 
cohesion for the sake of (largely economic) progress. Hobsbawn explains this thesis 
in his work The Invention of Tradition, where he attests: 
 
‘Invented tradition’ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by 
overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual of symbolic  nature, which seek 
to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which 
automatically implies continuation with the past. In fact, where possible, they 
normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.540  
 
This argument does not identify history as artificial per se, rather that “insofar as there 
is such reference to the historic past, the peculiarity of ‘invented’ traditions is that the 
continuity with it is largely fictitious.”541 To justify this position, Hobsbawn cites the 
modification of existing pre-national practices, such as traditional folksongs, toward 
more progressive national purposes – thereby altering their original meaning. The 
resultant conclusion is the underlying question of whether there is any legitimacy to 
culture and traditions as a means of defining modern national identity, or whether 
they are in fact imaginaries constructed to suit specific political narratives. As Ernst 
Gellner also concluded in his book Nations and Nationalism, “Nationalism is not the 
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awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not 
exist.”542 
  For postmodernists such as Bendict Anderson, nations and their histories are 
also seen as imagined constructs. This does not mean that the nation itself is totally 
artificial, rather that the way it is imagined by those it encompasses is not entirely 
genuine. Anderson describes all communities larger than those that are face-to-face, 
including nations, as “imagined communities”, and are “distinguished not by their 
falsity-genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.”543 Nations are 
imagined communities in the way they are constructed through a series of symbols 
and representations that allude to a sense of collective identity, without, necessarily, 
any real validation to those claims. The solidarity members of a nation experience 
with one another is false, because these members may never meet and therefore 
cannot claim any specific social bond outside of the national narrative provided them. 
The difference in nations, in other words, is simply constructed upon the different 
ways they are concocted and imagined.  
 For Anderson, the efficacy of the imaginary of the national community lies in 
the social group’s cultural roots as formative elements in a common national culture. 
The larger cultural systems that preceded nations are the foundations from which 
patriotism arises for the nation, and therefore is a key to nationalism’s success with 
the people.544 Culture, as such, plays a persistent role in how one imagines and 
constructs meaning around the image of the nation, and thereby feels a certain sense 
of solidarity with other members of the national community. National culture is 
therefore a discourse – a way of constructing meaning that in this case constructs 
identities by providing “meanings about the nation with which we can identify.”545 
The nation, therefore, is imagined through the cultural roots it encompasses, which 
are then redesigned and amalgamated into specific national identity narratives. As the 
British politician and classical scholar Enoch Powell (1912 - 1998) put it, “the life of 
nations no less than that of men is lived largely in the imagination."546  
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 The concept of collective memory is also a form of cultural memory, which, 
when preserved in selected histories, continues to influence the contemporary identity 
of social groups. Jan Assman defines cultural memory as such a process, describing 
the concept as ‘the concretion of identity’, stating that: 
 
Cultural memory preserves the store of knowledge from which a group derives 
an awareness of its unity and peculiarity. The objective manifestations of 
cultural memory are defined through this kind of identificatory determination 
in a positive (“We are this”) or in a negative (“That’s our opposite”) sense.547 
 
Cultural memory, as such, has the power to encourage solidarity as well as preserve 
the beauty and diversity of individual social groups (often as nation states derived 
from ethnic communities). It can, however, also provide the justification for 
exclusionary politics, as group identification formed around cultural affiliation can 
create sharp distinctions between those who belong within a community and those 
who do not. As Assmann explains, collective memory and cultural identity oscillate 
between images of “oneself and what is foreign” and through its cultural heritage, as a 
result, “a society becomes visible to itself and to others.”548  
 
4.4 - Mythology and folklore as features of Heimat 
 Folklore and mythology has also greatly affected the Heimat imaginary. 
Folklore differs from the discipline of history because it refers to three principal 
features: a body of knowledge, a mode of thought, and a kind of art.549 Folklore, in 
other words, preserves a certain amount of knowledge about the past, but is also 
affected by the thoughts and the cultural modes of the people who remember, 
imagine, and disseminate it. As a field that is largely defined by social context, time 
depth, and transmission, folklore is not believed to exist without the enduring 
presence of a ‘self-knowing’ social group. 550  Folklore, therefore, belongs to a 	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community of people and, subsequently, is used by that group as a means of self-
categorisation. It is the representation of a people’s past that is produced in such a 
way as to be instructive (the scholarship of the people), as well as an example of the 
folk’s erudition (the common intellectual property of the folk or the community).551 It 
is also, above all, an example of imagining the past in order to formulate an ethos and 
identity for the present based on the customs, values, and deeds of the ancestors.  
 Myths too relate directly to identity. Myths are defined as a group’s 
‘traditional tales’ that have a symbolic function in relation to providing 
anthropological and cultural insights into the group they represent.552 Myths therefore 
also function as a nucleus for group identity, as myths and memories are what provide 
identity to communities.553 Ernst Bruckmüller explains that myths are a form of 
cultural memory that usually includes stories of origins and beginnings.554 The 
function of myth is to “express man’s understanding of himself in the world in which 
he lives. Myth should not be interpreted cosmologically, but anthropologically, or 
better still, existentially.”555 Myth is also, however, open to interpretations and 
reconfigurations to suit existing social, or indeed political, systems. As Roland 
Barthes explains, it is possible for anything in the world to “pass from a closed, silent 
existence to an oral state, open to appropriation by society, for there is no law, 
whether natural or not, which forbids talking about things.”556 Myth, as such, is a 
discourse557, which, like the concept of Heimat, has the propensity to affect group 
identity through a discussion about group customs, values, events, and ‘culture’ more 
broadly. Although myths can describe fanciful tales about origins and catastrophe, 
they can also equally be adopted to validate an existing social system and not only 
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preserve, but also justify, traditional customs and behaviours.558 The memories, 
values, and symbols contained in myths therefore have a sociological function in the 
construction of communities, and it is here that myth gains its political efficacy.  
 The effectiveness of myth to characterize communities is seen in the 
nineteenth century Heimat movement, which similarly focused on the study of 
ethnography and the preservation of local mythologies in order to legitimate their 
distinct sense of community. As a result, local mythologies and folklore enhanced 
feelings of local patriotism by exemplifying the distinctiveness of Heimat. For 
example, Confino notes that Heimat enthusiasts in Württemberg sought to encapsulate 
their local way of life by encouraging ethnographic conscious through the celebration 
of Heimat ‘folklore’: 
 
that encompassed every aspect of traditional manners, customs, and life-style. 
Heimat folklore added to Heimat history and nature an important human factor 
by concentrating on the ways in which people in Württemberg lived and 
thought. Simultaneously, looking back to traditions helped define the origins of 
Württemberg society”559  
 
Similar to collective memory in the construction of national identities, Confino also 
asserts that ‘truth’ was never the goal in Heimat folklore. Rather, Heimat folklore 
encouraged patriotism and group identification through a “system of sentiments” and 
invented traditions that resulted in a perceived “collective character” 
(Volkscharacter).560 In her book on the Heimat movement of the Pfalz, Applegate 
also concludes that “through scholarly investigation and popular festivity” Heimat 
enthusiasts “established folklore alongside nature as a defining, constitutive element 
of Pfälzer identity.”561 
 It is the myths that reside within collective folklore that play an important role 
in the construction of national identities. Duncan S. A. Bell defines ‘nationalist myth’ 
as a story that in many cases “simplifies, dramatizes, and selectively narrates” the 	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nation’s “past and its place in the world, its historical eschatology: a story that 
elucidates its contemporary meaning through (re)constructing its past.”562 Smith also 
defines national identity by referring to a specific population and territory with 
common myths.563 The fascination with myths and their efficacy for nation building is 
by no means new, and is most commonly seen during the Romantic period. For 
example, during the nineteenth century many Romantics argued that myths were able 
to capture the ‘inner truth’ of peoples, and were therefore in many cases more 
authentic and conclusive than any historical study of the past. 564  Indeed, the 
interconnectivity of historiography and mythology in building national identities led 
to the conclusion that an inter-textual approach to national identity studies is needed – 
one that recognises the futility of discerning between myth and history in a national 
context.565 
 
4.5 – History and Heimat in the FPÖ’s discourse 
 History, as we have seen, is a powerful and emotive feature of national identity 
conceptions. The legacy of that which was is charming, mysterious, and nostalgic. It 
matters little if the ‘golden age’ of the past is real or imagined. Imagining antiquity as 
a collective memory allows communities to reconnect with their forefathers, and this 
continuity of history and identity provides justification for their (real or imagined) 
collectivism. A community’s history, therefore, is imagined as a possession: a mutual 
treasure that is exclusive of and accessible to all within the group, and inaccessible to 
those that are omitted as outsiders. History as an exclusive paragon of identity and 
Heimat also subsequently becomes a powerful political tool with which to garner 
empathy from voters, who, through the persuasive effect of populist Heimatrhetorik, 
feel that their exclusivity as a social group is being recognised and preserved by the 
Right-Wing populists.  
 Daniel Oesch explains that one success of Right-Wing populist discourse in 
Europe is the parties’ ability to tap into “disaffected and alienated voters who 
articulate their deep-seated disenchantment with contemporary politics”, and who also 	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feel that their national identity is undermined by foreign cultures, and therefore see 
“immigration and foreign cultures as greater threats to their identity.”566 In response 
to such concerns, the FPÖ focus on the collective native history of all Austrians, and 
depict these narratives as a feature of their identity. The advantage of this is that 
history does not require wealth or status to obtain, and is accessible to all Austrians by 
birthright. History, therefore, becomes a national common denominator and is used by 
the populist parties to facilitate a narrative of belonging and collective identity that is 
informed by specific, mono-ethnocultural markers. Central to this populist argument 
is the narrative ‘while the establishment have abandoned you or let you down, you 
still possess that one feature that makes you unique and binds you to your identity and 
the spatiality of your geographical Heimat – your history’.  
 The FPÖ define Austria as a Kulturnation, and use history to demonstrate 
Austria’s close cultural relationship to Germany. This position also informs their 
sense of Heimat. In the FPÖ’s Graz political programme German history is clearly 
described as a feature of identity and homeland.567 By ‘German’, the FPÖ refers to 
not only a common “Sprache, Religion, Kunst sowie Kultur”, but also a “über 
Jahrtausende gemeinsamen Geschichte sind wir in die deutsche Kulturgemeinschaft” 
in which members are bound.568 The long history that Austrians share is equally as 
important as other cultural manifestations – precisely because it is within the history 
that cultural identity is preserved and passed forward to future generations. The FPÖ 
characterizes ‘culture’ as antiquated, most commonly through an argument of 
Austria’s a long biographical roots. The FPÖ considers “Kultur”, such as religion and 
language, to be “identitätsstiftende Säulen”, and “Tradition, Sitten und Gebräuche” 
are “wesentlich für unser Kulturverständnis.”569 History, then, is as much a feature of 
Austrian identity and Heimat as other, contemporary cultural or political facets 
because history records and maintains the traditions and customs that the FPÖ 
designates as pillars of identity. The FPÖ demonstrates a practical commitment to 
history and cultural identity by encouraging the further establishment of modern day 	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Heimat museums. Similar to nineteenth century Heimat enthusiasts, the party 
promotes the “Schaffung des Hauses der Geschichte”, which they believe will 
preserve Austrian cultural identity and make it accessible to the population.570 
 The FPÖ’s German version of Austrian history and identity exposes the party’s 
Right-Wing, pan-German origins. Their thesis rests on the assumption that Austria’s 
close relationship with German and Germany, both culturally and historically, is a 
well-established fact. To validate this thesis one need only look at some pivotal dates 
in Austria’s recent history. In 1848 the banner of German unity flew from Vienna’s 
Stefansdom, and some thirty years later Heinrich Friedjung’s best-selling novel Der 
Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland reflected popular opinion by 
prophesising the unity of the two nations. 571 By 1938, thirty-five percent of Austrian 
citizens were believers in National Socialism, and this was clearly expressed in the 
reception they gave Adolf Hitler in Vienna’s Heldenplatz, which “represented (at 
least momentarily) a genuine outpouring of German nationalist feeling that was 
shared by virtually everyone in the interwar period.”572  
 Unsurprisingly, German defeat and the failure of National Socialism in Europe 
brought new perspectives and different attitudes to Austria’s immediate history. 
Austrian researchers and scholars have strongly contested the conception of Austria as 
a German nation since the formation of the Second Republic. A populist myth 
portrayed Austrians as “the better Germans”, and that in order to achieve distance 
from the history of German National Socialism “all Austrian roots in German history 
became taboo, Austria’s very own and separate historical past had to be utilized for 
identity formation.” 573  The ongoing post-war struggle to avoid ‘Germanness’, 
however, and the belief that Nazism in Austria was a German import, led to these 
cataclysmic failures to accurately define the Austrian collective self and nation. The 
varying interpretations of what constitutes Austrian history and identity, all of which 
are arguably a result of these contradicting founding myths, have complicated any 	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clear linear and uncontested position on Austrian identity. Despite one thousand years 
of history, the past has contributed very little to Austrian identity, and in many cases 
has obstructed an identity from either being established or enduring.”574 The Austrian 
Second Republic, as a result, is built on a biased and rather politically motivated view 
of historical reality.575 The quest to demarcate the borders of a unique Austrian 
identity was as much about avoiding ‘Germanness’ as about celebrating the beauty of 
Austrian heritage. The past, as a result, was explored and imagined with equal degrees 
of bias as was witnessed in the earlier pan-German era. The failure to address 
Austria’s past has left the question of Austrian cultural identity unresolved, and the 
image of Austria as Heimat incomplete. This allows for a wide spectrum of 
perspectives to fill the gaps. The door has thus been left open to the increasingly 
prevalent Right-Wing populist voice, and their definition of Austrian history has 
begun to dominate the debate once again. 
 Despite the taint of National Socialism in the German identity, the prevalent 
narrative in Right-Wing populist discourse stresses the German origin identity. The 
close relationship between Austrian and German identity is not, in fact, an argument 
confined to the discourse of populists. Indeed, the FPÖ reaches similar conclusions to 
many Germanist historians. For example, the German historian Karl Dietrich 
Erdmann (1910 – 1990) asserts that Austria is a part of the German Kulturnation, and 
that despite the failures of National Socialism, it is nonetheless deeply entrenched in 
German history and identity:  
 
The traces of Austria in German history all point simultaneously to the degree to 
which Austrian history in all its shifting political forms has also been part of 
German history, and to the fact that the Anschluss imposed under Hitler was no 
accident in the German history of Austria, but can only be understood in the 
context of a mutually collective history.576 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
574 Mathis, Franz. "1000 Years of Austria and Austrian Identity: Founding Myths." Austrian 
Historical Memory and National Identity. Eds. Bischof, Günter and Anton Pelinka. London: 
Transaction, 1996. 20 - 31. Print. 20. 
575 Pelinka, Anton. "Taboos and Self-Deception: The Second Republic's Reconstruction of 
History." Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity. London: Transaction, 1997. 95 - 
102. Print. 95. 
576 Erdmann 86 – 87. 
	   196	  
 
Although not a dominant narrative in academia today, it does indicate that the 
Germanist view of Austrian history endures. Austrian identity and history, therefore, 
are by no means fixed. The pervasive speculation over the roots of Austrian identity 
and the paragon of history leads to the conclusion that a single Austrian identity has 
never truly existed.577  
 Austria’s relationship with the broader European continent is also incorporated 
into the FPÖ’s concept of Heimat and identity. This is a complex problem, because it 
is difficult to conceptualize an Austria that is ‘European’, but not ‘German’. 
According to the FPÖ, the basis for the preservation of Austrian history as Heimat is 
due to the alleged cultural fabric recorded in histories, which also make Europe both 
diverse and unique – while simultaneously homogeneous and European. According to 
Right-Wing populist discourse, distinct histories, as well as the cultural features that 
are preserved within them, define individual European nations such as Austria, and 
any attempt at assimilating the identity of these separate nations is in fact code for a 
‘soft’ cultural genocide. The FPÖ argues that “Geschichte und die regionalen 
Unterschiede der verschiedenen Länder” in Europe cannot be denied, and therefore 
cannot be replaced by an “abstrakte europäische Identität” that, according to the FPÖ, 
the centralizing forces of the European Union seek to clandestinely implement in 
Europe.578 This European diversity is not the same type seen in multicultural or 
cosmopolitan models (the FPÖ stated in a 2005 billboard that “Wien darf nicht 
Istanbul werden” thereby rejecting a multicultural capital), but rather a rich tapestry 
of histories and cultures that, while different, remain decidedly ‘European’. Individual 
European homelands, with their own histories, and diverse (as well as autochthonous) 
identities, are consequently argued to be the “Charakter unseres Kontinents.”579 
Austria is therefore one piece in the larger European framework of identity, and must 
be preserved as such from the perspective of the FPÖ. 
 ‘European’ identity as a distinct Christian-Occidental model dominates the 
FPÖ’s definition of the continent. Austria and Europe, furthermore, have a symbiotic 
relationship that has allowed for a mélange of cultures and ideas to permeate the 	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continent giving it a ‘greater’ identity model. In their Graz party programme, the FPÖ 
emphasises the importance of ‘Western’ and nativist cultural identity: 
 
 Sie verbindet die europäischen Kulturnationen. Der Erhalt unserer 
 Kulturdenmäler hat dabei für uns hohe Bedeutung.580 
 
The FPÖ elaborates on their definition of ‘Western’ cultural history by referring back 
to thousands of years of distinctly German and European cultural and historical 
development. For the FPÖ, Austria is a part of the “broader europäischen 
Kulturraums”, and European culture “hat ihre ältesten Wurzeln in der Antike.”581 
Here, the FPÖ emphasises the timelessness of the Austrian culture, identity, and 
Heimat, which are all rooted in antiquity and developed from homogeneous and 
unique origins. Elsewhere, the FPÖ stresses the importance of preserving the “Erbe 
der Kulturen” in Europe and the “Traditionen der europäischen Zivilisation.”582 
 To further establish and refine a collective European identity, the FPÖ refers to 
Austria’s Christian and secular heritage. The FPÖ are forever enthusiastic to display 
Austria’s Christian heritage. According to their political programme, ‘our’, 
presumably Austrians, “abendländische Kultur ist reichhaltig und vielfältig.“583 For 
the FPÖ, European identity was formed through the religious teachings of 
“Christentum”, “Judentum”, other unspecified non-Christian 
“Religionsgemeinschaften”, and then gained secular development through the age of 
humanism and the Enlightenment.584 As a result, the FPÖ stresses a definition of 
Austrian history and identity that is largely guided by the “Grundwerten” of both 
“Kultur-Christentum” and the European “Weltbild.”585 The BZÖ also support this 
position on Austrian history and identity, and claim that Austrian society and state is 
based on “christlich-abendländischen Tradition”, and new migrants must therefore 
conform to this identity and associate with Austrian history rather than their own.586  	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 It is within the historical background of Christianity and European secularism 
that an Austrian national myth begins to develop. Much like previous examples of 
Heimatgeschichte and nation building, researching the cultural heritage preserved in 
history is not a pursuit to discover the truth of past events and peoples. Rather, the 
Right-Wing populist parties selectively choose history as examples to validate their 
epistemological stance on how the modern Austrian Heimat and population should 
look, based on a carefully organized historical narrative. Beyond the more 
conventional realms of history, native Austrian mythologies also play a powerful role 
in the dissemination of their argument, providing their audience with tales with which 
they can empathise and, as a result, feel pride in a collectively shared and distinctly 
Austrian antiquity.  
 
4.6 - Mythology in the FPÖ’s concept of Heimat 
 Right-Wing populist Heimatrhetorik is greatly enhanced by the use of 
mythologies in order to demonstrate a collective national self. Their strategy is to 
engage in ‘myth-building’ for the purposes of forming a centralised national and 
cultural identity for the nation. Mythologies, as a result, become valuable anthologies 
of Heimat and a historical medium with which to characterise the homeland. The FPÖ 
stresses in their political programme that ‘our’, presumably Austrian, “Märchen, 
Mythen und Volkslieder” bear witness to the “Wesen unseres Volkes.”587 Myths are, 
after all, considered to be a specific cognition, a way of life, or a system of thought.588 
In the case of the FPÖ’s Heimatrhetorik, then, myths provide an example of Austrian 
cognition, character, and an image of their interpretation of Heimat that is informed 
by a politics of traditionalism.  
 Conceptualising mythological texts as a compendium of national character and 
identity, however, is by no means a new ideological development of Right-Wing 
populism. Mythology has always had an important role in the identity discourse of 
nationalists and the extreme Right. The combination of the mythological and the 
national is, from a German-speaking perspective, derived from the antiquarian 
pursuits of völkisch nationalists. Johann Gottfried Herder’s (1744 – 1803) concept of 	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romantic or organic nationalism arguably laid the foundation for this style of political 
thought. In Herder’s thesis, mythologies were instrumental to nations as a portrait of a 
people that tied individuals together as a Volk through shared tradition and culture.589 
Herder, however, was more interested in promoting German as the language of 
literature over French and Latin, which were the dominant languages of publication at 
the time, than he was about promoting ethnocultural nationalism or racism. In a time 
when Germans were not unified, Herder attempted to explain what they had in 
common. Nevertheless, many nationalists subsequently applied Herder’s ideas to their 
own perceptions of Germanic mythology, which were then heavily infused during the 
nineteenth century with völkisch nationalism, as many völkisch writers sought to 
define German identity through the veneration of Germanic antiquity.590 By 1881, the 
Swiss Germanist Andreas Heusler (1865 – 1940) coined the term Germanentum to 
describe the cultural superiority he believed was personified in the heroic mentality of 
Norse-Germanic legend and Viking militancy.591 The belief that Germanic myth 
preserved a superior culture was then carried forward into National Socialism. It is 
well documented that Nazi philosopher Alfred Rosenberg (1893 – 1946) and 
Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler (1928 – 1945) were avid promoters of Germanic 
mythology as national identity.592 The ‘political myth’ of National Socialism and the 
state, however, eventually consumed mythology and history - perverting it towards 
Nazi political objectives.  
 Despite the Nazi adaptations of Germanic myth leading to the demonization of 
an otherwise interesting example of early Teutonic culture (or perhaps because of it), 
mythology remains a popular theme in the literature and worldview of the 
contemporary extreme Far Right. In the Far Right Rechtsrock music scene, for 
example, there is a vast array of Skinhead, Rap/Hip-Hop, Black Metal and Darkwave 
music with lyrics dedicated to Germanic mythology, Viking sagas, and the adoration 
of the militancy of Norse-Germanic gods such as Odin (Wotan) and Thor (Donner).593 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
589 Snyder, Louis L. Roots of German Nationalism. London: Bloomington, 1978. Print. 37. 
590 Mees 256. 
591 Mees 258. 
592 See Kamenetsky, Christa. "Folklore as a Political Tool in Nazi Germany." The Journal of 
American Folklore 85.337 (1972): 221 - 35. Print. 221. Mees 256. 
593  Dornbusch, Christian, and Jan Raabe. RechtsRock: Bestandsaufnahme und 
Gegenstrategien. Hamburg: Unrast, 2002. Print. 110 & 143. 
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The Right-Wing populists also look to the martial character of mythological heroes in 
order to demonstrate their own machismo, as well as the mythic legacy of the 
European people. During the 2007 Kongress der Republikaner in the German town of 
Mainz, for example, Strache made a speech about European identity and the 
continent’s future that was rich in mythological references and symbolism. His tone 
was decidedly polemical, and much like past nationalist forays into mythology, 
Strache evoked the themes of myths for their militancy and machismo. Addressing his 
Right-Wing populist political colleagues from the German Die Republikaner and 
Flemish Vlaams Belang, Strache warns that ‘we’, the European people, and the Right-
Wing populist movement more specifically: 
 
 …müssen zum Drachentöter werden und uns gegen die Auflösung unserer 
 nationalen Identitäten entschieden demokratisch zur Wehr setzen… (und) ein 
 neues nationales Selbstbewußtsein für freie Völker in Europa zu entwickeln...594 
 
In this speech, Strache evokes the myth of Sigurd the Volsung (German Siegfried)595, 
and compares the European Right-Wing populist movement with the machismo and 
power of this legendary Germanic dragon slayer. Sigurd appears in the Norse 
Völsunga Saga596 and the German Niebelungenlied.597 In all the legends, Sigurd is a 
famous Nordic-Germanic warrior-hero, who defeats and kills a dragon but in both 
accounts meets a tragic demise. Later, the composer Richard Wagner also used the 
Siegfried legend in both the Siegfried and Götterdämmerung operas. Strache’s direct 
reference to the tale of Sigurd the Volsung and Europe’s national identity and 
Selbstbewußtsein clearly demonstrates the important role mythology remains to play 
in constructing European identities in Right-Wing populist discourse. The celebration 
of past heroes and monumentous sagas in the construction of new national identities 
indicates that the legacy left by antiquity is crucial in the contemporary Right-Wing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
594 Die Republikaner. "Pressemitteilung Nr. 39/07 Vom 06.10.2007." Die Republikaner. Die 
Republikaner, 2007. Web. 07 Aug. 2010. 
595 See Morris, William. The Story of Sigurd the Volsung and the Fall of the Niblungs. 
Hamburg: Tredition, 2012. Print. 
596 Originally written in Icelandic (Old Norse) in the thirteenth century A.D., by an unknown 
hand. See “The Story of the Volsungs, (Volsunga Saga).” Project Gutenberg. Project 
Gutenberg, 7 Aug. 2008. Web. 14 Jan. 2017. 
597 Anonymous. Nibelungenlied. Translated by A.T. Hatto. London: Penguin Classics, 1962. 
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populist imaginary of ‘regenerated’, powerful, and culturally pure European 
homelands.  
 The congress location at Rheingoldhalle on the bank of the Rhine River 
similarly refers both intuitively and symbolically to the legendary myths of Germanic 
antiquity. Such a location lures one back to the assembly to the Old Norse Eddas, 
retold in Richard Wagner’s Das Rheingold. In this tale the Germanic gods Wotan, 
Donner and Loge are entangled in a mythic struggle against an external enemy, while 
hastening to make ready the defences of Valhalla - the great hall of the Aesir gods.598 
The Rhine River itself also conjures histories of an ancient alliance of Germanic tribes 
that used the river land topography as a fortification with which to defend themselves 
from Roman incursions from the south. For example, the Roman historian Tacitus 
noted the Germanic tribes north of the Rhine were “indigenous”, “of pure blood”, and 
were a martial people that had no taste for peace.599 
 Not surprisingly, then, Strache also uses the mythology associated with the 
Rhine to stir his audience into feelings of audacity that resultantly facilitate a 
commitment to the cause of defending Europe’s identity and borders. The populations 
of the present day German-speaking lands must rise against the “unverantwortliche 
Zuwanderungspolitik der letzten Jahrzehnte“ and the “Islamisierung Europas“, which 
Strache describes as a “gefährliche Bedrohung.“600 The message of the speech is 
polemic and uses history to draw attention to a past Islamic enemy that is still 
perceived as a great threat today. For Strache, it is once again the time “Europa zu 
retten, so wie 1683 als Wien von osmanischen Armeen belagert wurde.“601 This time, 
however, the use of myth to indicate the machismo of Europeans as soldiers and 
warriors is used as a symbolic weapon with which to smite the modern day Islamic 
social group that resides within the borders of Europe. Myth, then, as we shall now 
see, is not only valuable for collective identity management, but also as a ‘quasi-
historical’ narrative that demonstrates the root causes of those that are perceived as, or 
even desired to be, enemies of both the native people and their homeland. 
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4. 7 - The FPÖ’s Sagenbücher 
 New Right-Wing political groups all demonstrate a special form of ‘ethno-
nationalism’ that is rooted in myths from the distant past.602 The important role that 
mythology plays in the Austrian Right-Wing populists’ use of Heimat and definition 
of identity is seen most noticeably in the FPÖ’s Sagenbücher, which provides legends 
as Austrian ethnogeny together with a political narrative that compares antiquity and 
history to contemporary issues such as immigration and the preservation of national 
identity. The FPÖ released Sagen aus Wien during the 2010 Viennese elections, and 
Sagen aus Österreich during the 2013 federal elections. The FPÖ’s Sagenbücher are 
compendiums of historiographical discourse and mythical tales, which, according to 
nativist principles, describe the landscapes, heroes, protagonists, and antagonists of 
Viennese and greater Austria’s past. The FPÖ included their own written and pictorial 
narrative in the form of a prologue and epilogue, which were presented in conjunction 
with comic styled images with speech bubbles. The cartoons also introduce “HC-
Man”, a heroically depicted Strache who is illustrated as a character in comics.  
 The legends in the FPÖ’s Sagenbücher are not written by the party, but are 
sourced from pre-existing publications that record the myths and histories from 
various regions of Austria. In its original form Sagen aus Wien is a valuable source of 
Viennese ethnography and Volkskunde, available in book format603 and online.604 
Sagen aus Österreich has also been previously released as a book by Käthe 
Recheis.605 As the name suggests, the folklore is more inclusive of Austria in its 
entirety, bringing for example other districts such as Kärnten and die Steiermark into 
the text. As a source of ethnographic data, the legends in Sagen aus Wien and Sagen 
aus Österreich provide in their original forms a useful source of Viennese and 
Austrian heritage, compiled through a collection of folk tales and history relevant to 
the forests, rivers, castles and various cities of the Austrian landscape. The FPÖ’s 
version of Sagen aus Wien is 56 pages in total. The titles of the Sagen are “Die zweite 
Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683”, “Das Basiliskenhaus”, “Der liebe Augustin”, “Das 
Donauweibchen”, “Das Wunderkreuz”, “Meister Hans Puchbaum”, “Die 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
602 Rydgren 242. 
603 See Hofbauer, Friedl. Sagen Aus Wien. Berlin: G & G Kinder, 2000. Print. 
604 Morscher, Wolfgang. “Sagen aus Österreich.” Datenbanken Zur Europäischen Ethnologie 
/ Volkskunde. n.p., 2000. Web. 21 Oct. 2012.  
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Gefangennahme von Richard Löwenherz”, “Der Heidenschuss”, and “Der Stock im 
Eisen”. Eight of the nine stories are versions derived from these traditional myths, 
however the ninth story “Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683”, (which is 
produced as the first legend in the book) deals with the actual history of the Ottoman 
siege and is also the most important legend in this thesis. Both original publications 
are paperbacks and include a significantly larger number of legends, with the FPÖ 
presumably only using those legends that would suit their specific political 
commentary. The slightly curtailed FPÖ version of Sagen aus Österreich is only 24 
pages. The title of the legends are “Der Heidenschuss”, “Der Purbacher Türke”, “Der 
Schatz von Landskron”, “Die übergossene Alm am Hochkönig”, “Das Pferd des 
Teufels”, “Die Sage von der ‘Frau Hitt’”, “Die Drei Schwestern”, “Richard 
Löwenherz”, and “Die Entstehung des Grazer Schlossberges”. Two of the nine 
legends, “Der Heidenschuss” and “Richard Löwenherz”, are repeats from Sagen aus 
Wien, albeit with new cartoon narratives.  
 The mythic context of many of the legends in the FPÖ’s Sagenbücher provides 
the reader with examples of Austrian cultural heritage that dates back to antiquity. 
The first objective of the FPÖ is thus to implement a strategy that connects the party 
with the beauty, heroism, and legacy of Austria’s unique past. In achieving this aim, 
the FPÖ further demonstrate that they are the sole party that cares only for Austria, 
with no other clandestine interest or agendas. Other publications of Austria’s Sagen 
fittingly demonstrate the world that the FPÖ lures the readers into. For example, in 
the Produktbeschreibung for Wolfgang Morscher and Berit Mrugalska’s version of 
the Sagen aus Wien, called Die schönsten Sagen aus Wien, the reader is invited into 
the fantastic world of Austrian legend and tradition: 
 
 So eröffnen sie uns den Zugang zu einer Welt der Legenden und 
 Traditionen, die im Laufe der Jahrhunderte gewachsen ist und deren 
 geheimnisvolle Ausstrahlung uns nach wie vor umgibt.606  
 
Sagen aus Österreich is similarly described in Recheis version as a Sagenschatz, a 
collection of folklore that in its entirety speaks of the ancestry and identity of Austria: 	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“Jede Region, jeder Landstrich hat seine Sagen, die von Generation zu Generation 
weitergegeben wurden und so bis heute lebendig geblieben sind.”607 The primary 
purpose of these releases, then, was to introduce the reader to the archaism and beauty 
of Austrian history and tradition, a position which, incidentally, does not stray far 
from the Right-Wing populist political and emotional dominion over perceptions of 
mythology and Heimat. 
 The ‘official’ objective of the FPÖ’s Sagenbücher is also to make Austrians 
aware of, and be empathetic towards, their history. To achieve the bond between 
group identity and history the FPÖ uses the popular myths of the Austrian nation to 
reconnect the desired audience with an alleged collective past. This is seen, for 
example, in an interview with The Guardian, where Strache stresses that the party’s 
motivation behind releasing Sagen aus Wien was a desire to encourage Austrian youth 
to reconnect with their past: 
 
Wir haben das Historisch-real-stattgefundene: die Geschichte, die Sagen, die 
Geschichte real auch wieder wiedergegeben unserer Jugend, damit  man auch 
Geschichte und Geschichtsbewusstsein hat, und haben daneben in Comics die 
damalige Zeit illustriert - also nicht die heutige, die damalige Zeit…608  
 
Strache further stresses that the cartoons should be seen in an innocent and fun way: 
“Das Comic ‚Sagen aus Wien‘ ist ein sehr gelungenes Comedy, mit lustigen 
Karikaturen und Geschichten aus der Wiener Vergangenheit.609 FPÖ Generalsekretär 
Herbert Kickl also states the booklet is simply “alte Sagentexte” with no 
contemporary meaning or assertions.610 Kickl goes on to say: “Vielmehr habe die 
FPÖ-Broschüre ‘das Wissen der Wiener über ihre Geschichte und ihre Sagen 
vertiefen wollen.“611 Sagen as Österreich is similarly viewed by the FPÖ as exposé of 	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Austrian history and tradition. On his website Strache describes Sagen aus Österreich 
as a Sagenheft that references the legends from many regions of Austria: “Aus jedem 
Bundesland ist was dabei.”612 The FPÖ, however, changed its official description of 
the Sagenbücher with the release of Sagen aus Österreich. By 2013 Strache was frank 
in relation to the use of political comics in the Sagenbücher, where he stated “Sagen 
aus Österreich it da”, and naturally it comes “mit den Bewährten Comic-
Zeichnungen, die den Bezug zu aktuellen politischen Themen herstellen.”613 It is also 
noted on their website that the FPÖ have once more introduced comics alongside the 
text in Sagen aus Österreich as a means of highlighting current political and social 
issues in Austria, such as immigration, integration, multiculturalism, and the alleged 
corruption of the European Union.614  
 The Sagenbücher were designed by the FPÖ to target Austria’s youthful 
demographic. Although Right-Wing political perspectives were, in the past, perceived 
to be the domain of the over fifties voters, this is no longer exactly the case. It has 
been noted in many media circles that eighteen to thirty years olds are now, in many 
cases, far more Right-Wing than their parents, leading to the question on whether 
generation Y is, in fact, the new Right-Wing voting age group.615 The FPÖ strategy to 
appeal to the younger generation appears to confirm this thesis. For example, Strache 
clearly describes Sagen aus Österreich as Comic-Zeichnungen reproduced for young 
readers.616 The FPÖ also distributed 550,000 copies of Sagen aus Wien to households 
with young voters.617 Thus in a political sense the purpose of the comics was to 
illustrate the FPÖ’s perspective to young voters in the Viennese Gemeinderatswahl of 
2010.618 With the introduction of stylised action comics alongside traditional folklore, 
the FPÖ’s Sagenbücher have been described by many as a characteristic Right-Wing 
populist strategy to gain more popularity and influence among young Austrians, and 
have therefore attracted accusations that the books are solely politically motivated.619 	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Kickl conceded after the release of Sagen aus Wien that use of cartoons in the 
Sagenbücher was a new form of “verkürzten politischen Kommunikation” directed at 
“Menschen, die keine Lust auf trockene Inhalte haben.“620 However FPÖ politicians 
have stayed true to their Sagenbücher, and persistently claim that the purpose of these 
myths, despite the contemporary resemblances, is first and foremost to illuminate the 
beauty of Austria’s history and mythology. 
 The FPÖ’s public admission that the repackaged myths were infused with 
illustrated political messages demonstrates the high amount of media publicity and 
political attacks the Sagenbücher attracted. The use of Austrian myths, and the focus 
on Austria’s belligerent and perilous history with the Ottomans in particular, was 
received in many circles as either racially and culturally provocative, or directly 
xenophobic. Rather than receiving the FPÖ’s books as Sagenbücher, the Austrian 
media and political reaction to the releases was unfavourable. Much of the media and 
political establishment mutually concurred that the shared sense of belonging 
advocated in the FPÖ Sagenbücher glorifies a certain ‘Germanic’ image of Austrians 
while excluding or even demonising ethnic minorities.621 The release of Sagen aus 
Wien in 2010 coincided with contentious FPÖ slogans, advertised in Vienna and 
federally, such as Daham Statt Islam, Deutsch statt nix versteh’n and Wien darf nicht 
Istanbul werden, seen as direct political attacks against alleged unassimilated Turkish 
minorities in Vienna and Austria more generally.622 Online newspaper oe24 defines 
the texts as Far Right political propaganda aimed at a specific xenophobic voter base, 
naming Sagen aus Österreich “das provokante blaue Comicheft” with anti-Islamic 
messages: “Sie (the FPÖ) strotzen nur so von Anti-Islam-Ressentiments.” 623 
Similarly, the Österreich newspaper accused the Freedom Party of taking advantage 
of an electoral campaign to disseminate messages of resentment against foreigners, 
particularly Turks, but also Islam and the European Union, all in the guise of 
Sagen. 624  Der Standard describes Sagen aus Österreich as an anti-Turkish 
Sagenbuch, an effective means with which to reach young voters with the party’s 	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anti-Brussels, anti-European Union and anti-foreign message.625 The image of the 
FPÖ’s Sagenbücher in the media, then, overwhelmingly depicts the books as 
xenophobic, populist and anti-Islamic.  
 The negative reaction to the Sagenbücher is not only resigned to circles of the 
media, but is also voiced by the Austrian political Left. The Greens party confronted 
the FPÖ for using the 1683 Turkish siege of Vienna in Sagen aus Wien to encourage 
racial and religious agitation against Muslims in Austria. 626  SPÖ 
Landesparteisekretär Christian Deutsch told Die Presse in 2010 that “Dieses 
Hassblatt, das von der FPÖ an junge Menschen versandt wurde, ist reine 
Menschenhetze und der bewusste Versuch, das Klima in Wien zu vergiften. Es ist 
eine klare Anstiftung zu Gewalttaten hier und jetzt, ein bewusstes Spiel mit dem 
Feuer."627 Indeed a negative reaction to the FPÖ’s Sagenbücher is seen across the 
entire Austrian political spectrum. SPÖ Bundesgeschäftsführer Norbert Darabos 
complained “Strache betreibt Hetze der übelsten Sorte gegen Ausländer", Alev Korun 
from the Green Party claimed that the FPÖ is remaining intellectually “im 16. 
Jahrhundert bei der Türkenbelagerung", while fellow moderate Right ÖVP 
Generalsekretär Hannes Rauch lamented a “seriösen und sachlichen Umgang mit 
dem Thema Integration.”628 With accusations of FPÖ hate speech thinly veiled in the 
guise of Sagen filing the media and political spectrum in Austria, alleged links 
between the FPÖ’s Sagenbücher and National Socialist undertones was an inevitable 
result.  
 The controversial nature of the FPÖ cartoons has brought accusations of 
similarities to the racially derived notions of homeland and folk typical of National 
Socialism, as well as an alleged attempt to incite Austrian youth to racial violence 
through a subversive text that amounts to hate speech.629 The Green Party went so far 
as to accuse the FPÖ of breaking the law, specifically a clause that forbids 
“feindseligen Haltung gegen eine Kirche, Religionsgemeinschaft, Angehörige einer 	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Rasse, eines Volkes oder eines Volksstamms.”630 This refers specifically to alleged 
hate-speech against Muslims. FPÖ-Generalsekretär Herbert Kickl rejects such 
accusations, referring to the Left as a "humorlose Chaotentruppe", reiterating that, 
whether the Greens accept it or not, the two Turkish sieges of Vienna are simply a 
fact of history.631 The negative reception to the texts in some corners of the media and 
politics were undoubtedly expected, as the Freedom Party has kept the illustrator of 
the comics anonymous, so as to hide his or her identity.632 However Strache laughs 
off such accusations of racism or ‘tastelessness’ on his website, stressing that rather 
than inciting racism or religious intolerance, the text is simply a loving account of 
Austrian history dedicated to the nation’s youth.633 Strache’s testimony coincides with 
the statements of many other FPÖ politicians, such as Gernot Darmann from Kärnten, 
who proclaims: “Wir wollen unsere eigene Identität erhalten. Für uns sind unsere 
Traditionen, Bräuche und die Kultur einzigartig und schützenswert.”634 It is this 
argument, therefore, that the Right-Wing populists use to counteract any accusations 
of religious, cultural or racial intolerance. The use of fictionalised comics allows the 
FPÖ to engage in a ‘strategy of calculated ambivalence’, through which the party 
obscure the differences between fiction and reality, thus permitting the FPÖ to deny 
any accusations of xenophobia or discrimination.635  
 
4. 8 – Historical continuity, uniqueness, and exclusion in the FPÖ’s Sagenbücher 
 Underpinning the FPÖ’s Sagenbücher is the key questions of which group 
these legends allegedly belong to, how this Austrian national group is defined, and in 
what terms is the history selectively repackaged and illustrated by the party to justify 
their argument for an end to immigration. In the context of the party’s 
Heimatrhetorik, this helps to determine which collective myths the party believe are 
valuable to true Austrians, their homeland, and why. The themes identified within the 
Sagenbücher are the longevity of Heimat through a deeply rooted history that remains 	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contemporarily relevant (therefore historical continuity), the purity of ‘the people’ and 
the national community, and the foreignness (or undesirability) of outsiders. In unison 
these themes direct the reader to the foundation of the populist definition of Heimat: a 
homeland that signifies a pure community informed by an inward-looking national 
history and mythology. This introspective view of community and Heimat excludes 
outsiders by its very design. The FPÖ’s compendium of myths is intended to create a 
distancing of contiguity between the ‘native’ Austrian people and the demonized, 
foreign ‘Others’, who are antagonised as either threatening or inferior.636 
 In order to demonstrate the purity of ‘the people’ to whom the legends belong, 
the FPÖ carefully applies colour schemes and images to produce a highly symbolic 
front cover for Sagen aus Wien: 
 
 
Figure 52. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Wien.637 
 
The background in blue, the title Sagen aus Wien in white, and the Viennese flag in 
red and white symbolically combine in order to demonstrate a distinct social unit. Red 
and white represents the coat of arms of Vienna. Blue and white are colours 
associated with the FPÖ, and red and white represent the nation of Austria. Thus by 
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its very design the cover of Sagen aus Wien figuratively assembles the ‘Us’ group: the 
Austrians, the Viennese, and the FPÖ who represent them.638 
 The second way that the FPÖ discursively demonstrates a distinctly Viennese, 
and therefore Austrian, social group is through the evocation of a collective name that 
enhances historical consciousness. When a group decide that they are a community, 
usually because of shared myths and collective memories that are associated with a 
specific territory, they will almost always decide upon a collective title in order to 
strengthen their solidarity and establish their culture.639 The prologue in Sagen aus 
Wien is dedicated specifically to the “Liebe Wienerinnen, liebe Wiener”,640 thereby 
suggesting there is a distinct Viennese ‘group’ to whom these legends speak. The 
mythology associated with specific states is a powerful way to encourage group 
solidarity and patriotism. City based mythologies, such as those in Florence or 
Venice, encourage a local form of patriotism alongside feelings of separateness, 
uniqueness, and historical difference.641 
 The use of the personal pronoun ‘we’, including dialect forms and possessive 
pronouns, is also a powerful linguistic strategy to assist in the cultural demarcation of 
a national group. In their research into the discursive construction of national identity 
in Austria, De Cilla, Reisigl and Wodak note the use of the personal pronoun wir, as 
well as all other possessive pronouns, as a linguistic strategy employed by Right-
Wing populists to establish and strengthen a national ‘in’ group.642 In the FPÖ’s 
Sagen aus Wien prologue the party adopt this linguistic approach, taking every 
opportunity to emphasise pronoun use, such as the second person plural familiar form 
“Ihr wisst es sicher schon” (generating a camaraderie between the FPÖ and their 
audience), “worüber heut’ oft wir reden”, the group identification of ‘we’ “Wir 
wünschen Euch mit dem Gedichte viel Freud und Spass mit Wiens Geschichte”, as 
well as Strache also signing off with a possessive pronoun “Euer HC Strache” (Italics 
are my own).643 The use of personal pronouns to reinforce a definitive Viennese 
identity (and populace) that belongs within the city is seen elsewhere in the Sagen aus 	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Wien with the phrase “Unser Wien für unsere Leut!”(Italics are my own)644 The use 
of the personal pronouns ihr and wir immediately implies there is a communal and 
familiar advocacy at work here, a means of drawing “we Austrians” together, in order 
to reflect upon “our” shared tradition and history. Strache, furthermore, is described in 
the extract above from Sagen aus Wien as ‘your’ representative; thereby inferring his 
party represents true Austrians (as well as their myths and history). This is also seen 
in Sagen aus Österreich, where Strache states: “Hallo Leute! Ihr wisst ja, wir 
Freiheitliche sind stolz auf Österreichs Geschichte und Tradition.”645 Utilising the 
pronoun ‘we’ invites individuals to position themselves within that group, in this case 
the true Viennese, at the expense of those ‘Others’ that do not necessarily fit the 
national identity mandate. The use of pronouns is thus a linguistic procedure to 
organise a national ‘we group’ through particular modes of reference646, such as ‘we-
Viennese’, or ‘we-Austrians’.  
 The use of a collective name also has a powerful role in the promotion of 
communities that are seen to be either ethnically or culturally homogeneous. When 
the title of a people is spoken it evokes in the imagination the grand history, drama, 
and character of the social group it describes. Smith, for example, argues that a 
collective name is an emblem of an ethnic community, and it conjures “an atmosphere 
and drama that has power and meaning for those whom it includes, and none at all (or 
quite a different resonance) for outsiders.”647 Although it has already been established 
that the Austrian Right-Wing populist parties are decidedly pan-German, at least in 
their views on Austrian identity, their corpus of Sagen does cater to a form of 
distinctly ‘Austrian’ patriotism that has been particularly evident since the beginning 
of the Second Republic. In order to disassociate with German history, the Second 
Republic turned to the so-called artificial Ostarrîchi myth which allowed Austrians to 
enjoy the benefits of an ancient past by connecting the roots of the nation to the 
Middle Ages.648  
 The FPÖ’s Sagen aus Österreich also uses the potency of its title to appeal to 
the desired audience. Austria’s own unique historical past is being utilized in the 	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Sagenbuch. The compendium of legends is designed to charm the Austrian reader by 
drawing him or her into this fantastic and ancient portrayal of their own homeland and 
heroic forefathers. Thus the FPÖ utilises the Ostarrîchi myth to great effect, by 
emphasising the more ancient roots of Austria’s history while ignoring more recent 
(and more difficult) developments alongside Germany. For example in Sagen aus 
Wien the audience is reminded that Austria has a long history and tradition that is 
“nicht wenige”, and the recording of these momentous events for the sake of 
longevity and preservation was recognised by the party as a worthy endeavour.649 The 
FPÖ’s compendium of myths provides an anthology of tales that Austrians can, and 
should, be proud of – as it is the legacy left by their forebears. The historian David 
Lowenthal remarks that historical memory is instrumental to identity conceptions, in 
which “nations and individuals habitually trace back their ancestry, institutions, 
culture, ideals to validate claims to power, prestige, and property,”650 as well as, one 
may add, definitions of Heimat, culture, and national identity. A focus on tradition 
and myth allows Right-Wing populist parties to concentrate on underscoring 
Austrians as a homogeneous ethnic group who are strengthened by returning to 
traditional values. 651 The vibrancy of their conception of Heimat is thus reinforced by 
the atmosphere and drama of that which came before. The FPÖ’s prologue for Sagen 
aus Wien introduces the Viennese to their heritage, and explains that the name Wien 
summons a “lange Tradition”, which has been preserved in the panoply of myths as a 
“Zeugnis dieser früheren Welt.”652 The Zeugnis of the legends, therefore, is the living 
testimony of which true Austrians should be aware and be guided by. 
 The symbiosis between ancestors and descendants (and the link between 
former glory and contemporary power) is established in the Sagenbücher through the 
Austrian Right-Wing populist topos of historical continuity. The modern concept of 
historical continuity is derived from Arthur Schopenhauer’s argument in which 
nothing in history that is essential ever changes, except names and dates.653 Historical 	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continuity therefore refers to the idea that while many things may change through the 
course of time; there are some invariable elements of history that eternally endure.654 
The ever-lasting themes in history guide human development and endeavour like a 
divine providence throughout the ages. Through the continuity of history elements 
such as culture, belief systems, values or characteristics can be argued to be persistent 
and unchanging throughout the course of history. Understanding history in continuous 
terms requires emphasizing the recurrent nature of history, its capacity to instruct 
modern behavior and identity, as well as repeat similar outcomes.  
  When history endures largely unchanged it becomes a living past. This allows 
the lessons of antiquity to be reanalysed, and forefathers to symbolically rise up and 
once more walk among their descendants. Thus new life is given to the past, and its 
world can be said to be alive once more. It is not simply antiquarianism that inspires 
the rediscovery of the past, nor is it the disciplined pursuit to uncover history as it 
really was, but rather a desire to remigrate to a living past that acts in response to our 
contemporary needs.655 A living past teaches us our own identity as a link in a chain 
between ancestors and descendants, as well as often teaching us ‘where we are’ and 
‘who we should become’ as ordained by our ‘community of fate’.656 Myths, for 
example, contribute to the continuity and identity of society by providing a 
framework of memories that influence existent societies.657 The mythical world, as a 
result, is often illustrated with stark similarities (or lessons) for the contemporary 
world that imagines it. The most important aspect of myth, therefore, is “its character 
of a retrospective, ever present actuality.”658 In FPÖ discourse, myths are not simply 
tales that relate to an unfathomable antiquity, but are discursive examples of genuine 
identity, carefully illustrated as a valuable specimen of cultural inheritance.  
 Mythology’s efficacy, then, rests in its ability to inform national identity 
conceptions through its application as a living narrative. The myths, in other words, 
are still relevant to contemporary Austria. In the FPÖ’s prologue in Sagen aus Wien, 	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for example, the reader is encouraged to have a good, fun time while reading the 
Sagen, but is are also warned “dass vieles heut’ noch wahr sein kann.”659 The 
temporal divide between the historical and mythic discourse in the Sagenbücher and 
present day Austria is thus diminished by the FPÖ, allowing the audience to further 
comprehend and appreciate the interrelation between past and present. By suggesting 
that ‘much might be still true today’ the FPÖ stresses that the sagas are still relevant 
to the present. The party, therefore, utilises the topos of history as an instructive 
narrative.660 This argument is related to a typical Right-Wing populist assertion that 
the past should be preserved so that those in the present may learn from it.661 This is 
seen in the prologue where the FPÖ claims that although times change quite rapidly, 
“bleibt doch gar vieles aktuell.”662 Historical continuity is the central theme of this 
statement. The FPÖ are reminding their audience that the essential features of the 
historical narrative never change and endure throughout the course of time. The 
FPÖ’s argument for historical continuity continues in Sagen aus Österreich, when 
Strache as the cartoon hero ‘HC’ stresses that ancient history has “auch heute noch 
seine Gültigkeit!”663  
 The FPÖ strengthens its argument of an interconnected past and present In 
Sagen aus Wien by honouring the visual clues to city of Vienna’s grand, imperial, and 
living history: 
 
 IN WIEN LEBT DIE TRADITION. Wer mit offenen Augen durch die 
 Stadt geht, findet noch heute allerorts Zeugnisse, die uns an 
 vergangene Ereignisse erinnern sollen!664 
 
The FPÖ demonstrates here that although time may have passed, if one opens their 
eyes and looks closely at their surrounds, they will see a city that is still very much 
alive with myth and history. The physical presence of historical monuments is a 
gateway by which Austrians may re-enter into a living past. The FPÖ are using the 	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traditions associated with these visual prompts in order to take advantage of a human 
need for identification within a historic culture-community. These modes of 
identification are thus discursively arranged by the FPÖ as a coalescence of collective 
memory that forms the basis of national ‘traditions’. In this imaginary, the FPÖ have 
exploited the powerful legacy their nation’s capital, which is indeed rich in visual 
clues to the momentous historical events from its imperial past. The city of Vienna is 
known for the national and local histories that are recorded in both place and street 
names.665 The FPÖ employs the more typical ‘tourist’ attractions of the Vienna to 
demonstrate the living history of the city such as Schloss Belverdere and Der Liebe 
Augustin restaurant, but also, more importantly, include the Prinz Eugen-
Reiterstandbild, a memorial to the Capuchin monk Marco d'Aviano (1631 – 1699), 
and the Polish/Ukranian nobleman and soldier Jerzy Franciszek Kulczycki (1640 – 
1694)666, all of whom were instrumental to the defence of both Christendom and the 
city in the 1683 liberation of Vienna from the Ottomans.667  
 Vienna’s legacy as a frontier city that lay between the Occidental Christian 
lands to the West and North, and the Muslim land to the East, is again emphasised by 
including the Heidenschuss statue, which, the FPÖ explains, was constructed to 
“remind” the Viennese of the first Ottoman siege of 1529.668 The statue is erected in a 
place where, according to myth, the legendary baker Josef Schultz heard the Turkish 
army excavating tunnels underground to gain entrance to the city, thereby preventing 
the Turkish victory.669 In the accompanying legend of der Heidenschuss in the 
Sagenbuch the reader is told the “furchtbare Ansturm” of the Islamic horde that 
wishes to plant „den Halbmond auf der Spitze des Stephansturms".670 The legend the 
statue symbolises, therefore, forever places the city (and its population) in a struggle 
with the forces of Islam. According to the FPÖ Vienna and the Viennese are in peril, 	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and yet remain eternally vigilant, like the simple baker Josef Schultz and noble soldier 
Kulczycki alike, to that looming Muslim threat. The FPÖ, therefore, are taking 
Austrian identity beyond the typical cliché of the Alps or Mozart. Instead, they are 
reminding their audience of the country’s long and indeed militant history as a 
bulwark that defended European civilization from the incursions of the great Ottoman 
armies.  
 The FPÖ further diminishes the temporal divide between Vienna’s past and 
present through a focus on the central historical hero of the book Prince Eugen of 
Savoy (1663 – 1736), who is paraded as the central historical hero in the Impressum 
of Sagen aus Wien. In the first substantial text and image combination of the 
Sagenbuch, the FPÖ provides an illustration of two ‘national heroes’ rising above the 
city: 
 
Figure 53. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Wien.671 	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The pictorial, as well as symbolic, synergy between history (Prince Eugen), present 
(Strache and the FPÖ) and their Occidental values (Stephansdom) demonstrates a 
blending of antiquity and modernity – past and present. The constant centrality of 
Stephansdom in many of the FPÖ’s illustrations functions as a symbol of cultural and 
religious identity and therefore indicates that true Viennese can only be Christian.  
 The reader is also presented with an optical viewpoint that directly faces 
Strache and Prince Eugen. The close proximity between the anonymous viewer and 
the two characters creates the illusion that a candid and personal conference is taking 
place between all three - a ‘team meeting’, or ‘group huddle’ of sorts. The symbiotic 
relationship between Prince Eugen and Strache – between past and present – is the 
most striking aspect of this illustration. Strache appears to be pulling Prince Eugen up 
or forward, while the Prince points behind him to the city and Stephansdom, a 
symbolic service to the past and that which has come before. Strache is drawing the 
past (and the heroes that reside there) into the present, thereby establishing the link 
between Austria’s conception of Heimat and the collective nation’s historical 
consciousness. The fact that both Strache and Eugene both use the same speech 
bubble indicates that they follow the same purpose – presumably the defence of the 
city from a Turkish invasion (whether as an army from the past or an influx of 
migrants today).  
 The choice of attire is further evidence of the interaction between past and 
present. The opulence of Prince Eugen’s seventeenth century attire is starkly 
contrasted with Strache, who as the contemporary ‘Blue Knight’ is wearing a 
decidedly populist672 hooded sweatshirt, jeans, and boots. Their clothes demonstrate 
two personae that are clearly from a different time, and yet through the symbiosis of 
past and present both characters appear as one. The personal deixis of ‘wir’ in the 
opening prologue (“Wir wünschen Euch mit dem Gedichte, viel Freud und Spass mit 
Wiens Geschichte.”) also indicates the amalgamation of past and present by linking 
Strache directly to Eugene to the leader of the FPÖ, thereby establishing one character 	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that contains both personae.673 While Strache and Prince Eugen are blended into one 
singular entity, the reader is also brought into the group. The elevated viewpoint from 
which the reader perceives Strache and Prince Eugen in the illustration on page five is 
presumably from the Kahlenberg in the nineteenth district of Vienna. It was on the 
Kahlenberg that the Polish relief force arrived to crush the Ottoman armies alongside 
the Imperial Habsburg forces and lay waste the siege of Vienna.674 The Kahlenberg, 
then, is the site where a united Christian army repelled an Islamic invader, thus 
securing Europe and the values of Christendom. By introducing themselves to their 
audience at this most symbolic site in Austrian and European history, the FPÖ are 
including the readers of Sagen aus Wien in their crusade. Strache and Prince Eugen 
once more rely on them (and, presumably, their votes) to help defend the core values 
and identity of Austrians as the Polish forces had done in 1683 from a dangerous 
‘Other’. The readers literally become the relief force that will assist Strache to secure 
the nation and preserve Austrian self-determination from foreign threats. Their 
inevitable victory is implied on the final page of Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 
1683, where the reader is shown the commemoration statue for Prince Eugen’s 
victory over the Ottomans: 
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Figure 54. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Wien.675 
 
The viewpoint from below the statue gives the impression of a bystander looking up 
in awe at the great legacy of Prince Eugen and his victory for the Habsburgs. His 
immortality in Vienna’s Heldenplatz forever stands as a testament to the victory of the 
Viennese and Christian belief over the Ottomans and Islam. The FPÖ thus assures 
Prince Eugen’s status as a hero of the Heimat, and it is from this perspective that the 
party expand their thesis. 
 As an established military leader, Prince Eugen provides a good example of 
the martial abilities of a hero. It is clearly the military successes of the Imperial 
general that capture the imagination of the FPÖ. Prince Eugen is introduced in the 
Impressum by Strache himself: “Einer der berühmtesten Feldherren Österreichs, der 
sich auch beim Kampf gegen das türkische Heer vor Wien im Jahr 1683 große 
Verdienste erwarb.”676 The historical backdrop whence Prince Eugen is evoked is 
dramatic, desperate, and combative. The FPÖ explains alongside the image of Strache 
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and the Prince that the great siege of Vienna had lasted sixty long days.677 It is from a 
background of warfare, conflict, and strife that the FPÖ expands upon the glory of the 
ancestors. It is under the great military guidance of the Eugene (as well as with the 
help of the Polish relief force) that the Austrians drove the Turks from the city, and, 
finally, all of Austria.678 Such testaments of defiance and total victory provide the 
reader with the imaginary of ancestors that were superior in the martial arts and 
warfare. The coalition of Prince Eugen and Strache, furthermore, creates a link 
between the reality of the 2010 Viennese election and the Turkish threat, as well as 
battles, machismo and warfare more generally.  
 The popular myth surrounding Prince Eugen remains prevalent in Austrian 
society, and his inclusion by the FPÖ is used to pay homage to the general’s cult 
status. Many of the myths about the second siege of Vienna in 1683 are alive in public 
discourse, school curriculum and commemorations in Austria today.679 For many in 
Austria, the leader that commanded the victory of 1683 is more than just a military 
leader from Austria’s past. Rather, Prince Eugen symbolises the ‘turning of the tide’ 
in the war with the Turks, and is a man that therefore represents the moment when 
Austrian self-determination rose above an outside aggressor. The liberation of Vienna 
from a determined Ottoman siege, more specifically, is a symbol of ‘nativism’ in 
contemporary Austria.680 1683 was a definitive point in history where Austrians 
defended themselves and upheld their capital city’s independence from an army that 
sought to dominate them and usurp their national and cultural identity. The success of 
the Christian alliance and the defeat of the Ottoman army denoted the end of the 
Islamic presence in both Central and Eastern Europe, and also marked the zenith of 
Habsburg dominance in the region.681 The axis of power shifted from East to West, 
and Austria gained a new confidence in world affairs that subsequently brought forth 
the kingdom’s Heldenzeitalter, or new age of heroes.682 The grandiosity of this 
historical discourse provides good ammunition for contemporary nationalist rhetoric. 	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The decisive victory over the Ottomans is an heroic narrative that contains deeply 
emotive inferences for those whom it represents. The Austrian triumph is aptly used 
by the FPÖ as a discursive claim to a valiant Austrian past, through which an 
imaginary of ‘Vienna’ and ‘Heimat’ as something possessed, as ‘ours’, and as a great 
example of Occidental might is realised and maintained.683 
 Far from fading into insignificance behind the legendary figure of Prince 
Eugen, Strache’s character in the Sagen is greatly enhanced by the associations made 
between the two. By depicting Strache and Prince Eugen together, the FPÖ asserts a 
prophecy that Strache too will defend the city from the current Turkish ‘siege’ (a 
reference to Muslim immigration), just like, as the reader is aware, Prince Eugen had 
done in 1683. As a defender of Vienna (for both 1683 and today), Strache also adopts 
a decidedly martial demeanour, and this is paraded by the FPÖ as a positive (and 
essential) aspect of his character. Strache, as a result, assumes the character of ‘the 
hero’ on the Sagenbuch. This is seen, for example, in an illustration from Die zweite 
Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683: 
 
 
Figure 55. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Wien.684 
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The heroic machismo of HC is clearly evident in this example, with HC raising his 
sword and encouraging the youth of the city to rise up against foreigners and the 
threat of Islam. In images such this, Strache is the ‘Schutz’ of our ‘Heimat Österreich’ 
just like the party’s political programme argues, and is therefore ready to defend the 
borders of the city, and, indeed, the nation. The symbiosis between the warlike virtues 
of past figures and the present is significant here. The FPÖ are seemingly 
demonstrating the methodology that is needed to oppose foreign threats – both past 
and present. The virtues of machismo, as a result, become valuable in a narrative that 
implicitly encourages violence against contemporary enemies or dangers. HC, 
furthermore, assumes the role of a leader in the saga, with this sword 
characteristically pointed forward as if to lead the way for his band of followers. The 
depiction of the Left-Wing youth, on the other hand, is anything but heroic or 
masculine. The two rats in the cartoon exhibit a lack of patriotism and are illustrated 
as homeless ‘Outsiders’ and inebriated street rats. The cartoon thus depicts Left-Wing 
youth (Antifa) as a treacherous lot, who have forsaken their nation in the pursuit of 
hedonism and an indifference, or even hatred for, Austria. The Left-Wing youth are 
using a slogan that was made popular by die Grünalternative Jugend “Nimm dein 
Flaggerl für dein Gaggerl” and “wer Österreich liebt, muss scheiße sein” 685 The Far 
Left advertisement suggested that nationalism (in this case the Austrian flag) is only 
good for picking up your dog’s faeces.686 Any form of nationalism, in other words, is 
tantamount to ‘fascism’ or ‘racism’ for the Far Left. The implication, of course, is that 
the Far Left have lost all respect for Austria, for their own nation, and their lack of 
decency or will for ‘self-preservation’ in the FPÖ’s comic further disseminates this 
accusation.  
  In juxtaposition to the impotence, laziness, and treachery of the Left Wing 
failures, the heroic and masculine Strache is a powerful image in relation to the 
current asylum seeker crisis in Europe. During the presidential campaign of 2016, 
Norbet Hofer took advantage of this self-proclaimed image as ‘defenders’ of the 
‘Heimat’ alongside anxieties relating to foreign ethnocultural groups entering Austria 
illegally, using powerful slogans that evoke militancy, strength, and machismo: 	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Figure 56. 
FPÖ 2016. Image taken from Nachrichten.687 
 
 The change of HC’s clothing from populist attire to armour and more 
antiquated clothing of a ‘warrior’ is also calculated, as is his over-emphasised 
muscular physique. Depicting the FPÖ leader as a hero of Vienna and greater Austria 
attests to his personal description of himself as “ein echter Österreicher”, whose 
favourite film is Braveheart.688 This ‘true’ Austrian then, must display a pious faith, a 
relationship to history and the past, as well as the general machismo and 
combativeness necessary to defend Christendom, the Occident, and above all Austrian 
culture, identity and, therefore, Heimat. The image of Strache as the ‘Blue Knight’ 
clad with medieval armour demonstrates a broader initiative by Right-Wing populist 
groups to evoke the imagery and enmity between West and East that is typical of the 
crusades. In the past decade the European Far Right has emphasised a common 
Western identity that is rooted in and strengthened by medieval imagery and 
rhetoric.689 This historical discourse persistently spotlights the ‘clash of civilisations’ 
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that was endemic in the crusades, as well as the warriors of the Knights Templar.690 
This is also a common theme of the international anti-Islam PEGIDA movement, 
whose name is an acronym for “Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des 
Abendlandes.”691 The evocation of medieval and knightly themes is therefore, by its 
very design, incompatible with the followers of Islam. The threat of Islamisisation is 
drawn from a historical discourse that references the crusades and the siege of Vienna 
in 1683 in order to demonstrate the supposedly unquenchable Islamic desire to 
expand and destroy the West. 692 The city of Vienna and the event of 1683, as a result, 
provide a clear example for many in the Right of the unresolvable and eternal struggle 
between the values Christendom (the West) and Islam (the Middle East). The 
evocation of the machismo of knights as examples of Austrian power is a 
characteristic Right-Wing populist response to the perceived threat posed by the 
followers of Islam. The FPÖ’s use of Heimat depicts a nation that requires men to be 
as the warriors of antiquity, informed by the martial values endemic of a Western (and 
Christian) force that is revitalised and growing in strength and numbers.  
 The ‘cult of the warrior’ motif adopted by the FPÖ in the Sagenbücher 
demonstrates a deliberate move to garner support from males, and in particular, males 
from the Far Right. The warrior virtue of machismo is a popular identity topos for the 
Far Right. It is a self-applied persona that many Right-Wing Caucasian males, in 
particular, seek to emulate in their everyday lives. Many have formed Far Right 
groups in Europe and beyond that claim to be informed by Norse legends as an 
ancient example of their Far Right imagined community based on the tenants of 
mythology, völkisch nationalism, and racism.693 The theme of ‘die kriegische Heiden’ 
dominates various forms of Far Right youth culture, and is usually constructed around 
Nordic sagas, paganism and the deities and heroes of Norse-Germanic mythology.694 
When participants from the extremities of the Far Right scene adulate gods or heroes, 	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they are, in fact, self-identifying with the virtues of those characters. These virtues are 
almost always derived from a ‘fighter’ archetype, such as Kraft, Gewalt, Macht and 
Überlegenheit.695 Such attributes of masculinity and machismo, although important to 
the scene, are not limited to Far Right imaginaries.  
 In the FPÖ’s “Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683”, the Viennese 
defenders of the city also exhibit these combatant attributes: 
 
 
Figure 57. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Wien.696 
 
Although the Viennese army is clearly rallying under the central image of the 
Christian crucifix, there are some implicit visual signals by which the FPÖ pays 
homage to ‘die kriegische Heiden’ of the Far Right scene. In the centre of the image, 
directly under the crucifix, the reader notices a Viking styled horned helmet on one of 
the Viennese warriors. It is well established that the horned (devil) Viking helmet is 
historically inaccurate, and is an image usually linked to Christian criticism of the 
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Viking raiders that was later popularised in Wagnerian opera.697 However its use by 
the FPÖ does indicate approval of the Far Right’s rapport with Germanic mythology 
and the machismo of the Vikings. The Viking styled horned helmet is a popular motif 
among Far Right, such as the recently established Finnish anti-immigration group 
‘The Soldiers of Odin’.698 It should also be noted here that the horned helmet was, in 
fact, found to be symbolic of the Norse god Odin in accordance with certain 
archaeological finds in Nordic areas. A cast bronze die used to imprint helmets, for 
example, was discovered in Sweden that appears to depict the god Odin with a horned 
helmet alongside a Bezerker warrior typical of the god’s pre-mortem cult:  
 
 
Figure 58. 
‘Odin as Weapon Dancer’ Circa 600 A.D. Image taken from The Viking Rune.699 
 
The FPÖ also includes a second reference to the cult of Odin in the illustration. 
Directly in front of the horned helmet silhouette is a helmet with golden wings. This 
design is another popular classical Wagnerian depiction of the Nordic god, seen for 
example here:  
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Figure 59. 
The god Odin enthroned on Hlidskjalf by Carl Emil Doepler (1882).700 
 
Thus while the imagery of Christianity dominates the FPÖ’s version of Austrian 
history and Heimat, there is still a recognition of the Germanic mythology that is so 
important in the extreme Far Right scene. It is not without calculation that the Odinic 
and Viking helmets are illustrated beneath the Christian crucifix in the FPÖ’s image. 
This symbolically pays homage to the origins of Germanic identity, to the old mythic 
world of the Norse gods that came before the age of Christendom. The mythology of 
the Germanic people, as a result, is depicted as the ‘roots’ of what would later be the 
collective Christian identity of the Occidental people. The FPÖ proclivity for the 
mythic and the Germanic even led Strache to reference the worship of the ancient 
Germanic gods directly. When pressed about the difference between religious 
freedoms in the West and Islamic countries, Strache stressed that in a free society 
everybody should be at liberty to choose who they want to worship, “entweder an 
Jesus Christus, oder an Wotan, den Germanengott.“701 The Germanic gods therefore 
live on in the FPÖ’s conception of myth and Heimat: a living narrative that embraces 
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the characteristics of Occidental Christendom as well as the archaism of mythical 
pagan roots.  
 The FPÖ’s Sagenbücher also uses myth and history to practice exclusion. 
Right-Wing populism typically employs a strategy of exclusionary politics, which is 
justified by criteria of belonging and territorial boundaries.702 Belonging, however, is 
not a concept confined to territorial boundaries, but also the cultural boundaries that 
nations represent. Exclusion can therefore also be demonstrated by a focus on 
‘strangers’ who are defined not only as foreign geographically, but also due to their 
cultural and historical incongruities with the native population. To demonstrate the 
distancing of Austrians and ‘Others’, and of Heimat and the foreignness of 
‘elsewhere’, the FPÖ turns to history as discourse.  
 The collective memories of the events surrounding the Ottoman sieges of 
Vienna in 1529 and 1683 (as well as the destruction of the unprotected countryside 
during these periods) still circulate in present day Austria.703 This fact is exploited by 
the FPÖ as a source with which to encourage anti-Turkish sentiment, seen for 
example in Sagen aus Österreich’s “Der Purbacher Türke”:  
 
 
Figure 60. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Österreich.704 	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The image clearly illustrates the ‘Other’ as Turks through their banners, and the attire 
of the army with scimitars and turbans appears to maintain chronological accuracy. 
However, it is through the speech bubbles that the reader is given more information 
about the excluded Turkish group. The army are referred to as the Islamisten, which is 
a popular phrase in Right-Wing populist nomenclature used to imply distance 
between the native population and the culturally foreign (and usually criminal) 
Islamic group. It also suggests a level of danger, as the Islamisten are depicted as a 
menacing foreign army that seeks to invade the village (and has, indeed, already 
conquered the countryside). The second speech bubble, which warns the reader that 
this ‘Ostbanden’ will return in a few hundred years over an open border, finally 
demonstrates that this army is not only an army of history. The Islamisten, rather, are 
the waves of immigrants arriving in Austria from Islamic lands through Turkey. In 
Sagen aus Wien’s “Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683”, the Turkish sultan 
also threatens the Austrians with a dire warning for the future: 
 
 
Figure 61. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Wien.705 
 
The Sultan’s proclamation that if he is not successful in 1683 his descendants will 
have to join the European Union demonstrates a blending of the past with the present 
by insinuating that Turkey’s admission to the European Union (and therefore gaining 
freedom of movement there) will result in a Muslim invasion of the continent.  	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 The first ‘Other’ in the FPÖ’s Sagenbücher, therefore, is not the Ottoman 
army of 1529 or 1683. Rather the Islamisten are a modern Muslim group who seek to 
enter Austria as either migrants or refugees. The initial face of the ‘Other’ is an 
Islamic group that (currently) resides outside the Heimat and community – but is a 
group that seeks to break in. Their presence in Austria is compared to an invading 
army in order to create a symbiosis between an ancient foreign threat, and a modern 
immigration crisis. This immigration crisis is depicted in such a way as to 
demonstrate an invasion, with the FPÖ implicitly suggesting that Muslim migrants 
(whether refugees or otherwise) are a threat to Europeans presumably due to their 
Islamic terrorist or extremist agenda.  
 The Right-Wing populist definition of the ‘Other’ as a dangerous Islamic 
invader is further justified by illustrating Muslims as usurpers. This narrative is 
usually underpinned by an argument that Muslim migrants aspire to enter Europe in 
order to take over the continent, and through a process of Islamisation impose Sharia 
law over all Europeans. The FPÖ depicts this ‘Other’ as the Islamic usurper in Sagen 
aus Wien’s “Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683”: 
 
 
Figure 62. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Wien.706 
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The FPÖ discursively constructs the image of the Turkish usurper by reminding its 
readers that Muslims had once before sought to convert Vienna, and will do so if 
given the chance again. This theme in the Sagenbuch relates directly to official 
Freedom Party platforms, in which the party argues that radical Islamists are 
influencing and largely controlling the opinions of Muslim migrants in Europe, and 
that the religion of Islam dictates political domination and violence. 707 In this 
discourse, the Turkish minority in Austria and those seeking to enter as migrants are 
both examples of the ‘Other’. Thus the ‘Other’, or ‘Turk’, is depicted as a group that 
resides both within and without of the national borders. The distancing of ‘us’ and 
‘them’ in the FPÖ narrative also allows the party to imply that Turkish minorities, 
while citizens perhaps, are never truly Austrian – and this ‘fact’ is dictated by history.  
 The final attribute of the Turkish ‘Other’ is the imminent threat of violence. In 
Right-Wing populist immigration rhetoric, the native people (who, as we have seen, 
are usually a community defined as Occidental or Christian) must defend themselves 
from a dangerous external group.708 The radical Right usually illustrate the ‘Other’ as 
immigrant groups that are a threat to national identity, but also, through general 
violent acts, are argued to be the major cause of criminality and social upheaval.709 In 
their political programme, for example, the FPÖ indicates that security is a risk 
because of the growing problem with illegal immigration and 
“Ausländerkriminalität”:  
 
Von den insgesamt im Jahre 2012 ermittelten 259.923 tatverdächtigen 
Personen waren 84.103 nicht im Besitz der österreichischen 
Staatsbürgerschaft. Von den ermittelten 84.103 tatverdächti- gen Fremden 
waren 8.481 Asylwerber.710 
 
In “Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683” the FPÖ uses art and history to 
emphasise their point of an alleged link between the Turkish ‘Other’, violence, and 
criminality: 	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Figure 63. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Wien.711 
 
The image depicts the alleged Turkish depravity and violence during the events of 
1683, however it is not without contemporary relevance. The ambition behind such 
narratives is to encourage anti-Turkish sentiment against the modern day minority. 
The ‘intimidation’ the populace felt in 1683 is, according to the FPÖ’s argument, 
comparable to a native population that feels ‘besieged’ by the criminality of 
minorities within their own Heimat. This ‘clash of civilisations’ discourse therefore 
depicts Austrians as civilised, while antagonising immigrants as barbarous philistines. 
The enslavement of the children has a particularly strong effect here, almost 
dehumanizing the Turkish ‘Other’ beyond all possible redemption. This theme of the 
‘Other’ as uncivilised barbarians is seen in another illustration from “Die zweite 
Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683”: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
711 FPÖ Wien, 12. 
	   233	  
 
 
Figure 64. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Wien. 
 
The FPÖ’s example of a malevolent horde of Asiatic warriors is a visual strategy to 
play on a special populist brand of fear-based politics. The foreign Turks (immigrants 
or refugees) represent instability, strife, and violence, and are thus a personification of 
the very anti-thesis of the safe, nurturing, and predictable populist definition of the 
Heimat concept.  
 The ‘Other’ as the violent Muslim usurper, therefore, is a direct attempt to stir 
up Islamophobia in Austria, as well as demonstrate the incompatibility of Islam with 
traditional definitions of Heimat. Islamophobia is defined as harmful and 
discriminatory phenomena that is directed against Muslims by non-Muslims (and thus 
slightly different to generalised xenophobia), and is usually exhibited by nations and 
cultures that have a “prehistory” of or “historical context” for aversions to Islam.712 In 
the Sagenbücher, the FPÖ reminds the readers of such a historical context. In their 
narrative, all Muslims are extremists and capable of terrorism, indicated by the scenes 
of beheading in the FPÖ’s illustration. In the FPÖ’s political programme, there is a 
warning about the violent nature of Islam. The FPÖ argues Islam views the world as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
712 Allen, Christopher. "Was ist Islamophobia? Ein evolutionärer Zeitstrahl." Der Islam in 
Europa: Zwischen Weltpolitik und Alltag. Eds. Altermatt, Urs, Mariano Delgado and Guido 
Vergauwen. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2006. 67 - 78. Print. 68 & 76. 
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“Kriegschauplatz” wherever the populace is not Islamic.713 To further reinforce this 
argument, the FPÖ cites some of the principles of Islamic Jihad against the 
‘Ungäubige’ directly from the Koran: 
 
Siehe etwa Sure Al-Baqara 2,191: „Tötet sie, wo ihr sie findet“, At-Tauba 
9,29: „Kämpft mit Waffen gegen diejenigen, die nicht an Allah glauben, noch 
an den jüngsten Tag glauben, und die nicht für verboten erklären, was Allah 
und sein Gesandter Mohammed für verboten erklärt haben, und die sich nicht 
nach der rechten Religion [dem Islam] richten - von denen, die die Schrift 
erhalten haben [d. h. Juden und Christen] - kämpft mit der Waffe gegen diese, 
bis sie die Minderheitensteuer abgeben als Erniedrigte!“)714 
 
Through this argument Islam is described as an agitator: a dangerous ‘Other’ that is at 
war with the Christian West, and is therefore not only a threat to the native Austrian 
populace but also to their very definition of Heimat informed by the principles of 
secularism, Christianity, Germanic identity, religious freedoms and so forth. The 
illustrations of Austria engaged in battle with an evil foe in the Sagenbuch encourages 
further antagonism between Christianity (nativism) and Islam (Otherness), which 
results in a symbolic depiction of a friend (Austrians, Christians, and Europeans) 
versus enemy (Turks, Islam) diagram. All of these combative dichotomies occasion, 
of course, an influence over perceptions of who belongs in Austria as Heimat, and 
who is an enemy of that imaginary. 
 The final ‘Other’ in the FPÖ’s Sagenbücher is what this thesis classifies as the 
‘Facilitator’. This designation is reserved for the political establishment (the political 
Left and their supporters in particular), who the FPÖ accuses of actively expediting 
the downfall of Heimat through their advocacy for immigration, acceptance of radical 
Islam, and a general rejection of core ‘Austrian’ values. These accusations have been 
seen particularly under the leadership of Strache, who typically claims that the 
Viennese mayor Michael Häupl and other Left-wing politicians have purposely 
abstained from implementing any measures to combat Islamic extremism in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
713 FPÖ Handbuch 2013, 53. 
714 FPÖ Handbuch 2013, 53. 
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Austria. 715  The political Left and the corrupted establishment is therefore the 
treacherous ‘Other’ in the FPÖ narrative. While they are seriously anathema to 
Heimat and Austrian identity, they nonetheless reside within the borders of the nation. 
Their ability to influence governance and society within Austria is the primary 
example of why they are dangerous. This is seen for example in ““Die zweite 
Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683”: 
 
 
Figure 65. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Wien.716 
 
Here the FPÖ introduces the ‘great betrayal narrative’ that is typical of the party’s 
‘Facilitator’ topos. In the illustration Häupl is derogatorily portrayed through his 
decidedly opulent clothing. This is typical of Austria’s Right-Wing populist tendency 
to depict the political establishment and corrupt, ‘out of touch’, or a ‘gang of fat 
cats’.717 The fact that Häupl is a ‘cosmopolitan’ and not a ‘racist’ is contrasted with 
the defenders of the city – the local Viennese – who are described by Häupl as 
‘teppetan’ due to their willingness to defend their Heimat. Similar arguments are put 	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716 FPÖ Wien, 10. 
717 Wodak Embattled Vienna, 246. 
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forward by the FPÖ in Sagen aus Österreich’s “Die übergossene Alm am 
Hochkönig”, in which the political establishment (as well as the European Union) are 
seen to be celebrating their luxury with Lexus cars and caviar, while the common folk 
suffer in increasing poverty.718 The antagonistic manner by which the establishment 
laud their wealth at the expense of the common population is an example of their 
betrayal of Heimat in the FPÖ’s narrative.  
 The other visually ‘foreign’ character in the Sagenbücher is also a member of 
the Left-Wing movement, shown in Sagen aus Wien’s “Das Basiliskenhaus”: 
 
 
Figure 66. 
Image taken from Sagen aus Wien.719 
 
In the FPÖ’s saga the mythological Basilisk symbolises the alliance of the SPÖ and 
the Greens, and the stench it omits is an indication of the supposed general poor 
hygiene of Left-Wing supporters. Bad health, hygiene, and physical appearance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
718 FPÖ Österreich, 10.  
719 FPÖ Wien, 25. 
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characterises the Antifa720 youth in the illustration, who the Viennese look at with 
shock and disgust. The youth’s complexion is dark, perhaps of North African or 
Middle Eastern extraction. Elsewhere in the Sagenbücher, the Red-Green alliance is 
personified as a fraudulent ‘Other’ disguised as a Teufel in red clothing, who with 
false promises attempts to deceive and entrap the Austrian population.721 Thus the 
‘Other’ is typified in the FPÖ’s Sagenbücher as either foreign (and dangerous) or 
politically subversive to the concept of Heimat (characterised by their support for 
immigrants). The ‘Other’ is always distanced from the native Viennese, and is never 
at home in the surroundings.  
 The myths of the Sagenbücher are therefore not a simple discussion of 
Austrian antiquity, but a fictionalisation of the past that is used by the FPÖ to justify a 
Right-Wing populist narrative of exclusivity and exclusion. Myth and history, as a 
result, are features in a broader FPÖ Heimatrhetorik that defines the homeland as a 
friendly place accessible to certain demographics (Christians, Far Right, those of 
German cultural extraction, and those who conform to European values), as well as a 
fortress that must be impregnable to those that allegedly do not belong (Muslims and 
their facilitators who have betrayed Austria). 
 
4.9 - Conclusion  
Austrian history is long and complex, making the formation of national identity and 
Heimat conceptions difficult. It is very difficult to formulate one distinct past that can 
be applied collectively for all people. Austria existed in before the age of nationalism, 
it was the home to rulers of a great empire, faced defeat in World War 1, and suffered 
the abdication of a king. It has seen the rise of National Socialism and Anschluss, 
through to the re-emergence of democratic values during the Second Republic. 
Collective memories about Austria’s past are therefore difficult to quantify as a 
unanimous contemporary national self. It is difficult to connect the modern, smaller 
Second Republic with the vastness of the Habsburg Empire, just as it is equally 
unsuitable to imagine Austria as part of a greater German Reich. The question of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
720 A generic term for anti-fascist groups that are usually compelled by an ideology of 
socialism or anarchism. For example see “Was Sie schon immer über die Antifaschistische 
Aktion/Bundesweite Organisation wissen wollten.” Antifaschistische Aktion Bundesweite 
Organisation. N.p., n.d. Web. 2 Aug. 2014.  
721 For example see FPÖ Wien, 50, and FPÖ Österreich, 22 – 23. 
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whether Austria can be truly European without also being ‘German’, in particular, 
continues to create further conjecture. In light of the ambivalence surrounding 
Austrian identity from a historical context, the FPÖ have identified firm ground with 
which to advance their amended Austrian identity position. While the intellectual 
battle between the Austrian and German perspectives of Austrian national identity 
endures, the FPÖ has identified the political efficacy of embracing both arguments. 
 The Austrian Right-Wing populists remain true to their pan-German political 
origins by emphasising that their definition of Austrian history, culture, and therefore 
Heimat is German. However, designating Austria as a ‘Teil’ of the German 
‘Kulturgemeinschaft’ and ‘Geschichte’ allows the members of the FPÖ room with 
which to manipulate the concept of Heimat. By embracing a version of history that is 
distinctly Austrian (as seen, for example, in the Sagenbücher) alongside historical 
origins and group classification that are informed by German features, the FPÖ 
encourages a type of Heimat patriotism that embraces the exclusivity of Austrian 
identity, as well as its notable contribution to a broader German community that 
transcends conventional political borders. History, then, is just as important as any 
other feature in the FPÖ’s use of Heimat, as it conjures a central identity narrative that 
is supposedly ancient, unbroken, continuous, and, most importantly, maintains a 
purity of essence that is reflected in contemporary society. 
 The use of mythology to enhance the Heimat concept is by no means unique 
to the FPÖ. However the adoption of myths into the party’s Heimatrhetorik does 
demonstrate the politicisation and fictionalisation of the past to suit Right-Wing 
populist political discourse. The FPÖ uses Austria’s history and legends encapsulated 
in a mythic form to address the questions of similarity and belonging - why Austrians 
should be a community, why they are alike, and from where they originate. The myths 
help the FPÖ to depict their version of Heimat as both a moral and physical universe, 
thereby establishing the centrality and uniqueness of Austrians and the Austrian place 
in the world. The FPÖ’s compendium of myths, therefore, is an example of 
ethnocentric worldview, because it outlines group solidarity by referring to allegedly 
exclusive worldviews, cultural distinctiveness and an aura of superiority over outside 
groups and their different cultural identities.722 The historic culture that is joined with 
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the FPÖ’s image of an ancestral Heimat demonstrates an example of ethnic nativism, 
and as a result Heimat is defined through the rediscovery of archaism and traditional 
communal identity.  
 It is an argument for continuity in history that permits the FPÖ to blend the 
past with the present. These two worlds combine in the FPÖ’s use of Heimat to 
construct an image of what it means to be Austrian. This paradigm of Austrianness is 
therefore contemporary relevant, while also being connected to the deepest antiquity. 
The living narrative in the FPÖ’s Sagenbücher implies that history is instructive, and 
that much of what came before can still happen today. Past glories, in other words, 
live on in the emotive sense of Heimat, as well as past dangers and past enemies. The 
continuity of history in the FPÖ’s concept of Heimat, above all else, indicates that 
contemporary Austrians are but one link in a very long and ancient chain, and it is 
therefore their responsibility to preserve that which came before for future 
generations. The members of the FPÖ ‘help’ their audience do this, by paying homage 
to the glorious deeds of Austria’s people in history. The purpose of this return to 
antiquity is to strengthen and restore ‘the people’ of Austria, and to preserve a ‘pure’ 
definition of Heimat. 
 The purity of the Heimat as is demonstrated in the Sagenbücher through the 
legacy of the righteous pantheon of heroes that represent it, to which with little 
modesty, Strache admits himself. Heroes allow communities to imagine their own 
Heldenzeitalter and transmit the finer qualities of these characters to themselves. The 
past teaches us who we are by providing examples of our ancestors and allowing us to 
attach ourselves as links in this ever-growing biographical chain. We therefore 
attempt to re-live the lives of our forebears as if we were directly related to their 
community by fate. The use of heroes is therefore a process of collective identity 
formation, which is controlled by historical continuity and guided by the Austrian 
populist Right. The virtues they wish to resurrect and extol as characteristic of their 
people are largely martial, as the legends focus primarily on enmity and strife 
between cultures and nations. The use of both Christian crusader and Germanic 
warrior archetypes in their Sagenbücher assists the FPÖ to reinforce this narrative, as 
well as to attract young male voters from the Far Right in particular, who typically 
identify with the virtues of machismo. Vienna’s long history of war with the East also 
allows for a special collective memory to permeate in the audience, as the FPÖ leads 
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the people back into their collective past in order to ‘rediscover’ their alleged 
enemies. 
 The myths, cultures, and Heimat in the Sagenbücher are sacred, unique, and 
valued because they are examples of ‘Our’ heritage. The identity and culture of the 
‘Other’, however, is either defective or hostile towards native Austrians. This 
oppositional schematic between friend and foreign, exclusion and inclusion, or ‘Us’ 
and ‘Them’, is adopted by the FPÖ as a strategy to marginalise Islam and disrupt 
cultural pluralism from developing in Austria. The ‘Other’ in the Sagenbücher is 
foreign and their customs are perceived as either hostile or perplexing. The 
‘Facilitator’, or the Left-Wing ‘Other’, is also distanced from the purity of the 
community due to their alleged betrayal and subservience to a political doctrine that 
would undermine the purity of Heimat. Both groups, Muslims and the political Left, 
are therefore denied a place in the FPÖ’s concept of Heimat, because the first is not 
historically ‘one of us’ and the latter has betrayed their people. According to the 
party’s thesis it is inconceivable that either group will ever be able to (re)assimilate 
based on their identity being formed from an alien set of historical experiences or a 
political doctrine that is argued to be poison for the survival of an autochthonous 
Austrian national identity.  
 The emotive power of the FPÖ’s Sagenbücher in the imagination of national 
identity demonstrates the widespread attachment to archaism and the supposed values 
preserved therein. There is therefore an element of nostalgia that is carefully exploited 
by the Austrian Right-Wing populists in order to pervasively disseminate their 
political messages. The success of the Sagenbücher indicates societies desire to revert 
to simpler modes of existence, to reconnect with the illusive golden age that is 
eternally just beyond our grasp. There is an overt desire to reconnect with the 
ancestors, to understand their lives, and to understand, most of all, from whence and 
from whom we are derived. The love of Heimat speaks to this nostalgic yearning, and 
lures its audience into a world that is imagined to be possessed, and yet may also be 
irretrievably lost to the chronicles of antiquity. History and myth in the FPÖ’s 
definition of Heimat functions as this desired well-spring of communal identity, in 
which descendants meet their forebears, re-live their ancestors’ lives, and finally 
reassociate themselves with their historical enemies. 
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Conclusion 
 
The preceding discussion has demonstrated the manner in which the FPÖ’s Heimat 
narrative reveals features of an Austrian national identity abstraction. At a time of 
great instability brought forth by the migratory flows of foreign ethnocultures into 
Europe, this research attempts to formulate answers to the rise of the cultural 
nationalism and ethnocentric populism endemic to the FPÖ’s ‘Heimat patriotism’. In 
particular, this thesis established that in response to the dislocation brought forth by 
an increasingly globalised world, the FPÖ attempts to diminish the existential divide 
between their definition of the Austrian social group and an identity of place that is 
informed by landscapes of cultural significance, linguistic affiliation, and 
ethnography. Through an examination of the discursively constructed identity that 
characterises the FPÖ’s use of Heimat, this thesis has shown that the concept of 
belonging can transcend the banality of a democratically formed citizenship. The 
sense of Heimat, rather, is shown to be a code word for the FPÖ and their supporters. 
As a mutually understood euphemism, Heimat is loaded with a set of ‘innate’ 
sensibilities and a knowledge base that informs an ethnocentric notion of the nation 
and the collective self in Austria. The FPÖ’s use of Heimat is characterised by this 
close proximity to the notion of a homogeneous nation and community. This thesis 
has therefore attempted to show that maintaining the ‘purity’ of Heimat in FPÖ 
discourse also means enforcing a restrictive definition of national identity. The 
exclusivity of Heimat confers upon those that belong there a feeling of superiority and 
uniqueness that nullifies the sense of anxiety and displacement experienced by many 
in modern Europe. It also, however, facilitates a political programme that promotes 
exclusion in order to ‘preserve’ traditionalism and purity within the national 
community the Heimat idea supposedly represents. 
 Chapter One demonstrated that Heimat refers to a concept of belonging and 
identity dating back centuries in the German-speaking world. It is an ambivalent term 
that describes a heterogeneous concept informed by a wide-arrange of contrasting 
opinions on what constitutes one’s homeland, how one identifies with it, belongs to it, 
and subsequently formulates a group identity with a strong association to place. The 
chapter cited the potent emotive power the concept of Heimat has over those that 
identify with it, as a love of one’s homeland coalesces with expressions of patriotism 
and the experience of pride. We saw that in order to comprehend the complexities of 
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Heimat, a thematic analysis is the most useful approach. A focus on the historico-
cultural framework from which the concept of Heimat developed was attempted in 
order to prove that although Heimat is as subjective as the perceptions of those who 
imagine it, there are certain features that form its catalyst and from which its varied 
interpretations are formulated. 
 Of the weft of interconnected features that combine to make Heimat, nature 
established the first. The idea of Heimat appears first as the physical landscape, as no 
homeland can exist without the topography and territory that distinguishes it. The 
Heimat concept then sweeps over the incomprehensible void of nature and transforms 
it into a landscape that has value and meaning to the group who claim ownership over 
it. The special landscapes that characterise the Heimat idea are relative to the group 
that imagine them. However it was shown that classical depictions of Heimat are 
usually constructed around forested, rural/agrarian, or mountain topographies. The 
‘naturalness’ of Heimat assisted in the ‘beautification’ of the nation abstraction, and 
demonstrated a special terrain that also symbolised the uniqueness of the community 
that is a part of it. Environmentalism and the preservation of nature thus became an 
integral part of the Heimat movement. Natural landscapes turned into the first feature 
of identity for Heimat enthusiasts, and a way that their homeland was distinguished 
from the rest of the world. 
 Beyond the dominion of nature, we have noted that during the nineteenth 
century the idea of Heimat also developed a political dimension. While Heimat tended 
to celebrate local landscapes and community identities, these regional worlds became 
interrelated microcosms in the greater macrocosm of the nation. Heimat therefore 
demonstrated the regional contribution to the nation, and the importance of local 
ethnography in the construction of broader national identity narratives. The love of 
one’s Heimat became a simultaneous love for one’s people and country, resulting in 
the use of Heimat to facilitate nationalistic tendencies. We saw that the propensity of 
the Heimat idea to encourage patriotism and nationalism on a state level made it an 
easily adapted concept in National Socialist ideology. In the Nazi narrative, Heimat 
became a euphemism for racial and cultural superiority. The homeland thus lost its 
autonomy and innocence, and the term Heimat was instead used to describe the 
biologically derived notions of state typical of National Socialism. The collapse of 
National Socialism and the retreat of pan-German ideas brought forth a new era of 
Heimat thought in Austria, that was shown to focus primarily on the uniqueness of 
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Austria alone. Here, Heimat’s usefulness in nation building was again demonstrated, 
however this time the narrative sought a large degree of distance from the cultural 
relationship the majority of Austrians share with their German neighbours. It is likely 
that this led to the great schism of opinion in the Austrian nation as to the origins and 
characteristics of their collective identity. While many claim a distinctly Austrian 
narrative that is divorced from German history, the Germanist perspective remains 
and it is from the fusion of these two arguments that the oscillatory pro-Austrian, pro-
German populist position has developed.   
 We have seen that the Heimat idea outlines concepts of group belonging and 
place identity on both a local and national level. From its etymological origins, 
through to its development as a concept during the nineteenth century, Heimat 
provides answers to the questions of place in the world. Chapter Two returns to 
nature, and presented the importance of natural landscapes in FPÖ Heimatrhetorik. 
The chapter began with a thorough description of the FPÖ’s environmental policies. 
As was demonstrated, the greening of Right-Wing populism is not new; rather it is 
formed out of the long-standing Far Right adoration of local nature. Nature 
preservation is central in Right-Wing (and Far Right) populism because of the 
believed symbiosis between man and nature. Rightist participants see nature as a 
formative element in both Heimat and identity. Far Right ideology usually calls for a 
communal ownership of place because of their belief that individual human groups 
have related territories that they empathise with. Austria’s populist Right, who believe 
that the landscapes of Austria define the national ‘In’ group, has also adopted this 
position. Borrowing from typical Heimat narratives, it was shown that the 
agrarian/rural, alpine, and forest landscapes dominate the FPÖ’s definition of Austria 
as Heimat. The Far Right tendency to use nature to exemplify virtues of their social 
group was an important aspect of this argument. Rural and agrarian settings are 
important to the Right-Wing populist parties because they epitomize a long standing 
relationship to the land, the hard-working ethics of the rural population, a natural 
mode of life, and a close-knit sense of community that is informed by an identity of 
place and a long biographical account of the cultural relationship to the local area 
from which it originates. This ‘salt of the earth’ narrative thus typifies the Heimat 
community in a traditional manner, and is a strong oppositional discourse to the 
cosmopolitan, faceless, and often multicultural or pluralistic image of larger cities. 
The alpine vistas used by the FPÖ to illustrate Heimat also bestow upon Austria and 
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the Austrian population a uniqueness that transcends other examples of Heimat. The 
Alps characterise Austrian communities as well the virtues of a strong people that are 
at home in the heights. Images of politicians like Strache ascending the tallest peak in 
Austria demonstrate his party (and ‘true’ Austrian people indirectly) as a group of 
powerful, athletic, and determined folk who are capable of overcoming great 
adversity. The forest as a feature of Heimat, however, lures the observer back into a 
more pan-Germanic world of forest mysticism: to the deep groves of the Teutoburg 
forest from which the original, pure Germanic tribes were first encountered. 
 The FPÖ’s use of natural landscapes to define Heimat was presented as 
significant because it bestows upon the Austrian people a sense of identity and 
uniqueness that encourages patriotism and nationalism. In a modern age where 
communities feel increasingly dislocated from their surroundings and from each 
other, the Heimat narrative reminds the members of the community that they possess 
a unique territory that binds them together and reveals their exclusive virtues as a 
social group. The desire to preserve landscapes as clean and intact, however, can also 
be used to justify organically or culturally derived notions of a human landscape, 
which, theoretically, must also be kept pure in order to maintain the ‘virtue’ and 
‘cleanliness’ of Heimat. 
 The strategies undertaken by the FPÖ to preserve the natural landscapes of 
Heimat were used as the premise to introduce Chapter Three. Chapter Three explored 
language as the first characteristic of the FPÖ’s human landscape of Heimat. It was 
shown that when all other characteristics are taken away, language endures as one of 
the primal contributors to a sense of Heimat. The preservation of language is a central 
principle of FPÖ doctrine. For Austria to be Heimat it was shown, it must sound 
Austrian. The chapter demonstrated that the FPÖ’s insistence on language as a 
formative feature of Heimat and national identity signified the prevalence of the 
German Kulturgemeinschaft in their discursive construct of a national self. This was 
shown to strategically ignore or dismiss Austria’s multilingual past, and is even in 
many cases hostile towards minorities with long established roots in Austria such as 
the Slovenes.  
 Although party programmes and activities such as the removal of bilingual 
signs illuminated this, it was the introduction of the FPÖ’s Sagenbücher and Der 
blaue Planet that made clear in the chapter the efficacy of language and Heimat to 
form a national identity and use it as the justification for exclusionary politics. The 
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FPÖ used the fictionalisation of current events to demonstrate two opposing realities 
in modern Europe. First, the national ‘In’ group was determined through their 
conformity with the norms of the German language and thus the German cultural 
group. Central to the Right-Wing populist thesis is the premise that when a social 
group maintain a purity of language they are also demonstrating the purity and 
endurance of the values the language supposedly represents. In this context preserving 
a national language is as much about safeguarding the identity of the autochthonous 
community as it is about maintaining linguistic norms. The FPÖ demonstrated this 
through the purity of language that was evident in the Heimat community in their 
Sagenbücher and their fictional Blue Planet. The distinctively Austrian example of 
Heimat was also provided through an exploration of dialect forms that typify the 
linguistic traditions of the various regions of the nation. By using dialect the FPÖ 
demonstrate that the party conforms to these traditions, and indeed seek to defend 
them as characteristic of Heimat and therefore national identity. The use of ethnolect, 
conversely, was shown to marginalise or reject ethnocultural minorities in Austria as 
well as prospective new migrants. The inability of foreign groups to speak German 
was seen to be an example of their unwillingness (or ineptitude) to conform to 
Austrian custom and identity. Migrants and foreigners as the ‘Other’ are therefore 
illustrated as hostile to native Austrians through their tendency to subvert or damage 
national identity and Heimat. These conclusions were validated by the FPÖ through a 
typical rhetoric of fear that encouragers Islamophobia and xenophobia as the natural 
responses shown by patriots who are willing to defend their homeland from hostile 
foreign groups. 
 Chapter Four examined the FPÖ’s strategy of evoking a sense of Heimat 
through references to native history and mythology. We saw that history has been a 
consistent feature in Heimat discourse, connecting people with their past in order to 
encourage group identity and self-awareness. Central to this thesis was the theory of 
collective memory, which differs from standardised historiography in that it facilitates 
a level of empathy from the subject who imagines his or her own past and therefore 
indirectly experiences it. This process allows history to become emotive for those that 
seek to connect with it, and can encourage a sense of self-worth based on the 
character and exploits of one’s forebears. The FPÖ employs this strategy of 
encouraging empathy between Austrians and their collective past. It was shown that 
history informs the party’ Heimat imaginary by referring to examples of Austria’s 
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membership of the German Kulturgemeinschaft. Although distinctly ‘Austrian’, the 
FPÖ’s understanding of national identity was thus also revealed to be an example of, 
and contributer to, the greater German cultural sphere.  
 The FPÖ’s Sagenbücher proved to be instrumental to the chapter, allowing for 
a deeper analysis than conventional political programmes allow. The use of 
mythologies in the formation of national identities was shown to be by no means new 
to Right-Wing populism. However mythology as a stylised and fictionalised form of 
political ‘art’ demonstrated its susceptibility to the manipulation of those that control 
the dissemination and meaning of myths. The Sagenbücher illustrated the past glories 
of Austria to the reader, and were argued to be an innovative attempt on behalf of the 
FPÖ to take advantage of the human tendency to exhibit a deep nostalgia for the past. 
The Sagenbücher, with its references to monumental victories over foreign threats as 
well as a less complicated, mythic time, addressed the human desire to revert to a 
golden age or a simpler, earlier lifestyle. In the current age of capitalism and 
bureaucracy, political squabbling, and the dissolution of traditional hierarchies of 
identity, it was shown that nostalgia for the past diminishes the modern conditions of 
estrangement, homelessness, or a lack of group solidarity. The FPÖ provides one such 
antidote for this perceived existential crisis endemic to Western nations. Their Heimat 
narrative, infused with a patriotic compendium of myths, tells Austrians that they 
belong to an ancient association of blood and culture, and this gives an otherwise 
precarious life the semblance of certainty and a fate driven purpose. It was shown that 
defining Heimat through historical features does not only make an anachronistic 
model of identity, rather an alliance of ‘our kind’ that has specific temporal and 
spatial boundaries. The link between the past and the present was made evident in this 
chapter by referencing the Sagenbücher’s tendency to associate the contemporary 
Austrian community with the described past events, thereby showing that all 
Austrians are but one link in a great biographical chain dating back thousands of 
years.  
 The idea of history as instructive, however, was also shown to be a method for 
stirring enmity between cultures and peoples through the marginalisation of those that 
do not identify with the FPÖ’s model of Austrian history. In particular, it was argued 
that the FPÖ selectively picked elements of history in order to create a world where 
the reader could be reacquainted with old enemies. The Turkish ethnocultural group 
and the religious followers of Islam, in particular, were demonstrated to be the 
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principle enemy in the FPÖ’s narrative. This was shown to be the negative dual 
assumption that results from focusing on the centrality and distinctiveness of one’s 
national group. The myths, values, customs, and identity of the Austrian group were 
shown by the FPÖ to be natural and correct; they had intrinsic value, beauty, and were 
in unison a demonstration of ‘our’ national heritage. The ‘Other’ was conversely 
defined through a hostile culture (Islam) that was void of any legitimate links to the 
concept of Heimat. The Turks were depicted as strangers that could not speak the 
language, with customs that were alien because they were derived from a historical 
narrative that was entirely divorced from the identity of place that is characteristic of 
the FPÖ’s use of Heimat. The chapter therefore attempted to demonstrate the 
prevalent ethnocultural features that typify the FPÖ’s definition Heimat, which 
through the paradigm of history marginalises foreign ethnocultures and seeks to deny 
them in a place in Austrian society. 
 The original purpose of this thesis was to attempt to demonstrate the 
underlying xenophobia and cultural chauvinism which I believed typified the FPÖ’s 
Heimatrhetorik. However, my belief was guided by assumptions that were based on a 
pre-existing bias surrounding the party’s ideological position. What I discovered is a 
pervasive, underlying issue that goes to the very core of the modern European social 
imaginary. The declining sense of community felt around the concepts of Heimat and 
nation, the faltering of traditional modes of identity formation due to their perceived 
unfashionable origins, and the dominance of a consumer culture that dictates how 
people identify with their new, material societies, have all created a ‘spacelessness ‘in 
which many people suffer from alienation, anxiety, and a lack of meaning or 
direction. The Austrian Right-Wing use of Heimat provides an image of community 
with which many Austrians can identify, and is thus offered as an existential antidote 
to the negative societal conditions that are suffered in the modern age. Their 
increasing political success, I argue, is due to the emotive power that resonates from 
the Heimat idea, and its tendency to provide the audience with satisfying feeling of 
belonging to a homeland and a group.  
 The dangers, however, become evident when one considers ‘group based’ 
politics alongside the current migrant and asylum seeker issues facing Austria and 
Europe. An aggressive group mentality, even if derived from valid justifications, has 
the propensity to encourage a politics of separatism and perhaps, at worst, societal 
violence. The refugee crisis brings anxiety around the future of ‘traditional’ Austrian 
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identity to the fore, and also allows for empathy among certain demographics for a 
political platform that consolidates ‘Us’ against ‘Them’. The FPÖ has taken the 
notion of Heimat and used it as their primary tool with which to question the validity 
of governmental bodies that support multiculturalism over native populations. 
Through their “Recht auf Heimat” mantra, the FPÖ question the collectivist idea that 
nations can import large numbers of foreign ethnicities and have no societal problems 
as a result. Heimat, therefore, is consumed into Right-Wing populist nomenclature in 
Austria, and is used to describe an imaginary cultural border that guards the 
existential frontier between the national ‘Us’ and the foreign ‘Them’. I conclude this 
thesis by questioning the justification of a single party claiming ownership over such 
an emotive, subjective, and heterogeneous concept as Heimat. Heimat is given value 
based on the manner by which he or she perceives it and formulates an affinity with it. 
Heimat’s purpose as a political tool that thematically constructs a discursive account 
of national identity should therefore be questioned on its merits.  
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